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The Correspondence(s) of Benjamin and Adorno

Jeremy Arnott

Abstract
This thesis develops the concept of “correspondence” as a means by which to read the work
of Benjamin and Adorno. The term will be taken to entail at once explicit correspondence, in
the sense of the letters written to each other (1928-1940), alongside the implicit constellations
structuring their relationship. Beginning with Benjamin’s early writings (-1924), I will trace
the development of Benjamin’s immanent method of criticism, followed by Adorno’s redirection (or appropriation) of this method towards his own Marxist concerns, and notions of
“critical theory.” This will be shown as a “translation” of Benjamin’s early work, in which
Adorno’s re-direction reveals a political capacity inherent in Benjamin’s (original) method.
Following this I present their respective readings of Kafka (Benjamin, 1934; Adorno 1954),
as a means by which to contrast their respective notions of messianism, politics, and
criticism. This will be presented as a moment of “dis-correspondence,” in which their
divergent notions of criticism, and messianism are in full repose; however, such a
disagreement will be shown to be underpinned by a shared understanding of the possibilities
inherent in tradition. Finally, Benjamin’s 1938-39 work on Baudelaire will be presented as
emblematic of his “dialectical image,” and historical methodology more generally. Adorno’s
infamous letters surrounding this piece will be analyzed, and he will be noted as an important
contributor to the development of Benjamin’s methodology, culminating in his own
“negative dialectic.” Each chapter presents an isolated argument related to a constellation of
particular texts, yet can also be seen in the larger mosaic of the development of
correspondence.
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“Is it so terrible if Benjamin from whom I have learned so much is supposed to have learned
something from me?”
- Adorno to Scholem, 1968

“With Adorno, too, the reciprocal interaction [with Benjamin] ought to be studied in both
directions, beginning with the seminar the young Privatdozent Adorno devoted to Benjamin’s
book on the German Trauerspiel in 1929 and extending to the works Adorno published after
the war in which the authority of Benjamin is often evoked.”
-Missac, Walter Benjamin’s Passages, 24.

““He who seeks to mediate between two bold thinkers,” [Nietzsche] writes in The Gay
Science, “stamps himself as mediocre: he has not the eyes to see uniqueness: to perceive
resemblances everywhere, making everything alike, is a sign of week eyesight.” The morality
of thought lies in a procedure that is neither entrenched nor detached, neither blind nor
empty, neither atomistic not consequential. The double-edged method which has earned
Hegel’s Phenomenology the reputation among reasonable people of unfathomable difficulty,
that is, its simultaneous demands that phenomena be allowed to speak as such—in a “pure
looking-on”—and yet that their relation to consciousness as the subject, reflection, be at
every moment maintained, expresses this morality most directly and in all its depth of
contradiction. But how much more difficult has it become to convince oneself of the identity
of subject and object, the ultimate assumption of which still enabled Hegel to conceal the
antagonistic demands of observation and interpretation. Nothing less is asked of the thinker
today than that he should be at every moment both within things and outside them…And
then the salaried philosophers come along and reproach us with having no definite point of
view.”
-Adorno, “On the Morality of Thinking,” Minima Moralia, 75
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Introductory Remarks
“One needs a peculiarly dispassionate and steady gaze to consider relationship. The more fleeting glance can
easily be mis-lead by analogy.”
-Benjamin, “Analogy and Relationship,” SW 1: 208.

Approaching Correspondents (Or, what is an encounter with the Idea)
To the Reader,
This project began as an attempt to interrogate the correspondence of Benjamin and Adorno
in the explicit sense of the letters the two wrote to each other from 1928-1940. I began with
their most famous exchange, the 1938-39 letters surrounding Benjamin’s “The Paris of the
Second Empire in Baudelaire,” which have gained a degree of infamy due to the perceived
harshness of Adorno’s tone. Such a beginning was perhaps due to my pre-established notion
of each as a thinker—of Adorno as a Marxist critical theorist, alongside Benjamin as an
esoteric critic—and I was guided by such conceptions to explicit moments of correspondence
(mostly dis-agreements). It soon became apparent that in order to understand this seemingly
isolated encounter I had to go further, into their respective texts and letters, and the
intertwined dynamics of their thought. In a sense I realized that focusing solely on
correspondence (in the sense of letters) hid a manifold of other affinities and relationships—
1

that it was a fetish of deeper “constellations,” that justified and underpinned what was said.
In interrogating correspondences, I found myself chasing constellations with no established
method by which to proceed. Hence, what will be proposed is an expanded notion of
“correspondence:” one that encapsulates both their explicit textual encounters, alongside the
manifold of constellations underpinning their thought. This method seeks at once to
understand each in their respective thought, while developing a new conception of
intellectual history—of thinking figures in correspondence—that is, of embracing the
manifold of constellations latent in every intellectual position. What will be demonstrated in

1

This notion will be elaborated throughout (Ch. 1), though can be defined provisionally here in the sense of
Benjamin’s “Epistemo-Critical Prologue” (Trauerspiel)— “Ideas are to objects as constellations are to stars”
(34). That is, the Idea arises immanently from the material it apprehends, and constructs relationships (in
language) between these material elements, demonstrating them as something larger than themselves. As
individual stars become more than themselves when constructed in constellation. When objects are seen in
different constellations they are endowed with a radically different sense—in this respect, viewing intellectual
development “in constellation” allows one to understand singular thinkers in the broader context of tradition
and history, and with respect to other thinkers. Benjamin will further note the Idea as “experienced;” that is,
beyond the “intentional” realms of standard (logical/deductive) philosophical contemplation.
ix

the following project is the possibility of such a conception—of understanding the practice of
thinking as a constellation of synchronic points, which cites elements from throughout
history, and is constantly capable of recombination. In employing such a method, one must
break with both a static view of authorship, and a linear view of intellectual history; a
destruction which opens the multifarious affinities inherent in every intellectual position. In
what follows, such a method will be developed, and justified as immanently arising from
Benjamin’s work. It will also be enacted in a performative sense: the manifold of affinities
and relationships described in this project are demonstrative of the possibility of thinking in
constellation—of embracing correspondence, and Ideas, as opposed to determinate
intellectual categories.
Benjamin described the Idea (or constellation) as “beyond intention:” that is beyond
the reach of concepts, or deductive intellectual understanding. The Idea is a philosophicalexperience [Erfahrung], the encounter one has when approaching a figure (or epoch)
immanently. This project attempts to embrace such experiences, a testament to Benjamin’s
late assertion: “In the fields with which we are concerned, knowledge comes only in
lightning flashes. The text is the long roll of thunder that follows it.” [N1,1]
I. A “Correspondence” Theory
In what follows the “correspondence(s)” of Benjamin and Adorno will be developed—this
term will be taken at once to mean explicit correspondence (in the sense of letters), alongside
the manifold of implicit affinities existing between elements of their thinking. Such a project
is meant to rectify that tendency within intellectual history which treats academic influence
as a “one-way street:” subsuming a manifold of kinships and constellations under a linear
narrative in which one thinker surpasses another, often times simply because of their
diachronic position. At least since Hegel (and possibly as far back as Plato) such a view has
been (philosophically) discredited in favour of a “dialectical” conception, in which truth
develops in a historical process, and each moment is thought as equally important in such an
2

un-folding. Despite such assertions, talk of refutation resounds louder than “sublation”

2

As Hegel writes, describing the dialectical process, as opposed to the vulgar view of “truth” and “falsity”:
“The more conventional opinion gets fixated on the antithesis of truth and falsity, the more it tends to expect a
given philosophical system to be either accepted or contradicted…It does not comprehend the diversity of
philosophical systems as the progressive un-folding of truth, but rather see in it simple disagreements. The bud
disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say that the former is refuted by the latter…yet at
x

[Aufhebung], and few have taken such imperatives seriously for the practice of intellectual
history.
3

With respect to Benjamin and Adorno: most studies on the former hardly mention
the latter, and if they do it is in the context of various disputes throughout the 1930s,
generally asserting that Adorno did not understand Benjamin’s ideas, or his historicalmaterial circumstances. Against such claims, Adorno will be asserted as a philosophically
important interlocutor for Benjamin, one who contributed directly to the development of this
4

thought, particularly in a more “systematic” direction. Likewise, from the Adorno camp
(and the “Frankfurt School” more generally), Benjamin is mentioned as an important early
interlocutor only to be surpassed by the more orthodox guidance of Horkheimer.

5

Against such conceptions, the early correspondence of the two will be shown to be
the philosophical (epistemic) “origin” of the Frankfurt School, via Adorno’s reformulation of
Benjamin’s immanent model of criticism towards his own conception of “critical theory”
(Ch.1). Primarily, this project will centre around the development of Benjamin’s dialectical
image —from its early formulations as the Idea (1914-26), to its instantiations in his late
work (1937-40)—asserting at once a continuity (contra “Marxist break”) in Benjamin’s
thinking, along with a persistent role played by Adorno in his development as a thinker. The
role of Brecht and Scholem (in Ch. 2), in the development of Benjamin’s thinking will also
be noted, specifically regarding his attempt to span the two poles of “theology” and

the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in which not only do they not conflict,
but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole.”
Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 2.
3
Most notably: Sam Weber’s, Benjamin’s –Abilities, and John McCole’s, Walter Benjamin and the Antinomies
of Tradition, Both present cohesive readings of Benjamin with little mention of the philosophical importance of
the Institute, or Adorno. More common are studies as Jennings’s Dialectical Images, or Wolin’s, An Aesthetic
of Redemption, which treat Adorno, though he is “contained” as an isolated incident. These issues of intellectual
reception will be dealt with more substantially in Ch. 1.
4
“Systematic” will not be taken in the orthodox sense of a philosophical, or metaphysical system (especially
given Adorno’s aversion to such forms), rather as reproducible, or “applicable”—as one “applies” “critical
theory” to a given text or phenomena. Adorno was one who developed Benjamin’s methods in such a way, into
his own “negative dialectic.” Adorno developed an applicable model of criticism which he applied to a diverse
range of phenomena, that is somewhat pre-supposed, hence betrays Benjamin’s commitment to immanence.
This will be developed in more detail in Ch. 1.
5
This is endemic to most studies of the Frankfurt School as a generalized, or homogenous entity, notably
Martin Jay’s, The Dialectical Imagination, and Rolf Wiggershaus’s, The Frankfurt School.
xi

“materialism” in his 1934 writings on Kafka. Once this has been demonstrated, Benjamin’s
conceptions of eschatology and criticism can be placed in contrast with Adorno’s so as to
demonstrate each in their respective singularity, and the growing divergence in their
conceptions of criticism. The final plateau (Ch. 3) of correspondence will explore Benjamin’s
late writings on Baudelaire (1938-39) as demonstrative of his dialectical image, alongside
Adorno’s now infamous response to the essay. Here the dialectical image will be justified as
a constellation of divergent elements from throughout Benjamin’s thought, alongside a
consistent role played by Adorno (as an interlocutor) in its development, a role which
culminated in the development of his own “negative dialectic.”
This project attempts to span two poles of its own: intellectual history and
philosophical exegesis, demonstrating the interlinked, or corresponding nature of each. The
notion of correspondence provides a way to think the two in an immanent sense: with respect
to their own work, each other, and the philosophical tradition—as active thinkers of import
for our present moment. Susan Buck-Morss’s work should be taken as path-breaking in this
respect, specifically her 1979 study, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, which demonstrates
the possibly of understanding intellectual relationships in both a historical and philosophical
6

sense, against the static notions of intellectual historicism. As Chapter 1 will demonstrate, it
is such a re-thinking of “origin” that allows experimentations such as the present study to
take place. In her foundational reading of Benjamin’s Arcades, The Dialectics of Seeing
(1989), Buck-Morss takes such methodologies further, illustrating the possibility of reading
Benjamin not along “quasi-dialectical” or linear developmental lines, but rather of reading
Benjamin’s thought in “constellation:” that is, as a mosaic of synchronic elements centering
7

on the development of the “dialectical image.” Such a method recognizes that Benjamin’s
thought did not develop chronologically—“as beads on a rosary”—but rather episodically,
synchronically, and in an often retroactive way, with early methodologies gaining a radically

6

This is seen decisively in method of the work, which presents an intellectual history of the development of the
Frankfurt School in a historical-biographical sense, alongside a synchronic history of the development of
“negative dialectics” via Adorno’s engagement with Benjamin, Horkheimer, and the philosophical tradition
more generally.
7
As she writes: “To the mind that would comprehend intellectual phenomena in terms of logical or
chronological development wherein one thing leads to another…his [Benjamin’s] work offers little satisfaction.
It is grounded, rather, on philosophical intuitions sparked by cognitive experiences reaching as far back as
childhood. These “develop” only in the sense that a photographic plate develops: time deepens definition and
contrast, but the imprint of the image has been there from the start.” (The Dialectics of Seeing, 7).
xii

8

new sense when employed in different contexts. Such a form of development accounts for
much of the terminological inconsistency and ambiguity throughout Benjamin’s work—one
cannot say his early Idea is overcome in the dialectical image (though each contains elements
of the other)— his thinking develops in constellations, and correspondences, blasting open
the continuum of linear intellectual history. Such a method is particularly useful in
approaching Benjamin, who throughout his life, sought to redefine the possibilities of
philosophy to include a broader range of experiences (both intellectual and otherwise).
Benjamin should be seen as the thinker who sought to maintain an openness to influence and
encounters, and to reflect such experiences on the level of thought—it is in this sense that he
should be considered a fundamentally immanent thinker, one who sought to collapse ridged
distinctions between life, correspondence, and work.
In the present study the notion of “correspondence” will be proposed as an immanent
method of reading both the life and work of Benjamin and Adorno: a notion that at once
arises from the work of Benjamin, and provides a means by which to re-think their
relationship, and perhaps intellectual encounters more generally. In a primary sense, the
correspondence of Benjamin and Adorno entails the letters the two wrote to each other from
1928-1940 on topics ranging from personal finances, to the dialectical method. However,
such encounters are underpinned by deeper affinities that are beyond the reach of a simple
comparative study, based on a shared experience of history and tradition. Put otherwise, one
cannot comprehend their explicit correspondences without a deeper understanding of their
implicit philosophical correspondences. Such deeper affinities will now be justified via a
reading of Benjamin’s early work on language.

i.

Language, Relationship, Correspondence

Following Cacciari, it can be argued that Benjamin’s thought centres on the persistent
question of (re)presentation [Darstellung]: the mode by which thought should relate itself to
9

language (or rather, express itself in language). From his early work onwards, Benjamin

8

Throughout this study the notion of “synchronic” (contra “diachronic”) will be taken to mean a notion of
intellectual history based on constellations, or correspondence(s). That is, one that forms affinities between
divergent moments in time (as in Benjamin’s historiographical model), hence is not based on a linear
(diachronic, historicist) notion of intellectual development.
9
See Cacciari, The Necessary Angel Ch. 3. Throughout this project Darstellung will be taken to mean
representation, presentation, and even performance. This is in reference to Benjamin’s imperative of philosophy
xiii

will assert “truth”[Wahrheit] as inextricably bound up with (re)presentation—it is not seized
by, but rather emerges from within language. In this sense, one could place a consistent
question over Benjamin’s work: an attempt to interrogate the relationship of (re)presentation
to criticism, history, experience, and thinking more generally. Hence the importance of
“style” throughout Benjamin’s work, and his continual interrogation of the writing of
philosophy—an imperative that the form in which thought is carried out is interlinked with
10

the method, and the practice of philosophy.

Many of Benjamin’s disputes with Adorno

centre on such questions of representation, with Adorno criticizing Benjamin’s employment
of surrealist montage, or Brechtian “alienation-effects” as stylistic choices. Adorno, instead,
upheld his own method, informed by the enlightenment practices of the Institute. In this way,
Adorno could be said to contribute to Benjamin’s thought by aiding in such questioning of
representation: their letters (and Benjamin’s letters more generally) can be read as, sights of
experimentation and interrogation, as to the proper form the practice of philosophy should
take. Or, put in Benjamin’s terms, how the Idea should best be rendered in language. Such
experimentations will be demonstrated as particularly important in the development of
Benjamin’s own reflections on the dialectical image. Further, it is because Benjamin and
Adorno’s relationship occurs in language that it is elevated above a mere intellectual
“similarity.”
In an early fragment, “Analogy and Relationship” (1920) Benjamin warns of the
danger of conflating superficial “analogy” with “relationship.” The former designates the
simple awareness of “similarity,” while the latter aims at a fundamental constellation of
essences: “Relationships are not established by similarity. Only where the latter shows itself
superior to analogy [“similarity”]—which ultimately must be shown everywhere—can it

as the (re)presentation of Ideas. For more on this see Jacobs, “Benjamin Topographically Speaking,” in
Theoretical Questions, 6.
10
As he writes in the Trauerspiel, “It is characteristic of philosophical writings that it must continually confront
the question of representation [Darstellung]” (28). He goes on to assert the treatise (prose form) as the mode by
which philosophy encounters “truth” (which is beyond intention), given that it places representation
[Darstellung] at the forefront. Further, as he writes in “Berlin Childhood around 1900,” describing the literary
text as an enfolded sock—as the “folding” of form and content: “It taught me that form and content, veil and
veiled, are the same. It led met to draw the truth from literature as warily as the child’s hand retrieved the sock
from ‘the pocket’” (SW 3: 374).
xiv

indicate relationship, which can be directly perceived only in feeling (neither in intuition, nor
11

in reason).”

While “analogy” bases comparison on a determinate judgement of categories

(causality), or on metaphoric relations; “relationship” aims at something higher. For
Benjamin this is “expressionless, non-sensuous similarity;” as a parent is related to the child,
not in a causal, or determinate sense, but directly in terms of an affinity. Such a relationship
is experienced (“in feeling”), and does not take place on the level of reason, or intuition. It is
such a “relationship” that is aimed at in the present study: one not based on causal, or
determinate categories, but on the implicit affinities, experiences, and correspondences
linking Benjamin and Adorno. Benjamin will elaborate this conception of relationship further
in his text “On the Doctrine of the Similar” (1933), writing:
It is now language which represents the medium in which objects meet and enter
into relationships with each other, no longer directly, as once in the mind of the
augur or the priest, but in their essences, in their most volatile and delicate
substance…in other words: it is to writing and language that clairvoyance has,
12
over the course of history, yielded its old powers.
Such a relationship of essences occurs in language—as a constellation—and it is language
that marks the “-ability”

13

of such relationships to be to be created across history, and

experimented with anew. The essay interrogates not only the ability of art works to relate
mimetically to the world they apprehend, but the general ability of the human to create and
perceive similarities; yet in order for such similarities to be termed as robust encounters they
must occur in language. That is, in order for them to be elevated above the mythical
similarity of nature, affinities must be presented in language as “relationships.”

11

Benjamin, “Analogy and Relationship” SW 1: 208. The fragment begins cryptically, as Benjamin admits that
“analogy” and “similarity” are conflated throughout. Elsewhere in the fragment, he defines “analogy” as a
“metaphoric similarity,” or a relationship based simply on what objects have “in common.” This is opposed to
“relationship” which is established “non-sensuously” through the conflation of essences—as the son’s
relationship to the father is not based on ‘similarity,” rather on a relationship of essence.
12
Benjamin, “Doctrine of the Similar,” SW 2: 697-8. This text was published (first) in the same year as “On the
Mimetic Faculty” (1933); the texts deal with the similar thematic of “mimesis,” though Benjamin may have
considered the later a “second draft” of the former. However, the relationship is more complex (especially given
the theme of mimesis), and should be considered a “re-writing,” as opposed to simple a second draft. See,
Anson Rabinbach “Introduction to Benjamin’s ‘Doctrine of the Similar’.”
13
For Samuel Weber, “-ability” [-barkeit] is of great import throughout Benjamin’s work, in that he is
concerned not so much with the content of specific translations, or critiques, but with the broader “ability” to
partake in such gestures. Weber grounds this by pointing to the persistence of concepts such as
“reproducibility,” “citability,” “translatability” and “criticizability” throughout Benjamin’s oeuvre. See
Benjamin’s –Abilities, Ch. 1-7.
xv

In the revised “On the Mimetic Faculty” (1933), Benjamin speaks of the world of
“resemblances” perceived by the child—a world of reconciliation in which words and things
are interchangeable. This world is also that of myth and nature, which produces mere
similarity: “the human gift of seeing resemblances is nothing other than a rudiment of the
14

powerful compulsion in former times to become and behave like something else.”

Despite

nature’s production of similarities, Benjamin insists that the human production of
resemblances has the ability to elevate and “awaken” mute nature—a movement away from
15

sensuous resemblances (nature), into the non-sensuous realm of language.

This relates back

to his early essay, “On Language as Such and the Language of Man” (1916), where he asserts
that humans have “fallen” into language; though in this fall they gain the additional ability to
produce relationships above mere similarity, and it is such possibilities (relationships,
constellations, correspondences), which allows history to progress beyond mere nature.
Because such relationships occur in language—unbound from the “mere similarity” of
nature—a new possibility of experimentation and construction is opened in the human
mimetic capacity; non-sensuous similarities contain within themselves the additional power
of re-arrangement (citation), or the re-inscription of meaning.

16

In his late work on Baudelaire (1938-39), Benjamin examines the means by which
Baudelaire’s poetry attempts to “awaken” the mute “second nature” of the 19th century—
creating “correspondances”— which attempt to rise above the mythologies of commodity
capitalism. What is essential is not so much the success or failure of such endowments, rather
the capacity, or “-ability,” of new experimentations and constellations. A tragic sort of hope
exists in Baudelaire’s poetic gestures, the ability to create affinities against the mere
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Benjamin, “On the Mimetic Faculty,” SW 2: 721.
The relationship between “sensuous” and “non-sensuous” similarity in Benjamin is extremely complex, and
deserves a more serious treatment than is afforded here. Benjamin will insist that all human speech, and
language, contain within them an element of the original world of reconciliation (before the “fall” into
language)—this is what he will call the originary power of “the name” (the Jewish tikkun). See “On Language
as Such” (1916). In both 1933 essays Benjamin asserts that even after the fall, language contains and “image”
[Bild] of this world of reconciled similarity—that language communicates itself, and a time of reconciliation.
An affinity is evident here with Wittgenstein and his “picture-theory of meaning,” and an extremely productive
study could interrogate this relationship.
16
In his “Epistemo-Critical Prologue” Benjamin will define the Idea (constellations) as such a possibility—that
because “non-sensuous” similarity occurs in language it possesses the ability to be destroyed or recombined and
experimented with. Because of this, criticism for Benjamin contains a substantial “destructive” moment—a
“burning of the husk” (33), or destruction of its external form—that is, as destruction of previous constellations,
and “non-sensuous” similarities, in the formation of new relationships.
xvi
15

similarity of mechanical reproduction. It is in language, and through language that such
relationships, correspondences, and experimentations are able to take place.
Evoking such a mimetic capacity, Fredric Jameson will assert Adorno’s relationship
to Benjamin as “liberation by mimesis:” “…as the practical demonstration of the possibility
of another kind of writing—which is to say another kind of thinking.”

17

Through the mimetic

capacity of language, one learns to play, while discovering the ability of (re)construction in
the present moment. In aiming at such relationships, what is allowed is not simply an
understanding of the similarities (or differences) between the two thinkers, but an attempt to
(re)present them in a way that allows experimentations to take place—that each contains with
them a manifold of constellations, which can be re-combined, endowing them with a
radically new sense. Thus they are thought not in the historicist sense of “once upon a time,”
as static figures, but in an active sense for our present moment. Describing Benjamin’s work
on Baudelaire (1938-39), Terry Eagleton describes this ability as “re-constellation,” that is
18

the ability for the past to always be re-combined, and experimented with.

The present study

takes such a model of language as its starting point, viewing Benjamin and Adorno in
“relationship,” as figures that can be constructively interrogated (or “re-constellated”).

ii.

On Method

At this point, it is useful to clarify the usage of several terms which will be employed
throughout this project, and also to describe of the way by which it will proceed more
generally. The notion of “correspondence” will be expanded to include the notion of
“constellation”—allowing for an expanded notion of intellectual history to be thought.
“Constellations” will be taken in the sense of Benjamin’s “Epistemo-Critical Prologue”
(Trauerspiel, 1925): as immanent assemblages of phenomena arranged under the Ideas (in
language). Through such linguistic assemblages, these material elements are elevated out of
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Jameson, Late Marxism, 52. Though his mention of Benjamin is brief, the work focusing mainly on Adorno,
what is essential is that Jameson does not think the relationship between the two in “historicist” terms, rather
elaborates the two in a mimetic constellation. For more on the role of mimesis in the work of Adorno and
Benjamin, see Nicholson, Exact Imagination, Late Work, Ch. 4 This relationship between mimesis, and
experimentation will be clarified in Ch. 2 through a reading of Brecht.
18
Eagleton, Walter Benjamin or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism, 119.
xvii

19

mere particularity, and are able to participate in the “genuine unity of truth” —that is, in a
broader philosophical conversation (or tradition). Thinking correspondence in this sense
allows thinkers such as Benjamin and Adorno to be approach immanently, thinking them not
as static figures, but rather as constellations of divergent entities that can be experimented
with and re-combined. Benjamin was not simply a thinker who lived from 1891-1940, but an
assemblage of correspondences and constellations with his contemporaries and thinkers
throughout history (as is Adorno).
Closely related to this is Benjamin’s later “dialectical image,” the development of
which will frame this project. Arising as the major methodological tool for his late work (The
Arcades (1927-40), Baudelaire (1938-39)), it will be shown as continuous with his early
formulation of the constellation, though applied to a greater range of phenomena (the 19th
20

century), and utilized against dominant historicist frameworks.

It will be taken as the

constellation of historical entities with the “time-of the now” [Jetzt-zeit], as the “flash” that
occurs when historical entities are recognized (or become “legible”) from the perspective of
the present moment (Ch. 3). This will be shown as a mode by which history can be re-written
(or re-constellated), from the present moment; and a method through which Benjamin and
Adorno can be re-thought from our perspective today. Hence what is proposed is a turning of
Benjamin’s methodology upon himself, Adorno, and intellectual relationships more
generally.
This project will proceed as a genealogy of the major episodes of the AdornoBenjamin correspondence from 1928-1940. These episodes will centre on the development of
Benjamin’s methodology (constellation to dialectical image): examining its unfolding in his
texts and correspondence, alongside Adorno’s various utilizations of it. Such developments
are by no means linear, and should be seen as synchronic with the main chronology of the
text. What will be argued is that Adorno formulates his own model of criticism (the negative
dialectic), based on Benjamin’s early writings, and concept of immanent criticism.
19

“Phenomena do not, however, enter into the realm of Ideas whole, in their crude empirical state, adultered by
appearances, but only in their basic elements, redeemed. They are divested of their false unity so that, thus
divided, they might partake in the genuine unity of truth.” Benjamin, Trauerspiel, 33.
20
Such a reading will go against the trend of asserting a Marxist “turn” in Benjamin (1933-34) following his
encounters with Brecht. As will be demonstrated, Benjamin does not break with his early method to embrace
Marxism, rather recognizes a possible affinity of Marxist concerns with his own early writings, seeking to apply
his methodology on a larger scale; that is to history and politics. For more on the relationship between
constellation and dialectical image see Jennings’s, Dialectical Images, particularly 164-65.
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Throughout their correspondence, Adorno will hold fast to many of these early distinctions,
presenting them as imperatives to Benjamin, who constantly sought to elaborate his thinking
in new directions in line with his program to establish an expanded notion of experience.
Many of their disputes can be said to arise from such divergent notions of method; or the fact
that Adorno held somewhat of a static methodology throughout his life, while Benjamin
constantly sought new outlets and applications for his. Due to this, Adorno’s objections to
Benjamin gain a consistency throughout their correspondence, as he constantly issued
imperatives from the perspective of his own early reading of Benjamin—in a sense citing
Benjamin against himself, forcing him to confront and come to terms with his own
intellectual development.
The notion of correspondence as constellation invites one to consider new modes by
which phenomena are able to be grouped, and different modes by which intellectual
relationships can be thought. The main senses in which the relationship between Adorno and
Benjamin will be thought in this study will be stated here for reference throughout:
1. As Constellation: this in the sense of Benjamin’s 1925 “Epistemo-Critical Prologue,”
in which Ideas are defined as constellations: as immanent groupings of phenomena
held together in language. Primarily, this refers to the sense discussed earlier of
thinking the two as constellations of divergent entities—that is, as assemblages of
experiences and interactions with each other and tradition. Related to the earlier
discussion of “similarity” and “relationship,” constellations are groupings of elements
not based on what one has “in common,” in fact Benjamin will assert them as the
21
contrast of the “unique and the extreme,” that is, of wildly divergent entities. This
will allow the two to be seen as correspondents of “difference:” that despite
fundamental disagreement on issues of aesthetics and politics, correspondence allows
them to be held together (in constellation) as interlocutors. This will become
particularly evident with regard to their respective readings of Kafka, and Adorno’s
disagreements with Benjamin over his Baudelaire study. Despite disagreement
(difference), the two are held together in correspondence—they continue a
22
relationship in an attempt to clarify their respective position. In a different sense,
constellations allow one to experiment with divergent combinations of phenomena,
21

As Benjamin writes: “The Idea is best explained as the representation of the context in which the unique and
extreme stands alongside in counterpart” (Trauerspiel, 35). This will be discussed as the phenomenon of
“origin” (Ch. 1), by which an entity “sets itself apart” (as unique) from other entities in the stream of tradition.
As Benjamin will write later in the “Prologue,” it is such “extreme” entities which oftentimes define a genre
most aptly—that difference is more apt for defining entities than similarity.
22
This is in stark contrast to Benjamin’s relationship with Scholem, in which there are times of dis-agreement
(1933-40) where the two ceased to write to each other (or wrote seldom). Though there are periods of the
cessation of correspondence between Adorno and Benjamin, during their most profound disagreements, the two
continue to write to each other—specifically following Benjamin’s 1935 Exposé, his 1936 essay on the “Work
of Art,” and his 1938-39 Baudelaire studies.
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hence their letters become a site of experimentation in which the two perform or act
out possible readings and interpretations.
2. As Translation: this sense arises from Benjamin’s 1923 “The Task of the Translator,”
which defines translation as a mediation between the way of meaning of two different
texts—as a creative interrogation of the “original” in the reproduction. Adorno
specifically, will translate many of Benjamin’s ideas into spheres beyond the reach of
Benjamin’s original intentions (music, sociology, philosophy), endowing the
“original” with a radically different sense. Adorno’s applications of Benjamin’s
method, specifically in the spheres of Marxism, will be shown to “awaken” Benjamin
to many of the capacities inhering in his work.
3. As Correspondance (Baudelaire): for Benjamin’s Baudelaire, correspondance is a
means by which to act poetically (allegorically) within the fallen world— creating
new associations—endowing “second nature” with radically different meanings.
Historically speaking, Benjamin and Adorno’s relationship emerged at a moment in
which such intellectual relationships became impossible—during the rise of Fascism,
and destruction of experience and the tradition inherent in it. Such relationships held
out hope for the possibility of reconciliation, of a time in which intellectual
encounters could un-fold without historical turmoil. As Benjamin wrote to Scholem
in 1939, “Every work we succeed in publishing now could be said to have been
23
wrested from the forces of darkness.” The same could be said of his letters to
Adorno—that such relationships held out hope that the world could be different.
These possible relations should not be seen as exhaustive, or mutually exclusive and the
reader is invited to forge his or her own “correspondences” between the two. What is
essential is the ability to read the two in correspondence, and to show them as constellations
which are re-citable in our present moment, and throughout history.
Historicist notions of intellectual history—alongside static views of authorship, or the
unified notion of a “school”—cover over the manifold of affinities present in every
intellectual position. Benjamin is at once in dialogue with Adorno, Plato, and the tradition
more generally, citing a diverse array of figures in constellation. By presenting Benjamin in
constellation with divergent thinkers, one is able to understand his thinking in a
fundamentally different sense; the same is true of Adorno, or any thinker for that matter. This
will be demonstrated as particularly relevant with respect to the “Frankfurt School,” allowing
it to be thought not as a past-event, but as a manifold of affinities which can be re-cited, or
fulfilled today. This project will proceed chronologically (1914-40), through episodes
centring on particular periods of time demarcated by particular texts; while recognizing that
23

BSC, 262. Adorno elaborates the utopian possibility contained within the letter: “Writing letters creates a
fiction of life within the medium of the frozen world” (234); and further “…for him the letter letter represented
the wedding of something in the process of disappearing and the utopia of its restoration.” (“Benjamin the
Letter Writer,” 236).
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Adorno and Benjamin’s thinking developed in constellation: that is, not in a linear sense, but
through the creation of diverse experimentations across history in a synchronic sense. Thus
oftentimes the true significance (or “truth content”) of their thinking is not realized until it is
placed in repose with elements of “pre” or “post” history, both with respect to their own
work, and in the larger sense of tradition.
***
The story is told that the two were introduced at the urging of Kracauer in 1923; speaking
retroactively, Adorno described “…Benjamin as one of the most significant human beings
that ever confronted me.”

24

Despite fleeting encounters throughout the decade, their explicit

(written) correspondence did not begin until 1928-29, specifically following the “Königstein
program” (1929): a meeting later described as “world-historical” where the two laid out a
program for a shared prima philosophy, based on many of the formulations in Benjamin’s
Trauerspiel study, which Adorno as a Privatdozent, had begun to teach in 1929. Despite the
prolific nature of their correspondence, the two met rarely throughout the 1930s, especially
25

following Hitler’s 1933 rise to power.

One could assert that their intellectual relationship

developed in spite of this lack of physical proximity; more likely, it is perhaps because of the
absence of physical proximity that their relationship developed in the way they did: both
understood the essential nature of their correspondence and sought to fan the spark of this
relationship through the medium of language. This is especially clear when one considers
Benjamin’s relationship with Brecht, with whom Benjamin spent large amounts of time
throughout the 1930s (often times summering at his home in Svenbørg, Denmark). However
their relationship was more of a “one-way street,” with Brecht exercising considerable
influence upon Benjamin’s materialism, with little evidence of this being a reciprocal
26

interaction.

24

Speaking to the idea of “relationship(s)” being defined in language: Benjamin

Adorno Erinnerungen (1964), 67. Quoted in Buck-Morss, Origin of Negative Dialectics, 6. At the time of
this meeting, Benjamin was 11 years senior to Adorno.
25
The two met most intensely between 1927-29 when Adorno frequented Berlin. Following Hitler’s rise to
power (1933), Adorno fled to London (1934), and onwards to New York in 1937-8 while Benjamin remained
predominantly in Paris (the two met there in 1936, and in San Remo in 1937). Their most important meetings
will be argued as the 1929 “Königstein Program,” alongside their 1937 conversations in San Remo due to the
intellectual “agreements” inaugurated in each.
26
Benjamin first met Brecht in 1929, as Scholem notes, though the two shared an affinity regarding the
possibility of theatre, Brecht seems to have influenced Benjamin more directly: “Brecht was of a harder nature
and seemed to have made a deeper impact upon the more sensitive Benjamin, who entirely lacked athletic
qualities.” The Story of a Friendship, 129. This is further demonstrated by the importance Benjamin placed on
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and Adorno’s relationship developed in the way it did because it had to occur in language—
that is in texts, and letters—producing philosophical encounters above mere “similarity.”
Because of this, the letter form itself became a site of experimentation where the two
elaborated and preserved daring theoretical formulations.
As Adorno correctly identified, Benjamin was a prolific letter writer,
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engaging in

non-monogamous correspondence (both implicit, and explicit) with a variety of figures, most
notably Brecht and Scholem (Ch. 2). Interestingly, Benjamin sought to keep his
correspondents compartmentalized, particularly Brecht, whose influence he would attempt to
hide, specifically from Adorno but also from Scholem.

28

Benjamin’s letters to Scholem

resound in a decidedly intimate tone, speaking of a friendship rooted in early intellectual
29

encounters and in the Jewish tradition.

His encounters with Brecht (to Adorno’s dismay)

centred around questions of Marxist politics, and the role of the critic (and artist) in the class
struggle, positions which in many ways clashed with his early writings. What then is the
specificity of Adorno as a correspondent? In one sense—though he did not join officially
until 1938—Adorno embodied many of the ideals of the Institute for Social Research, and
persistently mediated between Benjamin and figures such as Horkheimer and Pollock:
attempting to interest the Institute in Benjamin’s thinking, and Benjamin in the Institute’s
program of critical theory. This position as a mediator was afforded by the fact that Adorno
was interested in Benjamin’s thinking as such—beginning with his seminar in 1929 on
Benjamin’s Trauerspiel Adorno sought to apply and further Benjamin’s ideas—fully
endorsing Benjamin’s program to articulate a broader notion of experience along systematic

Brecht’s opinions regarding the topics (Kafka, Baudelaire), and political character of his work. Specifically see,
“Diary Entries” (1938) SW 3: 335-343. One could speculate that this relationship occurred the way it did
because it did not occur in letters, rather centred on physical interactions.
27
Speaking to Benjamin’s prolific correspondence, and “talent” for intellectual friendship, Adorno writes:
“Within himself and in his relationships with others he gave unreserved primacy to spirit, and this, rather than
immediacy, became his form of immediacy” (“Benjamin the Letter Writer,” 234).
28
This is particularly evident with the extremely Brechtian “Author as Producer” (1934), which Benjamin kept
from both Scholem and Adorno.
29
For Scholem’s elaboration of this intellectual friendship see Walter Benjamin, The Story of a Friendship,
which is particularly insightful with respect to Benjamin’s early writings (1916-1923), and the role played by
Scholem in the formulation of Benjamin’s early views on language (“On Language as Such” (1916) was
originally formulated as a letter to Scholem to resolve a dispute). As will be demonstrated in Ch. 2,
correspondence with Scholem was essential in developing Benjamin’s reading of Kafka (1933-34).
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lines (Ch. 1). Not only did Adorno praise the topics of Benjamin’s inquiries (Kraus, Kafka,
The Arcades), but he sought to comprehend and supplement Benjamin’s methodology:
specifically, his conception of immanent criticism, and his historiographical notions of the
dialectical image, notions that Adorno would develop into his own formulations of critical
theory, and the negative dialectic.
Despite this, their methodologies should by no means be conflated, as profound
differences will emerge between them throughout the 1930s; but such differences emerge in
stark response only because of the profound (and prolific) correspondence existing between
the two, because the two maintained their differences in language and correspondence. It has
become far too commonplace to emphasize the differences between the two, over what they
had in common—oftentimes presenting Adorno as a contrarian zealot, as opposed to one who
30

proposed a genuine reading of Benjamin’s work.

An aspect of this study will be the

destruction of such an image of Adorno: presenting him as a genuine reader of Benjamin’s
work, with consistent criticisms regarding what he felt to be the overemphasis on Brechtian
and surrealist categories in Benjamin’s writing. Further, he will be shown as an important
translator of many of Benjamin’s ideas, in that he experimented with them in contexts
differing from their original use, leading to his own Marxist notion of criticism, and forcing
Benjamin to consider the political implications of his own work. Adorno read Benjamin in an
active sense from the perspective of his own situation. He did not engage as a passive
receiver of tradition; rather, as Benjamin’s “storyteller,” he sought to experiment and further
Benjamin’s ideas in his present moment. Hence, it will be shown that Adorno was an ideal
reader of Benjamin, in that he took Benjamin’s imperatives of immanence and
experimentation seriously, and in doing so provides a model by which we might approach
past figures in our present.
Benjamin and Adorno’s letters, texts, and encounters, contain traces of events that
would later become “world-historical:” the rise of fascism, the crises of modernity, alongside
technological innovation. While these texts should not be reduced to a mere product of such
circumstances, such events should be seen as an integral part of their composition. Such a
30

This often entails pointing to the fact that Adorno maintained the formal pronoun “Sie” (contra “Du”) in his
letters to Benjamin; while Benjamin addressed Adorno more cordially (“Du;” “Dear Friends” (to Gretel and
Adorno)). However, such a superficial reading ignores the depth of the philosophical engagement the two
shared—and it is perhaps this personal distance that allowed such an engagement with Ideas.
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questioning of authorship’s relation to historical circumstances is integral to Benjamin’s
conception of criticism: namely the development of a constructive view of authorship, over
and against a “symbolic” (cultic, or reductive (historicist, materialist)) understanding of the
author’s role. In his 1924 “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” Benjamin takes aim at figures such
as Gundolf, whose biography (Goethe, 1916), resulted in the creation of a “mystical author
cult” around Goethe—presenting Goethe as an ideal and mythical figure, clouding over the
historical elements in Goethe’s text. Benjamin will level a similar criticism against Max
Brod’s presentation of Kafka as a “saintly figure” (Ch. 2), which masked the dissonant
elements of Kafka’s work within a uniform theological interpretation. Against this, Benjamin
will assert that “works like deeds are non-derivable:” that the task of criticism is not to
reduce or explain the work by history or myth, but rather to seek “the precise interplay” of
these aspects within the work (Ch. 1). Benjamin instead proposes a “constructive” view of
authorship which illuminates history from within the work, examining the historical traces
scattered throughout the text, and locating the work in the context of tradition (its “pre” and
“post” history)—the text is related not reduced to its material and authorial conditions. This
view can be supplemented by Adorno’s own—specifically his 1933 Kierkegaard and the
Construction of the Aesthetic, and his later Aesthetic Theory (1969)—where works of art are
analyzed as “ciphers” to their historical circumstance: the “truth content” of a work lies not
31

only in itself, but in its hieroglyphic relation to its own time and, tradition more broadly.

This project will commence by dispensing with such symbolic determinations of
authorship, attempting instead to develop images of these figures immanent to their lives and
texts. This involves the destruction of pre-conceived notions regarding Benjamin and
Adorno: that Adorno should not simply be seen as a contrarian who hated jazz, and was out
of touch with the concerns of the students; nor should Benjamin be seen simply as an esoteric
critic with little to offer in the service of politics. Further, this entails recognizing the
historical and personal circumstances the two found themselves in at the time of their
writing, without wholly reducing them to such determinations. Thinking the two in
correspondence allows such a constructive view of authorship to emerge, and the two to be
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In his 1933 Kierkegaard study Adorno will assert the “truth” of Kierkegaard to be not simply his affirmation
of subjectivity, or his poetic view of authorship, but his insistence on such tendencies as an aspect of the
broader crisis of idealism and its reversion to myth. The “un-intentional social truth” being these broader
historical and philosophical elements. Adorno’s view of the “truth” of a work will be elaborated in Ch. 1.
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thought in dynamic sense from the perspective of our time. These thinkers must be
recognized both within tradition, and in relation to each other, but not reduced to wholly to
any particular determination. As far as I can tell, no study has aimed to established a
constructive theory of the relation of the two to each other, to “set apart” Benjamin and
Adorno, not only with respect to tradition, but with respect to each other. The majority of
current interpretation with respect to these thinkers is based on pre-mature conflation, or
historicist over-determination. What is needed instead is a productive means to theorize their
intellectual relationship: one that does not assert them as wholly similar, or different, but
recognizes them as mutually intertwined—as a constellation of mutually determinate entities.
As Benjamin attempted to “set apart” tragedy from baroque Trauerspiel, recognizing that the
latter sees itself “in constellation” with the former, so too must Benjamin and Adorno be
comprehended in correspondence (constellation), so as to demonstrate each in their
singularity.
Despite this, such traditional interpretations cannot be dispensed with hastily and
must be worked through. As will be argued in Chapter 1, Benjamin’s model of criticism
asserts that an aspect of a work (at its “origin”) is fundamentally historical—thus the
importance of the interconnected dimensions of “pre” and “post history.” Works (and
commentaries) that follow the original resonate backwards in history, endowing the original
with new valences. Hence the reception (“post-history”) should be thought as relevant to the
original work, as it often times reveals (or develops) new senses not grasped by its
contemporaries. In this project, commentaries on Adorno and Benjamin will be read as
relevant elaborations of their original works, alongside the primary texts. Both thinkers come
to us in a tradition, and this tradition must be worked through and not simply dis-regarded, so
as to discern the relevant new senses given to the works through their reception.
Both thinkers provide a different means by which tradition (the past) can be thought
from the perspective of the present. From his early work, Benjamin sought to establish a
mode of criticism by which to unfold history immanently from within a work, while also
establishing tradition as a valuable means to preserve phenomena (and works) from
transience and decay. However, following his encounters with Brecht and surrealism,
Benjamin became interested in the potentials afforded by the “destructive character” of
technology, and the potentials inherent in the tabula rasa of the avant-garde. This dual
character of Benjamin’s relationship to tradition will be un-packed and explored throughout
xxv

this project. Adorno can be seen as a last defender of the bourgeois tradition against the
horrors of the 20th century, attempting to reconcile the negativity of the work of art with the
historical dissonance of the Shoah. Few have defended the autonomous art work as valiantly
as Adorno, and his work provides a means by which tradition can be employed as a means to
resist the fascism and conformity of capitalist social relations, while pointing the way to new
political possibilities. Simply because he lived longer than Benjamin (to 1969), Adorno
witnessed (and facilitated) the incorporation of Benjamin’s work into the tradition associated
with the Frankfurt School, while he also saw the bearing out of many of Benjamin’s
predictions regarding the dark-side of modernity.32 Elements of Benjamin’s thought can be
seen throughout Adorno’s major works (Aesthetic Theory, 1970; Negative Dialectics, 1966),
and this project will interrogate Adorno’s re-direction of Benjamin’s model of criticism
towards his own negative dialectic, inquiring as to whether this redirection or translation
foreclosed something of its original power.
Finally, it would be a mistake to draw a rigid distinction between explicit texts and
the “correspondence” surrounding them, as Benjamin and Adorno’s letters should be seen as
their most explicit theoretical justifications of their work. This is especially true of Benjamin,
who scorned forthright methodological statements, instead resorting to expressing his method
in presentation [Darstellung].
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The editors of the English editions of Benjamin’s Selected

Writings (Jennings et al.) are correct in their inclusion of many of Benjamin’s exchanges
with Adorno alongside his “original” texts. Often times Benjamin’s letters serve to clarify
aspects of his major works, yet should also be seen as philosophical texts themselves—as an
essential aspect of Benjamin’s project of thinking an expanded conception of philosophical
34

experience (Ch. 1).

For Benjamin, the letter form allowed for further experimentation, and

the “re-constellation” of ideas based on a shared philosophical relationship.
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Controversies surrounding Adorno’s reception of Benjamin will be dealt with in Ch. 1. Further, Adorno lived
to see the later development of many of the figures Benjamin treated in his work, most notably Kafka, who
Adorno saw surpassed by figures such as Beckett. Such receptions of Kafka will be dealt with in Ch. 2.
33
Following his writings on photography (“Little History of Photography” 1931), Benjamin will assert an
imperative to “stop saying, and start showing.” Much of his work can be defined as a meditation on such a
possibility of thinking in images, outside of conceptual determinations, continuing his persistent questioning of
the representation of the Idea.
34
One cannot draw a rigid distinction between finished texts, and letters or drafts with respect to Benjamin. In
fact, many of Benjamin’s texts began as letters, notably his 1916 “On Language as Such,” and important aspects
of his 1934 (and 1939) essay(s) on Kafka. Hence his letters and drafts (as The Arcades) should be considered
philosophically relevant in themselves.
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Adorno’s (often lengthy) criticisms and comments should be seen as fundamental to
the unfolding of Benjamin’s work, locating it both in context of tradition, and the framework
of Benjamin’s oeuvre.

35

Adorno will also be shown to persistently urge Benjamin to clarify

his writing in a more programmatic direction (often to the standards of the Institute), and
Benjamin will often speak of the validity of Adorno’s systematic assertions and his points of
36

criticism more generally.

Further, Benjamin will employ many of Adorno’s own ideas

throughout his own writings, most notably Adorno’s concept of the Intérieur (Kierkegaard,
1933) which would play a substantial role in his own Arcades project; along with Adorno’s
1937 reading of Wagner as phantasmagoria which would inform Benjamin’s understanding
of commodity fetishism. There is substantial evidence that Benjamin attempted to
incorporate Adorno’s objections and considerations into his own work, most notably the
presence of citations from Adorno’s works and letters amid “Convolute N” of The Arcades
([N5,2]; [N2, 7]), demonstrative that these (at the very least) resonated methodologically.
II. Outline of the Project
Each chapter of this project can be seen episodically on its own terms, as an essay presenting
a reading of a given constellation of texts, yet also as part of the broader mosaic developing
the notion of “correspondence.” The project “progresses” in two different senses: the first
exploring the relationship between the two thinkers historically, while the second examines
the “development” of their thinking through a myriad of constellations and affinities, many
of which are non-linear and retroactive. The chapters proceed chronologically, through the
development of Benjamin’s conception of criticism: from its early (1915-26) instantiations as
the Idea (constellation), to its later formulation, and historiographical application, as the
dialectical image (1937-40). His writings on Kafka (1934) will be noted as an important
“mid-point,” in which Benjamin experiments with his method along Brechtian and
theological lines. Underpinning this linear progression, a manifold of constellations will be
demonstrated as the true synchronic development of their thought. That is, their thinking
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In this sense they could be said to embody Benjamin’s own method of criticism, where-by critique
“completes” the work in “truth”; that is it justifies it in the context of history and tradition. See Benjamin, “On
the Concept of Criticism” (1919). The full valences of this will be un-packed in Ch. 1.
36
As will be shown, following Adorno’s critique of his 1934 essay on Kafka, and 1935 Arcades Exposé,
Benjamin will ascertain the validity of Adorno’s objections (specifically regarding the relationship between
myth and enlightenment), and redirect his preceding studies in a more explicitly historical (materialist) direction
(Ch. 2 & 3).
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develops in a non-linear and oft-times retroactive way, forming constellations with their own
works, and the philosophical tradition more generally. Though this project progresses in a
linear sense, Benjamin and Adorno’s thought should be thought as “developing” in the sense
of “…images which are imprinted by light on a photosensitive plane;” [N15a,1], that is, in
constellations where past elements become “legible” only through events that come after. In
what follows, each chapter will be outlined in more detail for reference throughout,
specifically in the sense that each relates to the concept of “correspondence.”
1) Correspondence and Critique: The “Origins” of Critical theory (1915-1933)
This chapter will locate Benjamin’s conception of immanence (and immanent critique) as the
philosophical “origin” of critical theory. Beginning with his understanding of an immanence
to history (influenced by the German Youth Movement), Benjamin’s model of immanent
critique will be developed up to its formulation as Idea in the “Epistemo-Critical Prologue”
of the Trauerspiel (1925). Of particular importance will be his early formulation of the “truth
content” and “material content” of a work, along with the intertwined practices of
“commentary” and “criticism” (“Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” 1921-22). These early
concerns will be noted as decidedly against concrete political projects, and seen rather as an
attempt to uphold the higher dignity of the Idea. Following this, Adorno’s early readings of
Benjamin will be analyzed, specifically his 1931 address “The Actuality of Philosophy.” This
text will be read as an early formulation of Adorno’s “negative dialectic,” a model which
seeks to employ Benjamin’s early model of criticism in a political (Marxist) direction.
Adorno moves Benjamin’s method further, demonstrating that his thinking could be
employed as a “historical image:” fusing it with insights from sociology, and employing it as
a means of ideological critique in the analysis of existing social relations. It is in this sense
that Benjamin’s theory of criticism is the hidden “origin” of many of the Frankfurt School’s
notions of critical theory. Adorno demonstrates such possibilities further in his 1933
Kierkegaard and the Construction of the Aesthetic, which provides a model of dialectical
analysis by which to read an individual work for “ciphers” of its historical conditions. In this
episode, correspondence can be thought in terms of “translation:” that Adorno’s reading (or
appropriation) of Benjamin’s method reveals an “-ability” inherent in the original work—the
possibility of its application in the services of materialist politics, a possibility Benjamin
himself began to explore in his 1931 writings and encounters with Brecht. This early
xxviii

encounter will be decisive throughout their correspondence, as Adorno holds fast to many of
the distinctions in Benjamin’s early model, specifically his reading of Benjamin’s distinction
between “commentary” and “criticism” which he will advocate for in correspondence
throughout the decade.
2) On Parables: Reading Kafka with Benjamin and Adorno (1934-39/1952)
In this chapter Adorno and Benjamin’s respective analyses of Kafka will be read to reveal
broader trajectories in their thinking, specifically in relation to Messianism, politics, and the
task of political critique. The chapter begins by developing Benjamin’s reading of Kafka as it
is presented in his 1934 text “Franz Kafka: on the 10th Anniversary of his Death:” a work
which combines Benjamin’s engagement with theology (Scholem), and the practical
materialism of Brecht. Benjamin utilizes theological categories as a means to open the
present moment as a space of political action. With respect to criticism: this will be argued as
a movement away from several of his early distinctions (“commentary,” “criticism”),
towards a more Brechtian model, and his later theory of the dialectical image. Hence
Benjamin’s reading of Kafka should be seen as an important juncture in his thought, as
Benjamin began to consider the potential historiographical and political implications his
theory could have. Following this, Adorno’s criticisms of Benjamin’s essay will be analyzed,
alongside his own 1952 essay on Kafka. It will be shown that Adorno reads Kafka in a
decidedly more Marxist direction, holding a more orthodox notion of Messianism, and the
task of criticism. It will also be shown that Adorno attempts to hold Benjamin to many of his
early distinctions (regarding “commentary” and “criticism”), while Benjamin is developing
beyond these. Many of these disputes will be shown to anticipate those surrounding The
Arcades, and Baudelaire. Though the two will be shown to be in “dis-correspondence” with
respect to theoretical formulations, such conceptions will be argued to be underpinned by a
common philosophical relationship—a shared understanding of the radical potentials
inherent in tradition. This essay also marks the influence of “other correspondents”
(specifically Brecht and Scholem) in the development of Benjamin’s dialectical image, as he
continued to think through his method of criticism.
3) “Correspondences of Modernity:” Adorno, Benjamin and the Dialectical (Materialist)
Method (1935-40)
xxix

This chapter deals with Benjamin’s 1938 essay “The Paris of the Second Empire in
Baudelaire” as exemplary of his late formulation of the dialectical image. It will be shown
that Benjamin uses Baudelaire as an immanent image by which to “read” the 19th century.
Following this, Benjamin’s historical model more generally will be elaborated through a
reading of The Arcades and his other late works (1937-40). Such a reading will proceed by
analysing Benjamin’s engagement with surrealist, and Marxist historiographical categories—
demonstrating his re-thinking of the “base/superstructure” binary along the lines of the
phantasmagoria. Along with this, Benjamin’s re-thinking of Marxist eschatology will be
demonstrated, as an essential temporal formulation for his dialectical image. Following these
exegeses, the dialectical image will be presented as a theoretical practice of “citation” which
utilizes the past to open the present as a site of possibility (“now-time”), allowing history to
become “legible” and “re-citeable” from the present moment. After Benjamin’s late method
has been demonstrated, Adorno’s objections will be analyzed and utilized to clarify aspects
of Benjamin’s methodology. This will also demonstrate a certain “dis-correspondence” of
Benjamin with respect to his own early method: though he continues to employ a method of
immanent critique, his mode of presentation has altered substantially. Adorno’s criticisms
will be demonstrated as consistent through a genealogy of their correspondence surrounding
Benjamin’s 1935 Arcades Exposé, and his 1936 “Work of Art in the Age of Technological
Reproducibility.” These objections also relate to Adorno’s own rootedness in Benjamin’s
early model of criticism, antinomies he attempted to rectify in his own negative dialectic.
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1. Correspondence and Critique: The “Origins” of Critical Theory
(Or “Critical Theory” and the Question of Immanence)

The Historical task is to disclose this immanent state of perfection and make it Absolute,
to make it visible and dominant in the present
-Benjamin, The Life of Students.
I have discussed the most recent history of philosophy, not for general intellectual history
orientation, but because only out of the historical entanglement of questions and answers
does the question of philosophy’s actuality emerge precisely. And that simply means,
after the failure of efforts for a grand and total philosophy: whether philosophy is itself at
all actual.
-Adorno, The Actuality of Philosophy.

2

Throughout the first half of 1969, Marcuse and Adorno engaged in a (now infamous) exchange
surrounding the Institute’s relationship with the German student movement, or rather the
relationship between the Institute’s notion of critical theory and contemporary exercises in
politics (praxis). Marcuse urged Adorno to endorse the student’s activities (and disruptions) as
1

a moment in which “…theory is pushed on further by praxis,” while Adorno held to an
autonomy of theory independent of such “revolutionary situations,” going so far as to assert
critical theory as opposed to such Leninist and Brechtian imperatives. For Adorno, theory (as
art) opposed exchange society by its mere existence, thus the exercise of thinking was in itself a
gesture of resistance against the current order of things. Given Adorno’s death in August of
1969, this tension was not resolved, and many of its echoes resound throughout contemporary
critical and social theory: should theory take its cue from contemporary social movements
(from praxis), or should it serve as the “autonomous faculty,” freed from practical imperatives?
Further, has critical theory itself become a form of traditional theory—as calls abound that
critique has “run out of steam” or become “cynical”— has the Frankfurt School itself become a
“jargon of authenticity,” an enlightened justification of what exists, out of touch with existing
concerns? Or was this un-timely character what made the “school” critical in the first place?
In 1972, amidst the release of the first volumes of Benjamin’s collected works,
Habermas was invited to give a lecture commemorating what would have been Benjamin’s 80th
birthday. The title of the lecture, “Walter Benjamin: Consciousness Raising or Rescuing
Critique,” alludes in part to the direction the address would take: after providing an extensive
gloss on Benjamin’s oeuvre, Habermas linked many of Benjamin’s early linguistic concerns to
his later “materialist conversion,” while arguing Benjamin’s concerns to be of a conservative
bent (a “rescuing critique”), against the “consciousness raising” critical theory of a figure like
Marcuse. Habermas’s reading went against many in the student movement (1968-69) who
attempted to apply Benjamin’s thinking to their own political paradigm, emphasizing the
Marxist dimension in his thinking; yet for Habermas, such political elements ultimately
collapsed under the weight of Benjamin’s esotericism. Latent in such a dismissal is Habermas’s
own “authentic” conception of critical thinking, one rooted in enlightenment rationalism, with
explicit imperatives for politics—a spirit found more in Horkheimer and Marcuse, than in

1

Marcuse to Adorno, “Correspondence on the German Student Movement,” 125.
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Adorno or Benjamin. For Habermas, esoteric thinkers such as Benjamin represented a betrayal
of critical theory’s originary spirit, and theory should return to its authentic origin in the
unfinished project of the enlightenment. Such episodes present the divergence of opinion
surrounding critical theory and its origins, and the antinomies one must contend with upon
return.
***
“The origin is the goal” –Karl Kraus

Where then to begin; or rather, how to return? Can one speak of a return to origins that is
not marred by such “jargons of authenticity,” what Adorno would later call a
“provincialism” of thinking? Does the category of “origin” itself act as a device of
domination, of the transcendental against the historical, or the settler against the refugee?
Likewise, can one speak of the “relevance” of a school of thought without invoking a
hasty understanding of one’s present moment? It is such questions that Robert HullotKentor broaches in his 1989 essay “Back to Adorno,” an attempt to re-kindle Adorno’s
legacy in the United States, and many of his reflections can be used as a guide for a
return to both Benjamin and Adorno. Following Adorno’s criticisms of “first
3

philosophies,” Hullot-Kentor asserts that the notion of “origin” must be cleaved from its
solid foundations and thought in a historical sense—following Kraus’s dictum, “origin” is
thought as active, as created and transferred by the “goal”—an “originary spirit” that is
located in constellation with the present moment. One does not summon the past in a
historicist sense—returning to the primordial archetype of “once upon a time”—rather
seizes upon the possibility, or unfinished spirit of the past: “The only legitimate “back to”
2

Habermas levels similar criticisms against Adorno, specifically what he feels to be Adorno’s “distortion”
of many of the enlightenment categories in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944); that Adorno supressed
Horkheimer, making the text a Nietzschean repudiation of reason. In a sense Habermas’s own project (of
communicative rationality) arises out of an attempt to rectify this distortion. See, “From Lukács to Adorno”
in The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, 339-403.
3
“The full scope of Adorno’s work can begin to be described as a study of the “origin” that is asserted in
the radical critique of origin” (Hullot-Kentor, Things Beyond Resemblance, 8). Such a method is seen in
Adorno’s persistent criticisms of “first” or “authentic”, philosophy’s specifically phenomenology: that they
failed to understand the objective dissolution of philosophy after Idealism, and claimed to return to an
authentic (“original”) givenness. For Adorno, if philosophy were to begin in any meaningful sense, it must
foreclose such originary gestures, understanding itself historically. Only in Art does Adorno hold that a
possible reconciliation with the world can occur— “Origin is the Goal, if anywhere, then in Art” (AS, 66).
That is, Art must come to understand itself historically via Aesthetics.
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is one that calls for a return to what was never reaching in the first place.” If one were to
attempt a return to critical theory, such a sojourn should not be guided by some
“authentic” beginning, nor by some “awareness” of the present moment, rather by an
attempt to capture something of it “originary spirit,” and what remains to be decided
therein. These reflections begin with the assertion of something un-finished at the
“origin” of critical theory; or rather, critical theory’s inability to understand its own
“origin” in the early writings of Benjamin, and their correspondence with Adorno’s early
5

work. At stake in this chapter, and perhaps in this project in general, is nothing less than
a radical re-thinking of the “origins” of the Frankfurt School and its notion of “critical
theory,” along the lines of correspondence, and constellation.
In what follows, a series of provocations and experimentations (constellations,
historical images) will be proposed, centered on the “origins” of critical theory. These
origins will be located in a dominant perspective of immanence (or immanent critique)
present in Benjamin’s early writings (up to 1926) and conception of criticism (II).
Following this, the “post-history” of these conceptions by way of Adorno will be
examined, noting the mode by which he metamorphoses Benjamin’s ideas towards his
own concepts of criticism, inaugurating a new tradition associated with the Frankfurt
School (III). Further, this perspective of immanence will be located as a framework that
allows tradition to be continually re-written, or experimented with from the perspective
of the present moment (I), hence has important imperatives for the practice of intellectual
history. It is such an “originary” epistemic position—that one is at the “midpoint” of
history—that allows critical theory to pose questions of its actuality in a dynamic way,
overcoming the polarities of “authenticity” and “relevance.”
Hence these considerations could be said to have a dual focus: at first to
demonstrate that what today is considered “critical theory” contains wizened elements of
Benjamin’s thought within itself (he serves as the “hunchback” who guarantees
4

Ibid. 23.
It should be noted that these considerations centre on the “philosophical” or epistemic origins of critical
theory; a similar origin could be located “sociologically” in the writings of Horkheimer (see “Tradition and
Critical Theory” (1932)). A study is warranted on the interconnected dimensions of the crisis of German
metaphysics, and the early 20th century turn to sociology in figures such as Simmel, and Weber—notably
their engagement with Neo-Kantianism.
5
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“historical materialism’s” perpetual victory (“Thesis I”) ); and in a broader sense, to rethink the question of “origins” along the lines proposed by Benjamin’s work, allowing
one to think a more expanded notion of intellectual history from the perspective of
immanence. Following this, the political application of Benjamin’s work can be
broached, specifically the mode by which Adorno applies the models of the Trauerspiel
in the services of “critique” of existing social relations and modes of thought, marking a
decided turn away from Benjamin’s engagement with antiquated works. Though this may
seem somewhat circular, it should be noted that the methodology employed immanently
arises from Benjamin’s analyses of origin—Benjamin’s work will be approached via the
methodology advocated in his early writings.
Heuristically, it will prove useful to define “immanence” (in Benjamin) at the
outset: as the rejection of any fixed philosophical starting point (ontology etc.), or any
transcendent(al) metaphysical realm. Instead it proposes groupings or “constellations” of
phenomena which arise immanently by way of hidden affinities. One should note the
active role the “subject” plays in the construction of such historical constellations, though
6

(as will be shown) this should not be conflated with “subjectivism” or “historicism,”
7

rather has more in common with the practice of “collecting:” an allegorical practice of
the critic who arranges tradition so as to reveal its hidden contours and affinities. In the
terms of idealism (specifically Hegel), such a conception rejects the possible
reconciliation of “reason” and “being” on the higher plane of history, and is haunted by a
generalized distrust of totality, and systems. Such a starting point will lead Benjamin to
radically re-think the notion of “truth,” and its relation to the work of art and criticism
more generally. Such a conception arose out of Benjamin’s immanent conception of
history, informed by his early metaphysical writings on the German Youth Movement (to
1915).

6

Benjamin’s allegorical immersion in the texts is described in the following quote, in which he advocates
an erasure of subjective traces from his work: “If I write better German than most writers of my generation,
it is thanks largely to twenty years” observance of one little rule: never use the word “I” except in letters.”
(“Berlin Chronicle,” Reflections, 15).
7
Pierre Missac notes the “gallery of types” in Benjamin’s work which could be immanently re-fashioned to
describe his method of criticism: “the collector,” “ragpicker,” “gambler,” all of which emphasize different
aspects of his thought. See “Homo Scriptor,” Walter Benjamin’s Passages, 42-81.
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From the perspective of “correspondence,” these early encounters will prove to be
decisive in both a philosophical and personal sense. Philosophically, they define a certain
direction of application that would resonate throughout the years to come: namely
Adorno’s application of Benjamin’s immanent model of criticism in arenas which
Benjamin did not consider (music, philosophy, sociology, Marxism), and because of this,
the articulation of this model in a more (philosophically) systematic direction. As will be
shown, Benjamin’s model for a “coming philosophy” was one which could articulate
ephemeral experience in a systematic direction, Adorno will be shown to be essential for
this latter pole. Regarding this specific encounter, Adorno’s early applications
demonstrate the possibility of the application of Benjamin’s method to concrete historical
objects in a critique of ideology, alongside an analysis of contemporary modes of thought
(phenomenology, Lebensphilosophie). Such an application was a definite influence on
Benjamin, and it was after these early engagements with Adorno that he too began to
broaden the scope of his analysis to contemporary social phenomena— “awakening” to
the political potentials inherent in his methodology. This is further exemplified in a
personal sense as the two met in October of 1929, in Königstein in the Taunus mountains,
8

for conversations that “brought [an] epoch to an end,” leading Benjamin to realize the
necessity of a materialist direction for The Arcades.
It was my conversations with you in Frankfurt, and particularly that
concerning “historical” matters in the little Swiss hut, and afterwards the
certain historical one at table with you, Asja, Felizitas and Horkheimer,
which brought that [Berlin] epoch to an end. There would henceforth be no
9
more rhapsodic naiveté.
The two seem to have agreed that an immanent conception of history (and critique),
informed by materialist imperatives, must be taken seriously against the “relativism” of
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Benjamin to Adorno, May 31, 1935, ABC, 87-91. This letter is decisive, as in it Benjamin describes the
various correspondents surrounding The Arcades (Brecht, Adorno et al.), describing the methodological
genesis of the work in the early 1930s.
9
The continuation of the quote, alluding to the retroactive definition of these events as historical: “…This
romantic form had been overtaken in a raccourci of development, but at the same time, and for some years
to come, I still had no idea of any other possible form…Then followed the decisive encounter with Brecht,
and with it the culmination of every aporia connected with this work, which even then I still refused to
relinquish.” (Benjamin, ABC, 88).
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historicism, hence Buck-Morss will define it as the “Königstein Program.”

10

These early

intellectual encounters will prove decisive throughout the following decades (Ch. 3), as
an event, they could be said to “become historical” given the relationship of
correspondence that would develop out of it (as “post-history”). However, as will be
shown, both thinkers understand this “original” agreement in a different sense—each
projecting a different origin, based on their interpretation of events, and the other’s
methodology. It could be said that correspondence in fact began in “dis-correspondence,”
or out of this minimal divergence held together by the projection of a shared “origin.”
I. The “Origins” of Critical Theory: Towards a Theory of Reception.
“Only he who can destroy can criticize.”
-Benjamin, One-Way St. (SW 1: 460)

When considering the “origins” of critical theory (Frankfurt School) intellectual histories
exhibit certain general tendencies, often times beginning as follows: beginning with Kant
(or Hegel), one traces the development of the concept of “critique” (its three Kantian
instantiations, and fourth Marxist one), as a (linear) dialectical movement culminating in
the “Frankfurt School” and its notion of “critical theory.” The enlightenment arrogance of
this view is self-evident—entailing a nonsensical view that thought develops in a linear
way (diachronically)—and further that such trajectories can be categorized into
11

recognizable “genres.” When one examines the “extremes”

of such genres, their

absurdity enters into further relief—the figures left out (Löwenthal, Kracauer,
Benjamin…) demonstrate these histories as tenuous, and as serving a present history (or
telos) of critical theory. This is seen most prominently in the figure of Benjamin, where it
has become common intellectual parlance (if he is treated at all), to present him as a
melancholy and mythical figure (Jay, Jameson, Arendt)—a Dionysian slip before one
adopts the sober enlightened (and communal) position of Adorno, Marcuse, or Habermas.
10

See, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, 53/ 23.
As Benjamin writes in the Trauerspiel: “The Idea is best explained as the representation of the context in
which the unique and the extreme stands alongside its counterpart.” (35). The animating “Idea” of the
Frankfurt School should perhaps be considered its “extreme” manifestations, rather than the conventional,
or orthodox members. This notion of the “extreme” or “exceptional case” can also be read as a coded
reference to Carl Schmitt’s “state of exception” (Political Theology, 1922), in which the decision regarding
the “exceptional case” defines the power of the sovereign as such. Benjamin was engaged with Schmitt at
this time, and the full valences of their relationship (specifically with regard to the Trauerspiel) has yet to
be un-packed.
11
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The reaction from the Benjamin camp is perhaps no better, where it is common to think
Adorno as a “derivative thinker”—one who appropriated his (immanent) method from
Benjamin, and was unwilling to return the favor in an intellectual or personal sense. Such
traditional historiographies cover over what Benjamin would later refer to as the
“…revolutionary moments in the occurrence of history” [N9a, 5], the dis-continuous, or
non-identical moments in which history can be thought in an active sense.
Three intellectual histories of the Frankfurt School are of particular note, the first
being Martin Jay’s pioneering The Dialectical Imagination (1973), a work which
solidified a dominant narrative of the school. Jay focuses particularly on the figure of
Horkheimer, alongside a more orthodox and consistent mode of critical theory, held
together by the unified notion of a “school.” Hence he glosses over the manifold of
discontinuities, and non-identical figures (Benjamin,

12

Kracauer, Adorno), treating them

as momentary lapses before an orthodox Marxist analysis was re-established. Further, Jay
treats the “birth” of the school as a set of particular historical actions on the part of
individuals (Felix Weil’s 1922 “Marxist study week”), and fails to locate it with respect
to larger historical and philosophical tendencies (the crisis of the Idealist tradition,
alongside Marxist movements in Germany). Rolf Wiggershaus’s, The Frankfurt School
(1986) does not move beyond Jay in a structural or theoretical sense, but simply via the
addition of newly accessible historical material (notably the Adorno-Kracauer
correspondence), and the treatment of a larger historical scope. In Wiggershaus, Adorno
and Benjamin are treated in a more substantial sense, though he too must contain “nonidentities” within a homogenous “school.” It is in Susan Buck-Morss’s 1979, The Origin
of Negative Dialectics that such historiographical practices are put into question. She
explicitly moves beyond Jay: having had access to Adorno’s early writings (specifically
his 1931 “Actuality of Philosophy”), she recognized the origin of Adorno’s project in
Benjamin’s conception of criticism. The study is essential in that it conceives the School
not as a fixed set of events, or as a homogenous entity, but as an intellectual and
12

Though Benjamin is broached in the study, it is only with respect to his “disputes” with Adorno and the
Institute; these however are not presented in equal terms, as Jay seems only interested in Benjamin as he
related to the Institute (Horkheimer). Thus Benjamin is presented as an irrational Brechtian who refused to
tow the party line. This is seen in Jay’s offhand dismissal of Benjamin’s dialectical image for the “more
stable” notion of critical theory (203). See The Dialectical Imagination, 197-212.
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philosophical encounter (between Benjamin and Adorno)—an event independent of
specific historical occurrences. With such a re-thinking of the concept of “origin,” she
provides the means by which the Frankfurt School can be seen as an immanent “setting
apart” from tradition, transmuting the intellectual spirit of Benjamin’s work into
intellectual history. Though she considers the role Benjamin played in the development
of Adorno’s negative dialectic, she fails to consider the role Adorno had in the
development of Benjamin intellectually, hence she covers over much of the potential
contained in this dynamic. The goal of this project could be set as the presentation of the
two in proper “correspondence” (or constellation).
Such receptions of Benjamin have become far too commonplace, to the extent
that a reactionary response against Adorno (and the Institute) has developed; chastising
not only their appropriations of Benjamin’s thought under the larger umbrella of “critical
theory,” but also implicitly asserting that their lack of support led to Benjamin’s death
(1940). Hannah Arendt (1968) accused Adorno of selectively editing Benjamin’s letters
(Briefe, 1966) and works (Illuminations/Reflections, 1955) along the lines of his own
thinking, and of deliberately failing to mention the dire state in which the Institute’s
13

funding left Benjamin.

Few came to Adorno’s defense, with the exception of Scholem,

to whom Adorno wrote the following: “Is it so terrible if Benjamin from whom I have
14

learned so much is supposed to have learnt something from me?”

In defending his

practices, Adorno broaches a more general truth in the history of Benjamin’s reception:
thinking him as a figure in correspondence. This will later be shown to be possible due to
Benjamin’s commitment to immanence, but Adorno’s statement alludes to a dynamic of
intellectual interaction, not reducible to simple “one-way streets” of intellectual
application or appropriation. Thinking a figure in correspondence, allows the manifold of
intellectual affinities and encounters to emerge, while not reducing him or her to any one
interaction—that one may correspond to many, influencing and being influenced, while
maintaining one’s fundamental difference.

13

See Arendt’s 12.10.1968 article in the New Yorker, “Walter Benjamin,” alongside her 1968 introduction
to Illuminations.
14
Adorno to Scholem, 1966, quoted in Muller-Doohm, Adorno: A Biography, 458.
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Alluding to such receptions of Benjamin’s oeuvre Pierre Missac locates two
dominant tendencies in Benjamin scholarship, which could be extended to treat dominant
tendencies in intellectual history more generally—the first, treating a figure as wholly
autonomous; the second, as a moment in a broader trajectory of thought:
While some critics attempt to get close to Benjamin’s oeuvre and run the
risk of falling into imitation or tautology through this sympathetic or
empathetic method, others, no doubt with the same intention of reaching
the truth of the oeuvre, place certain tools, intended to facilitate the
reading, between the work and their own gaze—magnifying lenses of
various kinds, perhaps, or tinted spectacles that will give the work a
dominant tonality.15
For Missac, such histories miss what he defines as the play of “distance and closeness”
(the aura) central to Benjamin’s work, which contains both systematic and a-systematic
elements, and is both indebted and autonomous with respect to tradition. Further, such
criticism covers over the immanent and “collaborative” (or correspondence) model of
criticism at the heart of Benjamin’s work—one must not impose, rather must
“collaborate” with the text and other elements of tradition.
Such diachronic histories miss the complex of affinities and correspondences
hidden within every intellectual position, that they contain at once both progressive and
regressive elements. One does not simply respond to one’s contemporaries, rather one
blasts open the continuum of history, creating immanent constellations with a disparate
array of thinkers (one is as much responding to Plato as to Žižek). Throughout
Benjamin’s work one encounters “secret agents” (Baudelaire, Kafka, Kraus), those who
testify against their own time with their un-timely meditations—those who have become
old or young too early. Such figures serve to warn that progress does not de facto entail
enlightenment, or an understanding or overcoming of what has come previously; rather
that the practice of philosophy is perpetually “blasting open the continuum of history.”
It is precisely this “blind spot” in intellectual history (and history more generally),
which Benjamin attempts to overcome in his rethinking of the category of “origin” in his
work on the baroque Trauerspiel. Tragedy (and historical categories in general), do not
15

Missac, Walter Benjamin’s Passages, 16.
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develop along teleological or transcendent(al) lines—rather, forms and categories are
immanently reconfigured in each era. Trauerspiel was not simply a re-assertion of
antiquated tragedy; rather it saw itself in constellation with the past, reconstructing
elements of thought in its own moment. Hence Benjamin insists that, “Origin [Ursprung]…has nothing in common with emergence [Entstehen,“beginnings”]…Origin
stands in the flow of becoming as a maelstrom that irresistibly draws the stuff of
16

emergence into its rhythm.”

Hence “origin” should be thought “historically,” as that

which re-inscribes itself anew in each era. This leads to his formulation of “Natural
17

history”

with the interconnected dimensions of “pre” and “post history.” Thinking

emergence as a “setting apart” from the stream of history, does not entail a total rupture,
rather the splitting of the work at the sight of “origin” giving it a fundamentally historical
dimension. The “post-history” (or reception) of a work becomes an aspect of the work
itself, the mode by which the work is “restored” in tradition:
“Origin” [Ur-sprung], although an entirely historical category, has
nevertheless nothing in common with emergence [Entstehen]. In Origin
what is meant is not the becoming of something that has sprung forth
[Entsprungenen], but rather that which springs forth out of coming-to-be
and passing-away. Origin stands in the flow of becoming as a maelstrom
[Strudel] that irresistibly draws the stuff of emergence into its rhythm. In the
bare manifestation of the factual the original is never discernable, and its
rhythm is accessible only to a dual insight. It is recognizable on the one
hand as restoration, as reinstatement, and precisely in this as on the other
18
hand incomplete, unfinished.
The metaphor of the “stream” (“flow of becoming”) is instructive for thinking the
immanence of tradition: it presents history as nature, as a natural force in which one is
16

Benjamin, Trauerspiel (Weber trans. Benjamin’s –Abilities, 133-34). This view is contra Herman Cohen
who supposed certain transcendental historical categories. Entstehen connotes “arising”; Entspringen:
“emergence.” It should be notes that Benjamin does use the term Geburt (birth) along the lines of
Nietzsche. Sprung also has the additional connotation of “crack” or “split.”
17
This formulation allows Benjamin to think “nature” historically (as “natural history”), as he reads the
baroque as context in which history is petrified in the natural setting. This also allows him to understand
historical-philosophical concepts as having a “natural life,” hence of being capable of decay and
decomposition as nature.
18
Benjamin, Trauerspiel. Samuel Weber’s trans. in Benjamin’s Abilities, 134. My emphasis. Jennings’s
translation, clarifies the relation of this quotation to Benjamin’s distinction between “material” and “truth”
content: “Origin is a whirlpool in the stream of becoming and in its rhythms it swallows the material
involved in the process of its genesis” (Dialectical Images, 143). This distinction will be developed in the
proceeding section (II). Both translations clarify a sense not present in Osborne’s 1970 translation.
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constantly being borne along. One is always within history, always present at its
“midpoint,” and from within this position one can create “maelstroms” (Ideas,
constellations), by forming the material of tradition. Yet such immanent Ideas are
transient compared to the eternal passing of history. Such Ideas occur in language, and
in creating constellations one presents a legible entity against the “flow of
becoming”—combining the “material content” of history into the “truth content” of
origin. One can never step in the same river twice, and tradition will always be
recombined differently in each present moment (“now-time”). One is now compelled
to ask who or what drives such a history, and further, who is harnessing its power? Is
it being used in the service of a dominant narrative, and could it possibly be redirected for critical purposes? Continuing with the metaphor of the stream

19

in his

later writings on Baudelaire (1938-39), Benjamin reflects on such a possibility:
The sources flow as abundantly as one could wish, and where they converge
to form the stream of tradition, they flow along between well-laid out slopes
as far as the eye can reach. Historical materialism is not led astray by this
spectacle. It does not seek the image of the clouds in this stream, but neither
does it turn away from the stream to drink “from the source” and pursue
“the matter itself” behind men’s backs. Whose mills does this stream drive?
20
Who is utilizing its power? Who dammed it?”
One does not begin “from the source” (“authenticity”), nor does one search for some
transcendent logic (“the image of the clouds in the stream”), rather one stands at the
midpoint of history, recognizing that objects and thinkers come to us embedded in
tradition. It is this view which allows one to combat the over-determination of the
“destructive character” (deconstruction) in receptions of Benjamin’s work. It does not
entail an enlightened disregard for tradition in favor of a pure space of construction;
rather a recognition of the dual character of each work, one cannot simply return (or recite) a concept without recognizing its erosion in the hands of tradition, as oftentimes
19

One can note the prevalence of the “stream” as a metaphor throughout Benjamin’s work: a similar
analogy is utilized to describe “astonishment” in Brechtian theatre (“What is Epic Theatre?,” 1931), in his
considerations on surrealism, Benjamin speaks of the German critic “gaining power” from the stream of
forces surrealism unleashed.
20
Benjamin, “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” SW 4: 63. And further: “For it is an illusion
of vulgar Marxism that one can determine the social function of a material or intellectual product without
reference to the circumstances and the bearers of its tradition.” (ibid. 64). Such analyses of reception and
tradition will be argued as important for Benjamin’s re-thinking of Marxism in Ch. 3.
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such erosion polishes texts into new “citable” formulations. It is well recorded that
Benjamin was fond of asking Pollock or Brecht about Marx, perhaps more so than he was
of actually reading Marx. One should not prematurely dismiss this gesture: with such
actions did Benjamin not gain access to the refraction of Marx by his era, to the relevance
of his ideas with respect to tradition? Benjamin did not reject “tragedy” in favor of
“Trauerspiel,” but rather sought the point at which the two were set apart—one must
place the “original” and “historical” in repose with each other so as to gain a better
perspective on each. With such gestures Benjamin perhaps overturned Plato’s primacy of
the “original” over the “copy,” opening the intellectual field in a dynamic new way.
Transposing this to the field of intellectual history, a certain immanent position will
be located at the heart of “critical theory:” as both its explicit origin in the work of
Benjamin, and as the condition of possibility for such a contemporary application.
Because of an immanent perspective with respect to tradition, it can be constantly reinscribed and experimented with from the perspective of the present moment. This allows
the expression of numerous affinities hidden within this movement, but more so, allows
one to understand “critical theory” in an active sense (not as a fixed idea)—one that can
be renewed in each era, and contains within it elements bestowed by tradition. Today we
approach Benjamin’s early work, traveling upstream, from the lens of his “late work” or
more specifically from his embeddedness within a dominant conception of (Marxist)
critical theory. What will be demonstrated is that such a (Marxist) interpretation of his
work owes more to its “post-history” in the hands of Adorno than it does to his
“originary” intentions; to gain a proper representation of each thinker, they must be “set
apart” in the stream of tradition. In fact, if one takes such an idea of “immanence”
seriously one cannot be a Marxist or a Kantian in any deliberate sense; rather one gains
the possibility to wander and collect one’s way through various streams and discourses.
At stake is not a nostalgia for the past, or an authentic conception of critical theory—
rather the point is to demonstrate that the originary force of critical theory lies in a certain
immanent epistemology, a capacity which is at risk of being eroded by the stream of
history, yet also provides a possible means by which to reconfigure critical theory for our
era.
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II. Benjamin’s conception of Immanence (-1926)
“I positively felt a wish to explore its depths, even at the sacrifice I was going to make, and my principle
grief was that I should never be able to tell my old companions on shore about the mysteries I should see.”
-Edgar Allen Poe, A Descent into the Maelström

At this point the development of Benjamin’s immanent epistemology will be traced,
specifically as it is developed in his early writings (to 1926). As early as 1918 (“The
Program for a Coming Philosophy”) Benjamin was engaged in a reformulation of (Neo)
Kantian metaphysics in an attempt to “…undertake the epistemological foundation of a
21

higher concept of experience” :
The problem faced by Kantian epistemology, as by every great epistemology,
has two sides, and Kant managed to give a valid explanation of only one of
them. First there was the question of the certainty of knowledge that is lasting,
and, second there was the question of the integrity of an experience that is
22
ephemeral.
This remark should be taken as foundational for Benjamin’s own “Coming Philosophy:”
the articulation of a broader conception of experience extended to include the spheres oft
downgraded as “dogmatic” (lacking critique) by Kant. The (Neo) Kantian insistence upon
enlightenment had created a justified epistemology in which “…naked, primitive, selfevident experience…seem[s] to be the only experience given—indeed the only
experience possible.”

23

Benjamin sought to move beyond such a narrow conception,

arguing that philosophy must seek to justify experiences in realms such as “art,
24

jurisprudence, and history,”

and above all the realm of “myth.” In this sense, Benjamin

reads the Kantian critical pronouncement not as a rejection of future metaphysics, rather
as a prolegomenon: that metaphysical (“mythological,” “irrational”) experience could be
justified if one recognized it as fundamental to experience, and justifiable within a system
of knowledge.

21

Benjamin, “Program for a Coming Philosophy,” SW 1: 102.
Ibid. 100.
23
Ibid. 100. Given that the subject stands before the “mere appearance” of enlightenment epistemology,
Benjamin notes that this has much in common with myth, in which the subject stands before a primitive
fetish of experience, un-aware of the historical origins of such modes of thought. In this sense Benjamin
anticipates many of Adorno’s later insights in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944), regarding the mythical
character of enlightenment.
24
Benjamin, “Program for a Coming Philosophy,” SW 1: 107.
22
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“Myth” was a sphere of particular importance for Benjamin, here allying with
Ernst Cassirer and Herman Cohen in the elaboration of a “phenomenology of mythical
forms” (ethnology): one that attempts to articulate such forms (immanently), and not
25

reduce them to an enlightened or irrational system.

The transmission of such mythical

forms, via the passing on of “doctrine” [Lehre] broaches what is perhaps Benjamin’s
more fundamental concern—that of history. Myth is not assumed to be a-historical, but
rather is thought as “a doctrine” which is transmitted from generation to generation,
hence myths can be “read” historically. The mode by which this will occur is language:
through the “naming” (or becoming legible), of myth, one endows them with a historical
origin, allowing it to become transmissible (or re-citable) across history. Working
through an immanent critique of Idealism, Benjamin attempted to develop a model by
which one could “experience” (Erfahrung) history and tradition in the present moment:
“Thus, the demand upon the philosophy of the future can ultimately be put in these
words: to create on the basis of the Kantian system a concept of knowledge to which a
26

concept of experience corresponds, of which the knowledge is the teachings [Lehre].”
As will be later demonstrated (Ch. 3), much of Benjamin’s work undertakes to

“historicize” the myths that abound in the present moment (modernity, The Arcades)—in
this sense, history can be experienced, or glimpsed in the present, a conception of history
based on immanence. With this re-thinking of experience, one comes to the realization
that tradition passes through the present moment, that one is immersed in the stream, and
at every moment one is standing and receiving tradition.
This re-thinking of tradition was spurred by Benjamin’s involvement with the
German Youth Movement (to 1915) which elaborated the sentiment of “Youth” as a
means by which to revitalize or experience the pure Geist of tradition, beyond the
confines of the state or university. Youth found itself perpetually at the midpoint of
25

Exemplary of this is Cassirer’s Language and Myth (1925). Benjamin was also influenced by Lehman’s
comparative mythology. What is endemic to this thinking is its stance against “vitalism” and romantic
conceptions of myth. Benjamin will also take aim at the “myths” related to aesthetics and the autonomous
work of art, endowing them with a history “origin,” so they are able to be read historically.
26
Benjamin, “Program for a Coming Philosophy,” SW 1: 106. Benjamin employs the German Lehre,
which connotes the “teaching” of doctrine in a theological sense (transmission across time), this opposed to
Wissenschaft which would connote a “scientific” (a-historical) understanding. This anticipates his
encounter with Brecht, who developed Lehrstrücke (teaching-plays), in attempts to “transmit” ideas from
performer to audience.
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history, as a perspective from which to “awaken” the slumbering tradition from its
oppressive confines (because they could “experience” tradition). In his 1914-15 “Life of
Students,” Benjamin asserts that such an experience becomes possible when the students
realize the historical nature of their experience, as both receivers and transmitters of
knowledge they stand in the middle of history: “… as an image of the highest
27

metaphysical state of history.”

As such they have the ability to “re-awaken” the

potential of tradition, framing it as a force of relevance in the present moment.
It is such an immanence to history (and tradition) that will become fundamental in
the development of Benjamin’s model of criticism, a mode by which one can intervene
upon tradition and one’s present moment in a meaningful way. In these early writings,
Benjamin will reject historicist and idealist teleology, which assert the “Absolute” as the
endpoint of a larger historical dynamic. For Benjamin, the “Absolute” exists in the
present moment, if one recognizes oneself in “constellation” with another time, as both
the sender and receiver of tradition, in a continuity of historical experience: “…only in
teaching [Lehre] does philosophy encounter something Absolute, as existence, and in so
doing encounter that continuity in the nature of experience.”

28

Such a position has the

potential to be used in a critical sense; the task of the critic must be to disclose the present
as the “true state of exception,” by revealing the historical forces latent in the present, or
dormant in a work: “Critique gathers historical forces and concentrates their energies in a
focal point (Brennpunkt), a utopian image, in order to ignite ‘the crisis…that leads to
decision’.”

29

Politically, statements regarding the “awakening,” or revitalization of tradition are
ambiguous; and many in the Youth Movement (such as Wyneken, Benjamin’s mentor)
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Benjamin, “The Life of Students,” SW 1: 37. The Students are the “highest metaphysically” in that they
are able to construct history (Ideas) from their perspective in the present, or rather are able to act with
respect to the past. Benjamin elaborates the power of the constellation of the present with tradition in a
letter to Scholem: “Doctrine [Lehre] is like a surging sea, but for the wave (if we take it as an image of the
human being) everything depends on giving oneself over to its motion in such a way that it crests and
overturns, foaming. The tremendous freedom of this overturning is education… [it is] tradition becoming
visible and free.” Benjamin Briefe, 146. Quoted (and translated) in McCole, The Antinomies of Tradition,
77.
28
Benjamin, “Program for a Coming Philosophy.” SW 1: 109.
29
Commentary and quotation from “Life of Students” (GS II: 917) quoted (and translated) in McCole, The
Antinomies of Tradition, 63.
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rushed at the opportunities WWI provided for such a revival. Hence Benjamin would
abandon his explicit allegiance to the movement, attempting to think “Youth” (and
immanence more generally) in a purer or “un-conditioned” sense (as in Schelling’s On
University Studies), beyond all specific instantiations. The (early) Benjamin adopted such
a non-instrumental position above all political struggles, declining Martin Buber’s
invitation to contribute to his Der Jude on the grounds that language would be
“degraded” into “…a mechanism for the realization of the correct Absolute,” and adding
further, “[u]sed as a means, it is usurious.”

30

Philosophy (criticism) should not reduce

itself to political concerns, rather it should aim at the more fundamental concern of
expressing experience, and doing justice to particular phenomena. In this sense, the early
Benjamin remained on the level of esoteric and epistemic concerns, declining to apply his
method to explicit political programs (as Marxism). Despite this reluctance to engage in
concrete political projects, one can discern a political dimension in Benjamin’s early
work, by removing language from the sphere of political exchange, one is able to
formulate a “pure” Idea of language (as Mallarmé’s poésie pure) able to perform the
more fundamental task of criticism: of rescuing, and harnessing the active force inherent
in tradition. The problem was that the students wished to degrade Geist (the Idea) into a
specific manifestation; for Benjamin the Idea could not be reduced to such specificity as
criticism had a more fundamental task.
It is such a perspective of immanence that will allow Benjamin to develop his
model of criticism more robustly throughout the 1920s, in an attempt to move away from
many of the vitalist (Lebensphilosophie), and irrationalist elements of the Youth
31

Movement.

In “The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism” (1919), along with

The Origin of the German Tragic Drama (1925), Benjamin distilled many of his early
concerns, elaborating a framework of immanent critique. Benjamin’s dissertation, “The
30

Benjamin Breife, 127. Quoted in McCole Walter Benjamin and the Antinomies of Tradition 72, and
Jennings’s Dialectical Images, 111. One may object to this, pointing to 1921’s “Critique of Violence” as an
explicit political statement, though upon reading the essay, it is clear that it is not an explicit political
treatise, but an attempt to elaborate the criteria (or language), that could discern the successful use of force
[Gewalt]. It is written for intellectuals, not political actors.
31
As McCole is careful to note, “…Benjamin’s recovery and critique of early Romanticism set the
coordinates for all his subsequent writings.” Much of his later engagements with Surrealism, and
Romanticism, deal with the same elements he found problematic in the Youth Movement—its
irrationalism, and problematic political stances. See The Antinomies of Tradition, 82.
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Concept of Criticism…,” attempted to redeem aspects of the early Romantics (Schlegel,
Novalis) theory of criticism, while continuing the articulation of his “coming
philosophy.” Romantic criticism allowed Benjamin to develop his concept of experience
further: that criticism of art (or an object more generally) could unfold the highest levels
of “reflection,” higher than those capable of being reached by the Kantian or Fichtean
ego. For Fichte, the world was the imposition of a self-positing transcendental subject:
the progression of history was considered as the process of “reflection” of this subject
upon itself; the “Absolute” entailed the coming to self-consciousness (the “thinking of
thinking”) of this self- positing “I.” The Romantics (and Benjamin) criticized Fichte for
such an “egoism” along with the narrow notion of self-consciousness he reached—that
Fichte halted reflection at the subject, and did not extend reflection into the experiences
of art or history. If the Kantian (Fichtean) turn allowed a reflection on the conditions of
possibility of subjective experience, romantic reflection upon the work allowed the
subject to reflect on reflection itself; that is, on the possibilities of historical experience.
For the early Romantics, “criticism” became a mode by which one could utilize the
object to experiment (and reflect) upon an expanded notion of experience.
In Romanticism, critique became a mode of completing

32

the work, grouping

disparate fragments (via the Idea) so as to reflect the thinking of thinking (“reflection”),
and the ideals of art. In this sense the work is “absolutized” in that it is understood in the
context of the greater un-folding of tradition. As a work it is shown to have aspects of
tradition within it which are fundamental to its constitution, given that an aspect of its
“origin” is fundamentally historical—“…the past work is incomplete and criticism, in
completing the work goes beyond it.”

33

The critic becomes a vehicle for the completion

of the work, and the practice of criticism entailed: “… an experiment on the work of art
34

through which its reflection is awakened and is brought to consciousness of itself.”

Working immanently within the work and with respect to tradition, one is able to “set
apart” (represent [darstellen]) the work vis-à-vis tradition, allowing both to become

32

“It is clear: for the Romantics, criticism is not so much judgment of the work, as a method of completing
it.” Benjamin, “The Concept of Criticism,” SW 1: 159.
33
McCole, The Antinomies of Tradition, 97.
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Benjamin, “The Concept of Criticism,” SW 1: 148.
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active forces for the present: to understand the work with respect to the Absolute
(tradition), and the Absolute in the work. Following Novalis” dictum— “The reader
[critic] must be the extended author”—Benjamin sought to demonstrate how an
understanding of tradition could be un-folded immanently from within the work, but also
that the “truth” of a work lies inextricably in its “origin” with respect to tradition.
Romanticism allowed Benjamin to move from an immanent conception of history into an
immanent concept of criticism that utilized the forces of history in a critical sense:
“Romanticism is the last movement which once again rescued and brought over
35

tradition…madly orgiastic opening up of the secret sources of tradition.”

Benjamin’s 1921/22 essay “Goethe’s Elective Affinities” should be seen as an
application and extension of this model of immanent criticism, a mode of “illuminating
the work in the light only the work could provide,” a testament to Benjamin’s assertion:
“[Criticism] does not consist of reflection on a work, which could not…alter the work
36

essentially, but in the unfolding of reflection in a work.”

The task of criticism entailed

the “absolutizing” of the work, reflecting upon the historical traces within the work—its
relation to tradition and the history of art more generally. In so doing, criticism destroys
the illusion of the autonomous work, disclosing that it is not a self-contained entity, and
that the work points beyond itself into the greater stream of tradition. Hence Benjamin
will criticize mythical, and symbolic (a-historical) characterizations of authorship,
specifically Gundolf’s biography, Goethe (1916), which presented Goethe as a mythical
and inspired figure, neglected the historical aspects of the work’s “origin.” This relates
37

more generally to Benjamin’s dictum: “Works, like deeds, are non-derivable,”

criticism

can demonstrate historical, or mythological tendencies operative within works, yet one
cannot fully reduce a work to any such determination. “Form” (or medium) is where
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Benjamin Briefe, 139. Quoted (and translated) in McCole, The Antinomies of Tradition, 81.
Benjamin, “The Concept of Criticism,” SW 1: 151. And further, speaking to the role critique has in
preparing the work for un-folding in truth: “The past work is incomplete and criticism, in completing the
work, goes beyond it” (ibid. 154).
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Benjamin, “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” SW 1: 321. Gundolf, was a member of the circle around the
symbolist Stefan George, whose mythical notions of authorship and aesthetics Benjamin was highly critical
of. Despite this he expressed a reverence for George himself, despite his fascist political leanings.
Benjamin’s concept of criticism does not “reduce” the work wholly to a set of historical circumstances,
rather seeks the precise interplay of historical elements in a specific work, viewing the individual work as a
site of tradition and history.
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historical reflection oftentimes takes place most explicitly—as forms and genres alike
come down to the individual artist from history and tradition. To understand a work’s
relation to tradition, one can reflect upon the contents relation to its formal expression.
Here one can see an emergent modernist tendency in Benjamin’s work: that of
understanding the form, or mediums (photography, cinema) relationship to history,
utilizing it as a mode to “read” history in the work.
While working on the essay (1920-21), Benjamin’s own situation mirrored that of
Goethe’s novel: his own marriage (to Dora) was collapsing, as he fell for Julia Cohen—
Julia was represented by the figure of Otillie experimenting upon Eduard (Benjamin) and
38

Charlotte (Dora).

Despite this, or perhaps because of this, Benjamin will insist, “the

subject of Elective Affinities is not marriage,” rather “…the moral content of this work
lies at much deeper levels than Goethe’s words lead one to suspect.”

39

The novel is read

by Benjamin as a “cipher” to the bourgeois decline in values and regression to myth, not
as the naturalization of marriage, or human “chemistry.” Benjamin reads Goethe’s prose
as a struggle against such bourgeois values via their rational articulation as “myths” in the
work (specifically in the novella contained within).
As Benjamin is careful to assert, the task of criticism is not to “destroy” the
illusion of the work, “stripping away the veil” and reducing the text to a sham of
bourgeois consciousness; rather it is to seek the “precise knowledge of the veil,” the
moment at which “material” [Sachgehalt] content and “truth” [Wahrheitsgehalt] content
are interlinked. Hence Benjamin will distinguishes between “commentary” and
“criticism:” the former aiming at “material” content, or the way of meaning in a text,
while the latter (criticism) aims at the higher goal of reflection, establishing the work in
40

relation to the Absolute, and tradition.

38

Given that, “Only the material content of the life

“There developed a situation which, to the extent that I was able to understand it, corresponded to the one
in Goethe’s novel Elective Affinities.” Scholem, Walter Benjamin, 94.
39
Benjamin, “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” SW 1: 302; 312.
40
As Benjamin writes: “For critique ultimately shows in the work of art the virtual possibility of
formulating the works truth content as the highest philosophical problem.” (SW 1: 334), and further:
“Critique seeks the truth content of the work of art; commentary, its material content…. the more
significant the work, the more inconspicuously and intimately its truth content is bound up to its material
content” (SW 1: 297).
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[Work] lies open…and its truth content is hidden,”

commentary must prepare the text

for criticism, establishing what the materiality of the text is; criticism then reflects upon
this same material, establishing its relation to the Absolute (history, tradition). The
“truth” content of a work emerges immanently from within the work itself. The true task
of “criticism” becomes the provocation of reflection via the creation of immanent
constellations of material elements.
As is already clear, this distinction is essential for the early Benjamin—as it will
become for Adorno—though throughout his life the distinction between “commentary”
and “critique” will change substantially, becoming unified in the practice of “citation”
(the dialectical image). At this point it can be noted that the processes are not so much
distinct, as both occur on the same material: criticism creates constellations (in language)
with the material defined by commentary. Or rather, critique relates elements of the work
to the “truth content” of tradition.
Benjamin further formulates this model as “the Idea” in the “Epistemo-Critical
Prologue” (Trauerspiel, 1924), hence the infamous formulation of the “constellation:”
Ideas are arrangements of empirical phenomena constructed or represented [Darstellung]
in a monad. With this Benjamin inverts Plato, and to a certain extent Kant: Ideas are able
to be empirically experienced, the noumena can be perceived (or experienced) in the
phenomena. Following Plato, the Idea is of a fundamentally different world from what it
apprehends, though it participates (or persists) in the material or empirical world—
through criticism (as the creation of Ideas), the critic is able to experience the
metaphysical fragments of tradition in one’s time, in individual elements. Benjamin
employs a distinction between “truth” [Warheit], and “knowledge” [Erkentnnis], the
former lies “beyond intention,” in that it is not intellectually apprehended, rather is
experienced [Erfahrung] when one employs an immanent understanding of history. This
is not to say that “knowledge” is un-important, functioning as “commentary,” it prepares
the way for the true practice of philosophy (“criticism”), which is the reflection on the
particulars position within the Absolute. What is essential to note is that “truth content” is
experienced in the critical interaction with the work—as “beyond intention”—it is not
41

Ibid. 325.
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textual “truth” as arrived at through knowledge, nor is it the Marxist (or materialist) truth
of the historical conditions underpinning the work. It is an experience of the work and its
unfolding in tradition.
According to John McCole, one cannot comprehend Benjamin’s understanding of
criticism without understanding his conception of “allegory,” the redemption of which is
a central theme of Benjamin’s work on baroque Trauerspiel. Continuing his criticism of
Romanticism, and Idealism, Benjamin takes aim at their conception of the “symbol,”
which was thought as a timeless manifestation of the Hegelian “Idea” in the work of art;
allegory was downgraded as subservient to this—as mere particularity. For Benjamin, it
is precisely this creaturely, or contingent material element which expresses history (as
transience) most aptly: “…the experience of all that is un-timely, sorrowful and un42

successful,”

that is the experience of an era as Absolute, as part of a broader unfolding

of history and tradition. Symbol sees art as expressing timeless values, while allegory
grasps the immanence of art and value to history, as exemplary of the “ruin of progress.”
Under the allegorical gaze, “…the profane world…is both elevated and devalued,”

43

an

era is seen as historical (contra myth), yet such a realization is also recognized as a
moment of danger, as epochs and Ideas are at risk of passing away into history. Benjamin
will elevate the tasks of “criticism” and “commentary” against this threat of nihilism:
phenomena are in constant danger of transience via history, hence must be “redeemed”
(via the Idea) anew in each era. This model has a dual capacity: regarding an epoch like
the baroque (or modernity) that is seemingly without history (“natural”), the critic must
search for the “downcast elements,” which he or she then reflects upon to demonstrate
the presence of history. In a second sense, one must recognize that phenomena are also at
risk to this history, that an epoch not grasped by the present (as Idea) is at risk of passing
away. In the Trauerspiel, the “material content” is demonstrated by Benjamin as the
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McCole, The Antinomies of Tradition, 136. McCole further argues that the “Epistemo-Critical Prologue”
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baroque mourning play, the “truth content” of which is allegory (and history),

44

which

can be redeemed out of its specific epoch, and employed more generally. This immanent
model of criticism allows linear temporality to be blasted open—one exists perpetually at
the “midpoint” of history—overcoming the notion of eras of “decadence” and “decay:”
each epoch exists as an aspect of the Absolute.
Given that Ideas must arise immanently with respect to experience, or phenomena,
the sphere of (intellectual) history is opened anew to experimentation with divergent
constellations (Benjamin-Adorno; also, Benjamin-Deleuze...). Allowing one to give a
radically different sense to the present by re-arranging the tradition supporting it. This
space of experimentation, or the re-write-ability of tradition, is informed by a further
valence in the German “sprung,” which connotes a “crack” or “fracture” that occurs
when an entity “sets itself apart” from the stream of tradition (in its “origin”).
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This

fracturing at the site of emergence means that entities are incomplete in themselves, and
gain a full sense only within the stream of history (“pre/post history”). Citing an element
elsewhere allows elements to take on a profoundly new sense given a new constellation.
The affinities of such a view with those of the later Frankfurt School (or many in
the Marxist tradition) is highly evident, though from the preceding genealogy it can be
asserted that Benjamin’s early model of criticism is decidedly not Marxist, thought it
employs elements of such a tradition. At stake is not a simple reduction of works to a
“material” base, rather an understanding of the persistence of history and tradition in
individual works. Truth is beyond intention, even a Marxist one. However, Marxist
analysis does play a role in these conceptions, as Benjamin asserts Lukács as a figure
who is “…very important, particularly for me.”
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Specifically, Lukács’s analyses of

McCole, The Antinomies of Tradition, 136.
See Weber, Benjamin’s –Abilities, 134. For Weber, because of this incompleteness of the work at the site
of origin it becomes constantly “re-writable,” or “re-citable,” given different historical constellations.
Hence is emblematic to the “-ability” he reads as central to Benjamin’s work.
46
BC, 248. Writing to Scholem in 1924, Benjamin speaks further of the importance of Lukács” History and
Class Consciousness to the methodological genesis of the Trauerspiel study (see BC, 246-251). Lukács
should be noted as an important “correspondent” to both Benjamin and Adorno, though the present study
cannot elaborate this relationship in full. For Benjamin, his analyses of “reified thought” and literary genre,
provided epistemological tools to interrogate modern thought. While for Adorno, Lukács provided a model
by which philosophy (or “critique”) could be employed to “de-reify” existing reality, that is to demonstrate
45
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“second nature” (Theory of the Novel, 1920) which provided a means by which to read
mythological manifestations historically. Acknowledging this affinity, Benjamin writes
the following to Max Rychner in 1931:
Now this book [The Trauerspiel] was certainly not materialistic, if at the
same time [it was] already dialectical. However, something which I was
unaware of at the time of composition became soon after more and more
clear to me: that proceeding from the standpoint of my very unique
philosophy of language, there exist points of contact [Vermittlung]—
however strained and problematic—with the methods of dialectical
47
materialism.
Despite the engagement with political thinkers (Schmitt, and Lukács), Benjamin conveys
that the point of Trauerspiel was not simply to develop a critical materialist-historical
method, rather to elaborate an immanent method (via his philosophy of language or
Darstellung) through which tradition can be thought anew: as perpetually re-writeable or
citable from the present moment. One could attempt to assert the “truth-content” of the
work to be the “material” in the sense of Marx, but this glosses over the metaphysical
aspects of history Benjamin is attempting to redeem in his early writings. For example,
though Benjamin “comments” upon the mythical elements of the “bourgeois” in his
analysis of Elective Affinities, the point of his critique is the legibility of myth with
respect to history more broadly—a demonstration of the capabilities (“-ability”) of
critique to illuminate a work via history.
Further, if one takes such an immanent method seriously, one cannot be a
Marxist, only inhabit discourses so as to bring about a greater unfolding, and throughout
much of his work in the 1930s Benjamin will attempt to amend such vulgar Marxist
conceptions which a fuller understanding of metaphysics. As will now be demonstrated,
many of the “materialist” aspects of Benjamin’s model of criticism are perhaps more a
product of their “post-history” at the hands of Adorno, who utilized Benjamin’s method

it as historical and malleable. For more on the relationship between Lukács and the Frankfurt School see
Andrew Feenberg’s 2014 work, The Philosophy of Praxis: Marx Lukács and the Frankfurt School.
47
Benjamin to Rychner, March 7, 1931. BC, 372.
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in the critique of existing capitalist social relations, and the eventual formulation of his
own negative dialectic. If Benjamin’s thinking can be identified with later developments
of critical theory, this is due to the origin of many of its conceptions in Benjamin’s
writings. Further, if critical theory is said to draw power from its interaction with
tradition, this is due to its employment of Benjamin’s immanent model of critique.
III.

Post-History: Adorno’s early writings (-1933)
“The life of the mind only attains truth when discovering itself in absolute desolation.”
–Adorno Minima Moralia, 17

By 1931 Adorno was employing Benjamin’s work extensively towards his own critical
project. In a letter to Benjamin, he praises his work on the baroque for having
“…redeemed induction [immanence].”
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Susan Buck-Morss elaborates this statement by

Adorno, noting that in his work the concept of “redemption” entails the Hegelian
Aufhebung: a preservation and negation (re-construction) of former elements. Adorno is
49

at once asserting that Benjamin had redeemed the traditional model of induction,

while

at the same time reconfiguring Benjamin’s method in his own political direction.
Especially in these early writings, Adorno is theoretically extremely close to Benjamin,
though he is operative at the limit (or extreme) of Benjamin’s own applications of his
work. Adorno is useful in defining and clarifying many of the tendencies operative in
Benjamin’s thought, while he moves them into divergent spheres. In this sense, he could
be said to “translate” Benjamin’s thinking: the reproduction revealing something new
within the original; in these early works, it was a capacity for Marxist critique. At this
point, Adorno’s early negative dialectic will be un-packed, demonstrating it indebtedness
to Benjamin’s model of criticism.
Adorno thinks of immanence in a Hegelian direction—as the unfolding of “truth”
in history, and the tradition of philosophy—yet, as Buck-Morss will stress, Adorno
emphasized the tension, or non-identity, of “truth” with history. For Adorno, the idealist
conquest of the “real as rational” missed materiality and particularity, hence the
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Adorno to Benjamin, December 5, 1934, ABC, 62.
Traditional induction is not so much opposed to deduction—rather entails working from particular
phenomena with the presupposition of certain universals—Benjamin’s allegorical starting point
presupposes no such position.
49
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“historical truth” of the failure of idealist categories must be brought to bear on these
50

same categories.

Philosophy must be made to realize its own “non-identity” with

reality, that the world cannot be grasped in a systematic or total fashion. For Adorno, the
“historical truth” of idealism is only realized in its failure, that the attempt to articulate
the “real” via “rational” categories was false from the start, and such symbolic aspirations
should be read as the mere transience of allegory.
The concept of “historical truth” (or “social truth,” “truth”) is ambiguous in
Adorno and can be taken in several senses, all of which mark a significant movement
away from its formulation in Benjamin’s early work. Thinkers such as Jameson (Late
Marxism, 1990) have read this concept in an explicitly Marxist direction, arguing that
Adorno’s criticisms attempt to oppose the “identity” thinking which mirrors capitalist
social relations (“exchange-value” over “use-value”)—arguing that “truth” for Adorno is
a version of Marx’s “economic base.” However, such a view misses the complexity of
Adorno’s materialist engagement with the history of metaphysics, specifically Kant and
Hegel. For Adorno, the “truth” of such systems is not simply their class-status, but rather
their domineering, and oppressive character, that such enlightenment systems are based
on the suppression of nature, and (mythical) elements “non-identical” to the system.
Marxism becomes a mode of critique by which to understand the alienation inherent in
such systems, and to comprehend the particular “non-identities” foreclosed in Idealism.
Jay Bernstein (Disenchantment and Ethics, 2001), rightly emphasizes the ethical
dimension inherent in such thinking—an attempt to focus on concrete particulars (i.e. the
human, material suffering, “non-identity”), against the categorical abstractions of
idealism. Hence Adorno’s negative dialectic could be said to have a dual character:
firstly, it attempts to elevate particularity (“non-identity”) from its downcast position, yet
also understands the ethical imperative of an ideological critique—that philosophy is
obligated to expose the systems of domination, breaking the spell of reification, while
creating space for meaningful political action. What is essential to note is that “truth
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As Adorno writes in Negative Dialectics: “Having broken its pledge to be as one with reality or at the
point of realization, philosophy is obliged ruthlessly to criticize itself.” (3). Adorno felt “the point of
realization” of philosophy to have been the potential power of Marx (specifically Theses on Feuerbach, #
11), as critically harnessing (or realizing) the powers of idealism. Adorno’s project is one that attempts to
think through the possibilities of a “critical” philosophy after its objective failure in the writings of Marx.
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content” for Adorno is not simply the material base, but those “non-identical” elements in
excess of the general economy, alongside the mode by which ideological systems
obfuscate and leave out such elements. Adorno will employ Benjamin’s constellational
method in the service of such an ideological critique, moving it away from its originary
intentions. The complexities of this engagement will now be un-packed.
Adorno redeems materialism after the dissolution of idealism as a means of
elevating the material particularity not found in such systems—yet his was a Marxism
sans proletariat—one which presented a mode of cognition akin to Benjamin’s immanent
allegorical vision, one that understood the transience of history. Hence, Adorno
51

“…virtually equates materialism with the construction of Ideas,”

recognizing that after

the failure of the idealist project, concepts from idealism must be redeemed out the
oppressive totality, and re-directed towards “non-identity,” or material particularity. To
do this, Adorno employs Benjamin’s constellations, as a mode by which philosophy can
turn towards “non-identity,” yet also act as a critical tool to expose the “historical truth”
of idealist categories. Or rather, it can be employed as mode of ideological critique in the
services of specific political imperatives.
Adorno’s 1931 address to the Frankfurt philosophy faculty, “The Actuality of
Philosophy,” elaborates imperatives for the practice of “critique” after the dissolution of
metaphysics. Buck-Morss emphasizes that a continuity between this inaugural lecture and
his later Negative Dialectics (1966) can be drawn; much of Adorno’s thinking attempted
to immanently work through the ruin of idealism to discern what critical power still
remained in such a tradition. What is remarkable is the continuity of Adorno as a thinker:
he ostensibly held the same skepticism to positive representation (and affirmation),
52

before and after Auschwitz.
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Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, 93. And further: “How does Benjamin’s early, nonMarxist philosophy provide the key to Adorno’s own dialectical materialist method? The answer involved
following Adorno in a double procedure, translating Benjamin’s original conceptions into a Marxist
theoretical frame, and grounding Marxist theory philosophically with the aid of those conceptions in order
to prove immanently that dialectical materialism was the only valid structure of cognitive experience” (ibid.
xiii).
52
As Adorno will write in the preface to Negative Dialectics (1966): “To the best of his ability the author
means to put his cards on the table—which is by no means the same as playing the game,” (xix) he goes on
to emphasize the “dis-continuous” (or negative) continuity that exists between his late theoretical treatise,
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In such a critique of idealism, Adorno will employ Benjamin’s immanent model
53

of criticism in an explicitly political sense (“Marxism” ), towards contemporary social
relations and modes of thought. Adorno was the first to employ Benjamin’s method
beyond the epistemic, or textual domains of his early writings, into the realms of
sociology, music, and empirical analysis. Yet with this application, Adorno crystallizes
54

many of Benjamin’s concerns into a more “applicable” (systematic ) method of
criticism—what he terms the “historical image”—utilizing “constellations” to break “the
spell” [der Bann] of reification. With his betrayal of Benjamin’s aversion to concrete
politics, Adorno immanently reconfigures Benjamin’s thought in the direction of what is
conventionally known as “critical theory:” utilizing Benjamin’s expanded notion of
55

criticism and tradition in critique of present forms of domination.

In 1931’s “The Actuality of Philosophy,” Adorno takes Benjamin seriously,
asserting that philosophy must rethink its “actuality” historically: “…only out of the
historical entanglement of questions and answers does the question of philosophy’s
actuality emerge precisely. And that simply means, after the failure of efforts for a grand

and the various texts throughout his life which employ this method. Thus a negative unity can be drawn
throughout Adorno’s work—and one can read the majority of his writings as an attempt to employ his
modified dialectical schema; a continuity existing between his writings on Music, literature, popular
culture, philosophy, and sociology.
53
As argued earlier, Adorno should not be seen as a “conventional” Marxist, as many categories (such as
the proletariat) are absent from his work. Of particular importance for Adorno is Lukács” analysis of
“reified thought” (History and Class Consciousness, 1923), and much of Adorno’s method of critique
attempted to break the “spell” of reified thought through philosophical categories. For an elaboration of this
see Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, 25-28.
54
Though Adorno had a professed aversion to “systems” in their Idealist sense as founded on the
suppression and domination of nature (See Dialectic of Enlightenment), his method of philosophy did
contain substantial systematic, or consistent tendencies (if only negatively). For a specific elaboration of
this see Negative Dialectics, “Introduction,” 3-61.
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Though Adorno did not officially join the Institute until 1938, many aspects of his thinking (and his
appropriations of Benjamin) became dominant in the orthodoxy of the school (especially following the
1944 Dialectic of Enlightenment). Hence, via “post-history,” Benjamin unwittingly became more entangled
with “critical theory.” Such an employment translates Benjamin’s model of criticism explicitly into the
realm of ideological critique, moving away (via Lukács) from Benjamin’s a-political concerns with
tradition, and genre. For Adorno critique should aim primarily at “de-reification” (a breaking of “the
spell”), and should not focus primarily on locating the work in tradition (as Benjamin). However,
throughout his life Adorno sought the modes by which tradition could be used against itself; the mode by
which “traditional” elements could be utilized in ideological critique of existing social relations.
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and total philosophy: whether philosophy is itself at all actual.”

After the failure of

metaphysics (idealism), was philosophy still possible? Could it still claim to act
meaningfully upon the world, or assert a task of enlightenment? For Adorno, it could,
pending its abandonment of metaphysical, or idealist aims of constructing systematic
modes of thinking. If it is to remain “actual,” if it is still to have force in the world
philosophy must awaken its power of criticism: distorting existing reality so as to reveal
spaces for political action,

57

returning to the critical spirit found in figures such as Marx

and Kant. Philosophy had not become aware of its impotence in the face of material
suffering, of its own role in the destruction of the early 20th century, rather it acted in a
defeatist manner, simply justifying existing reality. It should be stressed that this is not
simply an ideological critique from Adorno’s perspective, but rather an assertion of the
objective situation of philosophy after the failure of idealism—that the conquest of the
real as rational had failed, and thought must abandon such attempts at reconciliation.
Despite this historical situation, such projects continued (positivism, Neo-Kantianism,
phenomenology), and Adorno sought to demonstrate their entanglement in the idealist
tradition, demonstrating their place in a convention turned to ruin. As noted, one cannot
oppose such systems externally—positing some “authentic givenness” (as
phenomenology)—instead one must immanently work-through the problems of
metaphysics, recognizing the symptoms of the tradition of domination therein, and in so
doing, Adorno will employ Benjamin’s model of criticism.
Adorno is particularly critical of phenomenology (Heidegger, Husserl), insisting
that Husserl’s imperative of a “return to the things-themselves” represented a regression
of the Copernican revolution of thinking to a mere cult of the mind: a “provincialism” of
thinking with little awareness of history, and its own entanglement with idealist
categories. Husserl attempted to overcome the idealist “subject/object” distinction,
though maintained a latent distinction between “reason” and “reality” (a Cartesianism).
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Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy,” 124.
In such critiques, Adorno again is not a conventional Marxist, nor does he simply deride the Idealist
project as failed. Rather he demonstrates that such systems failed by their own imperatives. As Susan BuckMorss writes, “He [Adorno] wanted to show that precisely when the idealist project of establishing the
identity of mind and reality—failed, it expressed, unintentionally, social truth, thus proving the preeminence of reality over mind and the necessity of a critical, dialectical attitude of non-identity toward it—
proving in short, the validity of dialectical materialist cognition” (The Origin of Negative Dialectics, xiii).
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He attempted to rectify this paradox through “intentionality:” the notion that knowledge
always presents as knowledge of something. However, this resulted in a doubling of the
object into the “object of thought” and the “object itself,” resulting not only in a regress,
but a re-inscription of the idealist distinction between “reason” and “reality.” Husserl’s
attempt to overcome idealism resulted in the relocation of “objectivity” in the subject, yet
could not account for thoughts relation to the external world other than through the
“mediation” of reason. Hence Adorno will assert, “…every one of the Husserlian analysis
of the given rests on an implicit system of transcendental reason.”
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For Adorno,

Husserl’s phenomenology was simply a continuation of the idealist attempt to conquer
the “real” by way of the “rational.”
Adorno’s criticisms of Heidegger begin with a similar premise: that Heidegger’s
“fundamental existential” analyses are based on an idealist suppression of the very
particulars he attempted to bring into philosophy;

59

that Dasein, despite its anxieties did

not possess the contingency (“spontaneity”), or historical awareness of an actual human
being. Thus Heidegger’s analyses should be seen as what they are: an idealist unfolding
of the concept of Being, in which “non-identity,” history, and the human are absent.
These criticisms should be seen as exemplary of Adorno’s own immanent model of
criticism: the use of categories from within a philosophical system to demonstrate its
historical un-truth, that phenomenology, despite its claim to describe reality authentically,
suppressed this same reality. Despite its assertions of “historicity,” phenomenology could
60

not understand (or overcome) its own historical origin.

In his 1932 work “The Idea of

Natural History,” Adorno further criticizes phenomenology from what could be termed
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Adorno, “Actuality of Philosophy.” 122. For more on Adorno’s specific criticism of Husserl see Against
Epistemology (1934-37); Susan Buck-Morss notes the “un-intentional social truth” of Adorno’s analysis:
that Husserl’s failure demonstrated the problematic of straightforward rational cognition of social reality,
an imperative Adorno would take up in his own analyses—that philosophy should now seek to apply itself
“critically.” See The Origin of Negative Dialectics, 71-72.
59
As Adorno writes: “All that is needed is an understanding of the narrowness of the Heideggerian
existential categories of throwness, anxiety and death, which are in fact not able to banish the fullness of
what is living.” (“The Actuality of Philosophy,” 124). Heidegger will be a persistent interlocutor
throughout Adorno’s life, most notably in The Jargon of Authenticity (1964), and “Part 1: Relation to
Ontology” of Negative Dialectics.
60
As Adorno will later state in his 1965 Lectures on Negative Dialectics: Heidegger’s system draws it
appeal from the fact that it deals with seemingly complex phenomena without recourse to conceptual
machinery (as idealism). Though for Adorno, the concept of Being contains within it wizened systematic
elements which allow him to overcome the “ontic”/ “ontological” distinction (see p. 38).
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his own “historical philosophical perspective”, while developing his concept of “Natural
history” beyond its employment in Benjamin’s Trauerspiel. Adorno asserts that such a
“return to givenness” (nature, “authenticity”) became possible only within the reified
context of capitalist social relations, within Lukács” “second nature,” which describes
“…the false mythical appearance of given reality as a-historical and Absolute.”
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The

phenomenological project arose in a context that suppressed history (as Benjamin’s
baroque), along with its own origin in idealism. For Adorno, as a thinker of immanence,
one must reject any “authentic” philosophical starting point—specifically ontology, or
any fixed “natural” categories—as following Lukács and Benjamin, such “natural”
categories always emerge at a certain point in history. It is essential to note that such
immanent critiques of philosophical systems are integral to Adorno’s own rejection of
totality, that philosophy must exist negatively, as a critique of existing totalities.
In “The Actuality of Philosophy,” Adorno is also careful to distance himself from
historicism (Dilthey), and “irrationalist” Lebensphilosophie (Simmel), as for Adorno,
such thinking cedes the autonomy of the individual to history or some greater force,
denying one’s ability to act meaningfully with respect to reality. Referencing Simmel, he
writes: “… [he] has admittedly maintained contact with the reality with which it deals,
but in so doing has lost all claim to make sense out of the empirical world which presses
upon it, and becomes resigned to “the living” as a blind and unenlightened concept of
nature.”
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For Adorno, philosophy must at once describe existing reality, while at the

same time, it must emphasize the ability of the subject to act, or come to a rational
understanding of his or her social situation. Adorno saw the relationship to theory and
practice to be inextricably linked, a rational articulation of the myths of current reality
already provided the means to move beyond them. As will be demonstrated (Ch. 3),
Adorno will level a similar criticism against Benjamin, that his “mythical” analysis
foreclosed possibilities of political action.
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Lukács, Theory of the Novel, 62.
Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy,” 121. Benjamin attempted to refashion many of Simmel’s
categories in his later work on Baudelaire (1938-39), which Adorno will be highly critical of, the bases of
his criticism can already be seen in these early writings.
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Such critiques are essential aspects of Adorno’s thinking, and one must recognize
that philosophical problems are immanent to history and tradition. In 1931, this entailed a
recognition of thought’s entanglement with idealism, and the crises therein. In favor of a
rejection, or repression of such an entanglement, Adorno would embrace and radicalize
the “subject/object” polarity inherent in idealism (specifically Hegel), recognizing the
contradictory, yet intertwined nature of the two poles—that aspects of the social existed
in the subject, yet by thinking in opposition to oneself, one possesses the ability to shape
the social world. Much of the research of the early Frankfurt School entailed a reflection
upon the failure of Marxist doctrine to seize the “masses”—both throughout the 19th
Century (1848, 1871), and in Germany during the Spartacus revolt (1919), and the rise of
Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (SPAD). For Adorno, such a failure
was not so much political as intellectual, caused by the lack of an understanding of the
ways in which modes of thought upheld the social world. For Adorno, such a relation was
first broached by Lukács with his conception of “reification” (History and Class
Consciousness, 1923), in which aspects of social reality appeared as fixed and given due
to the categories of bourgeois thought. However, Adorno criticized Lukács” insistence
that only the concrete action of the proletariat could break such a spell; for Adorno,
dialectical theory could break open existing reality, revealing it as historical, and
malleable. Or rather, it could reveal the “origin” of such social relations. Yet following
Lukács, Adorno recognized that one must think against oneself, given that one’s own
consciousness supports aspects of administered reality. In a text entitled “On Subject and
Object” (1954), Adorno radicalizes the Kantian antinomy between the “empirical” and
“transcendental” subject—the former expressing one’s spontaneous subjective capacities,
while the latter conveys aspects of subjectivity given to one by society (Marx’s “socially
necessary labor time,” Max Weber’s “bureaucracy”). Hence, “The subject’s reflection
upon its own formalism is a reflection upon society;”
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in recognizing the “primacy of

the object,” one comes to reflect upon the ways in which one’s own consciousness is
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Adorno, “On Subject and Object,” 257. This marks an important movement away from Lukács for
Adorno. In History and Class Consciousness, Lukács accords a semi-messianic role to the “proletariat,”
arguing that if they are able to come to consciousness of their “reified” position this will enact a negation of
existing social relations. For Adorno, criticism can aid in “de-reification,” but no such guarantee of
revolution can be asserted, all that exists is the “impossible-possibility” of thinking.
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immanent to the social world, tradition, and history. Vis-à-vis this splitting of
subjectivity, one has the ability to act against this objectivity, via the critical power of
thought. As Adorno will later put it, “To use the strength of the subject to break through
64

the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity.”

Hence in 1931, Adorno will stress sociology as a means for philosophy to come to
terms with its own dissolution—to perform psycho-analysis upon itself—recognizing
which of its categories are given to it by the social, and attaining a self-consciousness of
itself in its own ruin. Adorno contrasts this with Heidegger, for whom philosophy aims at
what is fundamental (ontological), whereas sociology simply “burgles” such insights. For
Adorno, after the ruin of such foundational projects, all that is left is what has been taken,
65

the fragments of the critical power of metaphysics.

And further, philosophy must now

work alongside other (empirical) disciplines, such as sociology, whose research into the
material-social world philosophy must interpret. With such an academic division of labor,
Adorno is closer to Benjamin than the orthodoxy of Horkheimer, applying Benjamin’s
model of “critique” to the social world. Summoning Benjamin’s distinction between
“commentary” and “criticism”—alongside the distinction between “truth” and “material”
content—Adorno will write: “The idea of knowledge [Wissenschaft] is research, that of
66

philosophy is interpretation.”

As commentary for Benjamin, research must undertake

to present existing reality in empirical assemblages; presenting data within a framework
as knowledge. Philosophy then must interpret such assemblages, creating “constellations”
by which knowledge can be reflected upon, so as to reveal it in “truth,” that is, in history
and tradition.
The task of philosophy is not to search for concealed and manifest
intentions of reality, but to interpret the unintentional reality in that, by the
power of constructing figures, images, out of the isolated elements of
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Adorno, Negative Dialectics, xx.
“For the house, this big house [Idealist systems], has long since decayed in its foundations and threatens
not only to destroy all those inside it, but to cause all the things to vanish which are stored within it…if the
cat burglar steals these things, these singular, indeed often half-forgotten things, he does a good deed,
provided they are only rescued.” (“The Actuality of Philosophy,” 130). Adorno goes on to write that the
sociologist (burglar), does not always know the worth of his societal insights, hence the philosophy must
employ what has been looted from such idealist systems.
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Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy,” 93.
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reality, it negates questions whose exact articulation is the task of
67
knowledge.
Philosophy, then, “negates” mere knowledge, moving beyond simple understanding, and
in doing so illustrates the possibilities that reality could be different; it creates
“constellations” (Benjamin’s Idea) and images of existing reality, demonstrating the
historical nature of reified social relations. As Adorno will demonstrate in his 1966
Negative Dialectics, such a theoretical gesture is itself already “praxis” in that it breaks
the spell of existing reality, pointing to the fact that things could be different. The task of
criticism for Adorno is to point the way for such possibilities. “Materialism has named
68

this relationship with a name that is philosophically certified: dialectic,”

Adorno re-

fashions the “dialectic” from historical materialism (via Lukács, and Benjamin): he
suggests that philosophy must demonstrate individual fragments, or moments of time, as
part of a larger process of history—that they have a historical “origin”—hence can be
molded or overcome (negated) in the present moment. Instead of attempting to grasp at
totality, philosophy is able to allegorically grasp a fragment, demonstrating history in the
present era. As Adorno states at the outset of the lecture, “For the mind is indeed not
capable of producing or grasping the totality of the real, but it may be possible to
69

penetrate the detail to explode in miniature the mass of merely existing reality.”

Adorno will call such constructions “historical images,” the truth of which is
demonstrated when reality crystalizes around them in “exact fantasy”—that is, categories
which arise immanently from the phenomena they attempt to apprehend—this against
idealism which employs general categories, negating the critical power of particularity.
Interpretation (“criticism”) entails the experimentation with such arrangements, an
attempt to construct an interpretation which could be seized upon politically: “The point
70

of interpretive philosophy is to construct keys, before which reality springs open.”
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Ibid. 127. On this point Jameson will argue that Adorno’s model has immense power for the
development of an “ethically” driven sociology; one driven by the imperative that the humanities and
social-sciences must not merely describe existing reality, but open avenues for it to be overcome from a
leftist perspective. See Late Marxism, 5.
68
Ibid. 129. A further valence of this is that philosophy must always see itself in process (historically), it
cannot start from scratch without thinking through tradition, and the problems of philosophy therein.
69
Ibid. 133.
70
Ibid. 130. The ambiguity of this formulation should be noted, “for whom” reality “springs open” for is
ambiguous in Adorno.
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Adorno’s “interpretative-gaze” has much in common with Benjamin’s “allegorical-gaze,”
which sees present day symbols already as ruins, as already decayed by history, and
contains within it the power to awaken one from the “charnel house of rotted
interiorities:”

71

He [Benjamin] is driven not merely to awaken congealed life in petrified
objects—as in allegory—but also to scrutinize living things so that they present
themselves as being ancient, “ur-historical” and abruptly release their
72
significance.
Allegory at once de-mythologizes the present, and also opens up the space of
construction that is history, allowing the construction of new constellations (“Ideas”). For
Benjamin, the Idea must arise immanently from within the work, its guarantee of “truth”
is its esoteric ability to unfold the work beyond itself in the practice of reflection. For
Adorno, the “historical image” finds its guarantee of truth in its exoteric relation to
material and historical circumstances, its “truth” is found to the extent that it de-reifies
existing reality to the extent that it elicits practice. For Benjamin, “commentary” prepares
the way for “criticism,” in which textual elements are entered in the “truth” of tradition;
for Adorno, commentary (knowledge, sociology, research), is negated into the “historical
image” which finds its truth in its opening up of reality for political purposes. For Adorno
critique has a straightforwardly “objective” relationship with the social world, such a
relation is not so for Benjamin at this point.
What is essential for Adorno is a constant tension between “subject” and “object,”
one which understands historical circumstances (via constellations), yet also is able to
meaningfully think and act (politically) in the present moment. This slight alteration of
Benjamin’s dialectical method will prove significant later in their correspondence (193839), and his fixation of the dialectical poles (“subject/object”) betrays something of the
fundamental immanence of Benjamin’s method—a mode of thinking which tolerates no
fixed starting point, even a dialectical one. One could ask if this move forecloses
something of the “originary” force of Benjamin’s method—though it performs an
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Adorno, “The Idea of Natural History,” 190.
Ibid. 191.
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important task (critique of present social relations), it perhaps has the tertiary effect of
solidifying Benjamin within a dominant narrative of “critical theory.”
In 1931, Adorno gives an example of what such a construction of an objective
historical constellation would entail. In History and Class Consciousness (1923), Lukács
asserted Kant’s problem of the “thing-in-itself” to be the result, not of a metaphysical
antinomy, but of the inability of reified thought to grasp existing reality. For Adorno,
Lukács’s insight into the “social truth” of Kant’s categories (through the introduction of
the “ideal type” of the commodity form), demonstrates the historical “origin” of
supposedly eternal metaphysical questions. “Like a source of light…,”

73

the critical

constellation constructed by the critic illuminates present reality as changeable through
political action, demonstrating that “eternal categories” too have a history (or “origin”).
Already in 1931, Benjamin recognized the affinity of Adorno’s address with his
own concerns: in reference to Adorno’s statement regarding “the task of philosophy…”
Benjamin writes, “I can subscribe to this proposition. Yet I could not have written it
without some reference to the introduction of my book on Baroque drama.”
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Adorno

will acknowledge this oversight, while pointing to an emergent intellectual solidarity.
Benjamin too will confess this convergence, writing to Adorno after reading his work on
Kierkegaard: “Thus it is true that there is still something like a shared work after all; that
there are still sentences which allow one individual to stand in for and represent
another.”
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Despite this claim of solidarity, neither could anticipate how such a solidarity

would unfold over the coming years. This early “translation” will be of particular
importance for Adorno, given its consistency with his later named “negative dialectic”
(1966), and it could be said to define the dominant direction for much of their later
correspondence: namely Adorno’s reading of Benjamin’s “constellations” as objective in
his employment of them to critique existing social relations.
The influence of Benjamin’s model of criticism is seen most explicitly in
Adorno’s 1933 Kierkegaard and the Construction of the Aesthetic, a text which would
73

Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy,” 128.
ABC, 10. Here one could speculate that the “origin” of critical theory is Adorno’s (un-intentional?)
plagiarism of Benjamin.
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ABC, 19.
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prove influential to Benjamin’s later formulations of the dialectical image, (Ch. 3) and is
exemplary of Adorno’s own conception of the “historical image.” For Adorno, the “truth”
of Kierkegaard’s work lay in its “un-intentional historical elements,” in the images of
bourgeois life upon which his existential dramas were staged. Hence Adorno elevates
(constructs) the “bourgeois intérieur” out of the ruin of Kierkegaard’s texts, and such an
image is demonstrated as the condition of possibility for Kierkegaard’s existential
subjectivity—that it rests on a mythological suppression of the conditions to which gave
rise to it, that Kierkegaard responds to historical alienation, in an a-historical, and
theological sense. As Adorno writes, “The concrete self is for Kierkegaard identical with
76

the bourgeois self.”

Despite this absence, or disavowal in Kierkegaard’s work, history

is still there, and can be read by the interpretive gaze of the theorist. Yet Adorno also
reads this historical cipher as emblematic of a greater historical philosophical trend: of
the regression of idealism to myth, a regression which is readable only in the extremes, or
in the “late works” of the tradition. Thus the “truth content” of Kierkegaard’s work is not
his affirmation of subjectivity, or his poetic pseudonymity, but rather the relation of such
gestures to the decline of idealism—the fact that Kierkegaard’s gestures can be read to
reveal a greater social truth. Kierkegaard is not reduced to a set of material
circumstances, rather is read as a cipher to greater historical and ideological processes.
Methodologically the work is extremely dense and vague; Adorno’s method of
criticism is so immanent that he does not employ an introduction or conclusion, nor does
he define his methodology, but rather elaborates it out of extensive readings of
Kierkegaard’s texts, elevating their detritus elements to explain the whole. The
methodology employed is clearly Benjaminian, and is perhaps the most extreme
commitment to his model of immanent criticism, as Adorno attempts to unfold
Kierkegaard further through criticism, while using him as a lens to view earlier
trajectories of thought (idealism). It is in this work that Adorno develops his “historical
image” with respect to the work of art (the “aesthetic sphere” in Kierkegaard): art acts as
a “cipher” to existing reality without being subsumed by it, the precise relation of which
must be “decoded” by the critic. Art, as other detritus objects, remain “non-identical” to
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ideological appropriations, and dominant narratives—though they can be incorporated,
they are never fully reduced. For Hullot-Kentor, this is the appearance of “truth” in the
77

“extreme” in Benjamin’s sense:

that the truth of an era (or genre) is found more in what

it excludes than includes—for late bourgeois society, the artwork is excluded from
exchange by dint of its being art, hence it is afforded special insight, or has the ability to
“reflect” upon the reality from which it is autonomous. The precise relationship of this
reflection must be read by the critic, who demonstrates the refraction of social reality in
the work, yet also its prismatic quality: as “non-identical” to the existing world, it refracts
that things could be otherwise. As Adorno writes, “…no truer image of hope can be
78

imagined than that of ciphers, readable as traces.”

That such ciphers, and the possibility

of decoding them, points to the fact that things could be otherwise; that reified society has
a historical origin, which can be revealed and moved beyond, in the work of art such
semblances of hope flash up, as a “firework.” Such insights will be elaborated more fully
in his later Aesthetic Theory (1969), though it is important to note that seeds of Adorno’s
later thinking are already latent here.
Benjamin responded to the text enthusiastically with a review in the Vossiche
Zeitung (1933), asserting that Adorno had developed a new model for historical analysis
of the 19th century—that he had unearthed a hidden panorama of affinities linking the
epoch.
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Despite Adorno’s employment of his categories, Benjamin is clearly impressed

by the applications the young Adorno had made with respect to his method—specifically
the practice of endowing myths (images, artworks) with historical power, of reading
ciphers (“historical images”), so as to reveal broader trajectories. Citations from this text
77

As was argued earlier in defining Benjamin’s “Idea” as the constellation of the unique and extreme. See,
Hullot-Kentor, Things Beyond Resemblance, 77-94.
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Adorno, Kierkegaard, 126. This relates more generally to the “dual-character” of art in Adorno’s work,
that works of art are both “autonomous” and “heteronomous” with respect to society: that the conditions for
autonomous (or non-exchangeable) art, where themselves created within exchange society, hence
autonomous art relates to a particular epoch dialectically. Put otherwise, they have a material content within
a given epoch, but an ideal existence outside of it as art. In this definition, one can see many of Benjamin’s
early formulations relating to the Idea. For more on this character of art see AS, 3-22.
79
“And no cultural history of the 19th century will be able to compete with the vividness with which, from
the very centre of his thinking Kierkegaard is here linked with Hegel, now with Wagner, now with Poe,
now with Baudelaire” (SW 2: 704). One can see how Benjamin’s later analyses of Baudelaire employ a
similar method of reading an epoch out of a single work or figure. A study of more depth is warranted on
the specific relationship of Adorno’s Kierkegaard and Benjamin’s work. This relationship will be broached
again in Ch. 3.
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were found in “Convolute N” [N2, 7] of Benjamin’s Arcades, testaments to Adorno’s
influence on the development of his own dialectical image in a potentially political sense.
Benjamin’s 1931 “What is Epic Theatre?” mark some of his first comments on
Brecht, and one can read the text itself as cipher to the influence of Adorno in the
development of his thinking in a political direction; though to Adorno’s dismay, it was in
a Brechtian sense. In his reading of Brecht’s A Man’s a Man (1931), Benjamin comments
upon Brecht’s “Alienation effect” in fashion that anticipates Adorno’s analyses of
Kierkegaard: “[b]ut there exists a view in which even the most usual scenes of
bourgeoisie life appear rather like this [as estranged].”

80

In the same way Adorno’s

historical image estranged one from the myths of the bourgeois intérieur, revealing them
as historical, Brecht’s performances revealed the world as constructible—as capable of
being molded by political action. In his translation of Benjamin’s method, Adorno may
have unwittingly pushed Benjamin further towards Brecht, whose influence will be
clearly demonstrated in the next chapter.
IV. Concluding Remarks: A Betrayal of Immanence?
Peter Sloterdijk’s 1983 Critique of Cynical Reason describes the mutation of critique
throughout the 20th century into an “enlightened false consciousness”: “critique, in any
sense of the word, is experiencing gloomy days. Once again a period of pseudo-critique
has begun, in which critical stances are subordinate to professional roles”
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For

Sloterdijk, the main culprit of this movement is Adorno (and his post-history in the hands
of Habermas)—those who moved “critique” away from its “originary” stance into a
cynical, dogmatic, and self-sufficient enterprise. For Sloterdijk, the critique of the
existing order of things has itself become an aspect of such an order of things. Whether or
not Adorno is to blame for such a movement cannot be decided here; what can be said is
80
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that he was one of the first to inaugurate such concrete applications of Benjamin’s
method. If one were to argue for “critique’s” present actuality—of a redemption of
Marxism, or dialectics—one should take seriously the immanent and constructive
perspective first illuminating it as a meaningful gesture. At stake is perhaps an inquiry
into what is to be redeemed (in both Benjamin and Adorno) for our present moment, a
question which considers both a history of reception (via tradition), while allowing for reconstruction in our “now-time.”
Chastising contemporary movements of “pseudo-critique,” Sloterdijk glosses the
figure of Benjamin as one who inaugurated such a critical movement, yet also perhaps
provides the key to it re-thinking via his recovery of the space (“-ability”) of
construction. In modernity, things have become too close for “disinterested” or removed
(theoretical) contemplation, one must recognize one’s immanent position to both the
present, and tradition. In this way Benjamin (like Socrates) exhibits “dialectical thinking”
in its true sense (dia-logos—movement of the “word”): there can be no fixed positions
(even dialectical ones), what matters is perhaps the recovery of this immanent space of
(re)construction. Benjamin describes the decline of the “removed” Kantian critic, while
alluding to the new possibilities opened by a perspective of immanence:
Fools lament the decay of criticism. For its day is long past. Criticism is a
matter of correct distancing. It was at home in a world where perspectives
and prospects counted and where it was still possible to adopt a standpoint.
Now things press too urgently on human society. The “un-clouded,”
“innocent” [disinterested contemplation] eye has become a lie, perhaps the
whole naïve mode of expression sheer incompetence.82
This early encounter between the two will prove decisive over the coming years,
and for the remainder of this project, with Adorno holding largely to this early model of
criticism, with Benjamin seeking new applications for his critical methodology. This will
entail an application of his model of immanent criticism to a wider range of
phenomena—specifically the historical and political potentials therein.
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2. On Parables: Reading Kafka with Benjamin and Adorno*
“This divine power [violence] is not only attested by religious tradition but is also found
in present-day life in at least one sanctioned manifestation. The educative power [study],
which in its perfected form stands outside the law, is one of its manifestations.”
-Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” SW 1: 250.
“It’s not that the students don’t ‘get’ Kafka’s humor but that we’ve taught them to see
humor as something you get—the same way we’ve taught them that the self is something
you just have.”
-David Foster Wallace, Laughing with Kafka
“Many complain that the words of the wise are always merely parables and of no use in
daily life, which is the only life we have. When the sage says: "Go over," he does not
mean that we should cross over to some actual place, which we could do anyhow if the
labor were worth it; he means some fabulous yonder, something unknown to us,
something too that he cannot designate more precisely, and therefore cannot help us here
in the very least. All these parables really set out to say merely that the incomprehensible
is incomprehensible, and we know that already. But the cares we have to struggle with
every day: that is a different matter.
Concerning this a man once said: Why such reluctance? If you only followed the parables
you yourselves would become parables and with that rid yourself of all your daily cares.
Another said: I bet that is also a parable.
The first said: You have won.
The second said: But unfortunately only in parable.
The first said: No, in reality: in parable you have lost.”
-Kafka, On Parables

*A version of this chapter was published as “On Some Motifs in Kafka (that they exist…): Reading Kafka
with Benjamin (Brecht, Scholem) and Adorno.” in Reclaiming Walter Benjamin for Revolutionary Times,
Heathwood Journal of Critical Theory, 1.3, pp. 61-84.
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I. Only a Parable?
“And what had been the point of all his studying! He had forgotten everything; if he’d had to take up
his studies again here, he would have found it very hard.”
-Kafka, Amerika

Reading Kafka with Adorno and Benjamin is already quite a crowd, and their respective
readings summon up a further polyphony of voices: Scholem, Brecht (at least), and
further, Siegfried Kracauer, Werner Kraft, and Max Brod—a veritable community of
interpreters and commentators. Adorno and Benjamin’s respective considerations of
Kafka (Benjamin 1934, Adorno, 1952-53) can be used to date the emergence and decline
of this interpretative industry that arose following Kafka’s death in 1924. In confronting
Kafka, one is thrown into this community of readers, forced to choose which religion
(Marxism, existentialism, Judaism) Kafka is authoring parables for. Kafka of course
would be in a unique position to appreciate the ironies of such endeavors, and it seems
his work does much to provoke such ambiguity and discord—each motif seems to
convey, yet withdraw in perfect simultaneity. In Kafka we encounter a writer of a
distinctly modern sensibility: one profoundly aware of various interpretative industries,
along with the weight of tradition, and perhaps even the levelling to which these forces
would subject his stories. In this sense, a Kafka as himself is difficult to reach, and
perhaps this was never intended.
Treated in these considerations then will not be Kafka’s work, but rather two
readers of Kafka (Adorno, Benjamin), and the (dis) correspondence this encounter
demonstrates. For Benjamin and Scholem, Kafka provided a stage upon which a complex
theological (-political) dispute could unfold—yet what did his work stage for Adorno and
Benjamin? Adorno claimed that Kafka presented “…our agreement on philosophical
1

fundamentals,” yet this is clearly not the case, as their respective readings reveal
profoundly divergent notions of utopia (Messianism), politics (Marxism), and perhaps the
dignity of philosophy (critique) as such. Hence Kafka becomes the ideal terrain upon
which the dis-correspondence of these two thinkers can be articulated, and each better
illuminated in their respective singularity as correspondents of difference. This episode
demonstrates Adorno’s further employment of Benjamin’s model of criticism (along

1

ABC, 66.
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Marxist lines); beside the development of Benjamin’s dialectical image along materialist
2

(Brechtian), and theological lines (Scholem). Despite this divergence, it will be shown
that the two share a conception of the radical potential of tradition, and the possibilities
therein.
In what follows these respective positions will be articulated and juxtaposed:
beginning with Benjamin (II), it will be demonstrated that his Kafka entails an attempt to
bridge theological tenets formulated against Scholem with the “practical” materialism of
Brecht, all in an attempt to recover a certain sense of (action in) the present moment.
Following this Adorno’s response (III), along with his own reading of Kafka will be
elucidated (IV): despite his claim of accord, it will be demonstrated that Adorno utilizes
Kafka in a critique of capitalist social relations. Fundamentally, each thinker interprets
Kafka from the perspective of his own thought—the parallaxes in their respective
readings relate to a broader chiasmus in their thinking in general. These center broadly on
models of “resistance”—where hope exists in Kafka’s world, and what type of agency is
granted to the subject. Of particular import for Benjamin will be resistance to the
mythical basis of “the law,” and the potentials afforded in Kafka’s work for such a task.
More fundamentally, this episode questions the role “theory” should play in the
formulation of a coming philosophy, or a coming politics. Formulated in these
considerations are two models of “revolutionary criticism”—following Benjamin’s “The
Author as Producer” (1934)—“the critic” must take a stand in the literary struggle,
formulating (collective) images of critique and resistance from within tradition. Each
utilized Kafka to illustrate their own position in such a literary struggle, demonstrative of
their respective understandings of the relationship between art, criticism, and politics.
II. Benjamin’s Kafka (1934-39)
“The decisive moment of human development is continually at hand. This is why those movements of
revolutionary thought that declare everything preceding to be an irrelevance are correct—because as yet
nothing has happened.” -Kafka, The Zürau Aphorisms, #6, p. 8

2

Though Adorno’s “Notes on Kafka,” was written after Benjamin’s death in 1952, much of its original
content was likely developed as early as 1925, and is clearly further influenced by Benjamin’s 1934 essay,
and early models of criticism. However, by the 1950s Adorno was more established as a critic,
supplementing Benjamin’s early model with an “enlightened” mode of critique, attempting to provoke an
understanding of social conditions so as to allow their overcoming.
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It is likely that Benjamin encountered Kafka as early as 1915, though an active concern
for his work did not begin until 1925, with his reading of “Before the Law” (and the
subsequent Trial). For Benjamin, Kafka was a distinctly modern storyteller: one who
expounded the transmutations of his childhood fables under the morose gaze of
modernity. It is in this sense that Benjamin would locate Kafka “…at the crossroads at
which my though had taken,” a figure who articulated the materialist and theological
3

sentiment his thinking would take after 1934. On April 19, 1934 Benjamin conveyed his
desire to Scholem to write a major statement on Kafka, one akin to the Kraus study he
had published three years earlier (1931). Scholem facilitated this via Robert Weltsch
4

(editor of the Jüdische Rundschau), who agreed, and by the ninth of May, Benjamin had
commenced work enthusiastically.
Benjamin began working on Kafka ten years after his death (1924), a time in
which an “author cult” (spearheaded by Max Brod) had begun to emerge, centering on a
5

dominant (Judeo-) theological reading of Kafka’s work. Because of this proximity,
Benjamin is at once writing on Kafka and upon the context of criticism. Benjamin’s work
distances itself from any unitary symbolic interpretation: Kafka was indeed a writer of
Parables, yet these did not refer to, or clarify, some underlying doctrine (Halakhah6)—
hence could not be “explained” via one interpretation. As he writes, “Kafka had a rare
capacity for creating parables for himself. Yet his parables are never exhausted by what is
explainable; on the contrary, he took all conceivable precautions against the

3

BSC. 139. This will be shown as the attempt to develop an immanent model of theology along materialist
lines, which allows for meaningful political action in the present moment. Yet from the perspective of his
theory of criticism, it marked an essential movement of his early theory of criticism away from his earlier
distinctions (“commentary” and “criticism”), towards critical formulations informed by Brecht.
4
The largest circulation of Jewish publication at the time. In the end only the sections “Potemkin” and
“The Little Hunchback” where published, and Benjamin was (to his dismay) paid a mere 60 marks for his
work.
5
Benjamin took a decisive stand against such “Jewish” readings of Kafka, though did attempt to redeem
his own theological interpretation (as will be demonstrated), asserting to Scholem: “My essay has its
own—though admittedly shrouded—theological side.” (BSC, 128). This mania of interpretation is
embodied in Benjamin’s difficulty in procuring a copy of The Trial, which had vanished from his library.
This absence is persistently mentioned in correspondence with Scholem to the extent that Scholem sent him
a copy in Denmark.
6
The Haggadah (parable) seeks to the clarify the Law (Halakhah), yet as a parable it does not exhaust (or
articulate) the law fully. As Jesus told parables which clarified Christian doctrine, but did not reify it into a
specific “law.”
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interpretation of his writings.” This foreclosure of symbolic interpretation leads
8

Benjamin to an allegorical reading of Kafka: treating his texts as incomplete “ruins”
upon which new meanings can be enacted (or constellated). However, Benjamin’s
reading of Kafka marks a substantial shift from his earlier model of criticism. His reading
is clearly immanent: he develops motifs from throughout Kafka’s oeuvre, utilizing these
as lenses by which to un-fold Kafka further. However, these motifs do not attempt to
“reflect” Kafka with respect to the greater un-folding of tradition (esoterically), but to
develop imperatives for political action in the present moment (exoterically). The
influence of Brecht is clear, as Benjamin reads Kafka’s as provoking “astonishment” at
mythical conditions, while providing potential models of resistance. Kafka is not resolved
with respect to tradition, but an element from tradition read (criticized) so as to provoke a
resolution in the present moment. It is an element of tradition, read in constellation with
the present, the former presenting imperatives for the latter. This entails a collapse of
Benjamin’s early distinction between commentary and criticism, a model which become
more unified in his (re)presentation of Kafka’s work. Benjamin also introduces anterior
elements into Kafka’s work, though not as an attempt to reduce it, rather to heighten its
parabolic quality.

9

The completed work, “Franz Kafka: On the Tenth Anniversary of his Death”
(1934), contains two distinct scenes corresponding to the two major interlocutors
Benjamin engaged with during the essay’s composition. In his theological sentiments,
Benjamin is clearly engaged with Scholem, and their prolific correspondence over the
year allowed Benjamin to articulate his own views. In the early summer Benjamin
travelled to Denmark to stay with Brecht, hence his more materialist influence is seen in
the discussions of the “nature theatre” and “gesture.” Both of these correspondents are

7

Benjamin, “Franz Kafka,” SW: 2. 804.
As defined in the Trauerspiel, (contra symbol) as ceding meaning to be immanent to history, as a ruin that
can be endowed with meaning in each epoch. See Ch. 1.
9
Notably Benjamin’s “own parables:” the Pushkin story with which he opens the essay, and the “Little
Hunchback” who is revealed to be Scholem. On the introduction of “external” elements so as to heighten
the parabolic quality of the work, Benjamin writes in “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” with the “stranger”
referring to the parable: “Let us suppose that one makes the acquaintance of a person who is handsome and
attractive but impenetrable, because he carries a secret within him. It would be reprehensible to want to pry.
Still, it would surely be permissible to inquire whether he has any siblings and whether their nature could
perhaps explain somewhat the enigmatic character of the stranger” (SW 1: 333).
8
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actively engaged with Benjamin during his writing process, and the essay itself
crystallizes many of these points. It can be read to discern the current state of Benjamin’s
model of criticism (in 1934), and as an early experimentation of his attempt to resolve the
dialectical image along theological and materialist lines (Ch. 3.). During the composition
of the essay, Benjamin did his best to keep these two anxieties of influence from each
10

other,

though the essay (and his own thinking) attempts to bridge something of their

two perspectives: a rethinking of a sense of political action in the present moment along
theological and materialist lines.

i.

Corresponding Theodicies: Benjamin and Scholem
“It is only our notion of time that allows us to speak of the Last Judgement, in fact it is a court martial.” Kafka, The Zürau Aphorisms #40, p. 41.

Anson Rabinbach notes that Kafka facilitated Benjamin and Scholem’s discussion of the
11

inner most messianic elements of the Jewish tradition, a medium through which the two
could maintain a friendship, though holding divergent notions of theology and revelation.
Many of their views are articulated in correspondence; hence to understand the full
valences of each, they must be articulated in repose. For Scholem—despite his authorship
in German—Kafka did not belong to the Germanic tradition, rather to the redemptive
tradition of Zionism, hence his work should be read prophetically, as a foreshadowing (or
negative image) of an eventual redemption. For Benjamin, Kafka was one who belonged
to both traditions, in fact his thinking could be described as the collapse of this
distinction—an elaboration of the modes by which the profane (historical), could be
12

thought as messianic.

10

Despite this schism, both thinkers agreed that Kafka presents a

This is likely out of fear of disagreement. Brecht repeatedly criticized the mystical elements of Kafka,
while Scholem expressed that he could not comprehend the discussions of “Theatre.” Benjamin further kept
the explicitly Brechtian “Author as Producer” (1934) from Scholem during the year, perhaps out of fear of
straining the friendship. This relationship is also borne out in a “spatial” sense, Benjamin wrote the 2nd half
while in Denmark with Brecht, and these sections are decidedly Brechtian.
11
“Introduction,” BSC. As has been noted, these letters are decidedly more intimate in tone than those with
Adorno, though Scholem expresses continual dismay at Benjamin’s aversion to explicit Jewish readings of
Kafka.
12
In a letter from December 17,1934, Adorno claims this utilization of Kafka against the theological
tradition to be “decisive” (ABC, 67). Here both are unified in a shared understanding of the radical potential
of tradition. It should be emphasized that despite maintaining a “theological” reading of Kafka, Scholem is
by no means a conventional zealot of the Kafka cult, in fact many of his statements can be read as attempts
to demonstrate the relevance of Jewish categories in modernity.
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fractured relationship between The Parable and The Law (Haggadah and Halakhah).
Kafka was not the founder of a religion; thus the fundamental question became: what is
to be deciphered (or decided) in Kafka’s world? Would there be a last judgment, or
redemption of the profane realm (in a Marxist or more secular sense)? Or more
fundamentally, is there a Law (Halakhah) that can be discerned behind Kafka’s Parables
(Haggadah)?
Parenthesis: The Law
“Pre-history [is] Kafka’s secret present.” Benjamin, GS II 3. 1165.
13

“The Law”

should be understood in a multivalent sense: as a primordial, or un-bounded

force [Gewalt]; as that which the parable seeks to clarify, but can never articulate or
exhaust fully. As a primordial entity, the law gives sense to its various manifestations
(both legal, and religious), but is not reducible to its particular instantiations. During his
summer in Denmark (1934) Benjamin wrote to Scholem: “I hold Kafka’s steady
insistence on the law to be the blind spot of his work, by which I only want to say, that it
appears to me impossible to put it interpretively into motion by way of this notion,” the
drafts of the letter go further in disavowing “the law” as “…the drawer of a mystery14

monger.”

Readers of Kafka’s work will likely find such statements puzzling, especially

given the primacy of the legal process in his writings. Such bewilderment is likely due to
15

the conflation of definite and indefinite denotation (i.e. “laws” with “The Law.” );
indeed Kafka depicts legal proceedings with clerk like clarity, yet the telos or force of
such proceedings is rarely broached. The force or basis of “the law” is read by Benjamin
as the central aspect of Kafka’s work, hence the “semblance like character…” of its
16

particular instantiations (laws), “…that in truth are only for display.”

The “enigmatic”

or “semblance-like” character of the law demonstrates not that it is unimportant, rather
13

For more on Benjamin’s relationship to the law in Kafka’s work see: Gasché’s “Kafka’s Law: In the
Field of forces between Judaism and Hellenism,” and Agamben’s Potentialities, “The Messiah and the
Sovereign: The problem of the Law in Walter Benjamin.”
14
11.9.1934. Ibid. 135-136. The phrase “mystery-monger” is a modified phrase of Brecht’s describing the
mystical elements of Benjamin’s reading, betraying his growing influence upon the text. Benjamin, GS II 3,
1245.
15
Benjamin employs this distinction via Werner Kraft who argues for a distinction between “the law” and
“laws” in Kafka’s work. Benjamin asserts the “laws” to have merely a “semblance like character,” focusing
instead on the primordial “force” of the law. See GS II 3, 1250 (trans. Gasché).
16
Benjamin, GS II 3, 1172 (trans. Gasché).
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that it draws its authority (or force) from some ambiguous else-where, what Gasché will
17

define as the “…lawless character of the law” —a mythical and “law preserving
violence [Gewalt]” (as in Benjamin’s 1921 “Critique of Violence”).
For Benjamin this is due to the fundamental metamorphosis undergone by the law
in modernity, and Kafka’s work presents such a transformation. Kafka’s world exposes a
context of sovereignty in which the law has regressed to the mythical forces of “prehistory”—to the pure force, of the law presented as “second nature”—everywhere it
appears as “open” (as in “Before the Law”), yet by merging with the setting it continues
to govern through the mystical ambiguity of fate (“pre-history”). Here Benjamin alludes
to the work of Bachofen, whose studies present the matriarchal “swamp-world” as the
basis of modern patriarchal authority, a world ruled by arbitrary and mythical decrees.18
For Benjamin, Kafka’s world demonstrates that such a mystical origin of authority has
not been overcome, and the law still governs through such mystical forces of “prehistory.” What Kafka presents is the mythical “truth” of authority.
Such a regression of capitalist-modernity to mythology is discussed in Benjamin’s
1921 “Capitalism as Religion:” “[c]apitalism is probably the first instance of a cult that
19

creates guilt, note atonement.”

Capital enacts a metamorphosis of personal obligations

into those of exchange, rendering them relations of creditor and debtor [Schulden] by
disseminating guilt [Schuld] (and accusation) generally. This processes is seen in Kafka
through the conflation of laws from various spheres: the law of the father, and the last
judgment amount to the same thing. As Benjamin puts it, “the sin of which they [the
fathers] accuse their sons seems to be a kind of original sin.”

20

These various spheres

have been combined into one terrifying law, which determines guilt through accusation,
17

Gasché, “Kafka’s Law,” 979. An affinity is evident here with the “a-moral” origin of morality throughout
Nietzsche’s work, that the categories of “good” and “evil” are founded upon deeper power relations.
Specifically, Genealogy of Morals.
18
Johan Jakob Bachofen, a 19th-century Swiss philologist and legal theorist notable for his 1861 text
Mother Right, which argued that modern patriarchal authority gained its “force” from the mythological
power of the mother in more “primitive” times. This conception of “pre-history” will be elucidated in more
detail in Ch. 3. For more on Benjamin’s relationship with Bachofen see “Johan Jakob Bachofen,” SW 3:
11-23.
19
Benjamin, “Capitalism as Religion,” SW 1: 288.
20
Benjamin, “Franz Kafka,” SW 2: 796. For an elaboration of the relation between guilt and debt see
Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality, specifically the “Second Treatise: Guilt and Bad Conscience.”
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and to which none have access: “It is characteristic of this legal system, that one is
21

sentenced not only in innocence, but also in ignorance.”

What is essential to note in

Benjamin’s analysis of myth and its relation to capitalism and modernity is that he does
not date them as specific, or historical epochs—rather, he describes such forces in a
strangely primordial, and archetypal sense. This point will become central in his
discussions with Adorno, for whom critique must demarcate the emergence of such
myths as specific historical material circumstances so as to break the spell of reification,
allowing them to be overcome.
Justice [Recht] will be of little help either (one need only recall Joseph K’s fate in
The Trial). As Benjamin argues in “Critique of Violence” (1921): myth bastardizes
22

“divine violence” in the creation of the law —hence what appears as “justice” is in
reality a “violence crowned by fate,” the “law preserving violence” at the heart of the
law. In Kafka’s world, the law is presented as equally un-just [unrecht], yet it is perhaps
this corruptibility that provides the semblance of hope in Kafka’s world—one must
employ cunning, and other means of deferral, rather than attempt to get justice on one’s
side. K. grasps something of this in his discussions with Titorelli (The Trial) —one will
not be proved innocent, yet can prevent the trial from reaching conclusion, the small hope
that exists in deferral: ““What is common to both methods is that they prevent the
accused from being sentenced.” “But they also prevent him from being really acquitted”
said K.”

23

Thus the truth of the law in Kafka’s world.

In this horrific world of myth explicit law may be of some help, a mode of
structuring existence against the myths and fate of “second nature”—“…written law
24

being one of the first victories scored over this world” — yet not as a moral victory,
simply as a mode of deferral. For the Jews in exile such written law (The Torah,
Kabballah), provided a way of dealing with the force of the divine, and their condition as

21

Benjamin, “Franz Kafka,” SW 2: 797. Kafka’s The Judgment can be read as demonstrative of this
conflation of legal levels (the father and last judgment). The son’s condemnation by the father is also his
damnation, and cause his death in the stories final scene.
22
“Once again all eternal forms are available to pure divine violence, which myth bastardizes with law.”
Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” SW 1: 252.
23
Kafka, The Trial, 115.
24
Benjamin, “Franz Kafka,” SW 2: 797.
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émigrés—remaining on the level of the Haggadah in an attempt to glimpse the Halakhah.
In this sense it could be taken as a textual “truth” underlying various parables, the
doctrine that permeates any religious articulation or expression. It is this relationship of
explicit law (or critique) that will become important in Benjamin’s discussions with both
Scholem, and Adorno.
The question can now be posed, what is to be done with respect to this law?
Should one attempt to understand it rationally in the form of critique (as the “man from
the country” in Before the Law)? Or can other modes of resistance be elaborated that
allow one to shed guilt and act meaningfully in the present moment? For Benjamin,
within this context resistance will not come from enlightenment or articulation of this
law, for it has regressed into pre-history and myth instead one must formulate new
gestures of resistance, models of which Benjamin finds in Kafka’s interstitial
“assistants.” To understand the radicalism of Benjamin’s model it is necessary to
articulate it against Scholem’s more orthodox theology, in which the possibility of an
articulation of “The Law” still exists, however slight.
***
For Scholem Kafka’s world is a nihilism in need of redemption—the “nothingness of
25

revelation” (Nichts der Offenbarung) — or rather, the nothingness prior to redemption.
The scripture (Law) of its understanding is not “lost,” yet cannot be deciphered at this
moment. It relates allegorically to the exile of the Jews own tradition: an exile outside of
life, and outside the village—into a finitude of understanding. The task of thinking
becomes a certain “redemptive quietism” in this dissolution—the scouring of these
Parables for a glimpse of the (true) law and a judgment that may (or has already)
26

occur(ed).

Writing to Benjamin, Scholem describes the world in which revelation

appears as a “nothingness,” as that which manifests as “force without signification:”

25

“Kafka’s world is the world of revelation, but of revelation seen from the perspective in which it would
be returned to is own “nothingness”” (BSC, 127). In this sense it is a revelation that even if it did occur,
would likely remain un-noticed. Though it still exists as a possibility to come.
26
Scholem asserts that such moments exist in Kafka, as the priest in The Trial who provides possible
interpretations of the parable “Before the Law.” For Scholem this is testament to the existence of the law in
Kafka’s work, though it is glimpsed only slightly.
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You ask what I understand by the “nothingness of revelation”? I understand
by it a state in which revelation appears to be without meaning, in which it
still asserts itself, in which it has validity but no significance [Force without
significance]. A state in which the wealth of meaning is lost and what is in
the process of appearing (for revelation is such a process) still doe not
disappear, even though it is reduced to the zero point of its own content, so
to speak27
Scholem will later write, describing the possibility of a future deciphering of the
law:
Those pupils of whom you speak at the end are not so much those who
have lost the scripture…but rather those students who cannot decipher
it.28
For Scholem (and later Adorno), this element of “decipherability” (contra absence) holds
open the possibility that redemption may in fact manifest itself, though its content cannot
be recognized at this moment. Hence a hermeneutic importance is placed upon “study:”
through engagement with “the law” (in Scholem’s case the Torah) one can catch a
glimpse of the messianic moments hidden in the present. In this sense Scholem’s
nihilism (“nothingness”) is not absolute, revelation appears as “force without
signification,” as a form in which could potentially be filled with content (a site of
deferral). Theologically, Scholem’s view is more orthodox, entailing a dialectical
messianism (negative theology), that the further the world moves toward nihilism, and
away from redemption, the greater the possibility the messiah (“Angel of History”) will
manifest itself. One could elaborate such a conception to point to a broader dialectical
(materialist) messianism endemic to “critical theory:” hope exists that some future
“enlightenment” (class consciousness) will liquidate present mythologies. A critique of
such positivist thinking will be shown central to Benjamin’s formulation of meaningful
political action (Ch. 3.). Writing to Benjamin, Scholem poetically articulates this gesture
29

further: though the law cannot be discerned at this moment there is a possibility (as-if )
placed over the profane present.
“Thus alone teaching that breaks through semblance
27

BSC, 142.
Ibid. 127.
29
A concept employed by Jacob Taubes to describe a certain utopian function constantly maintained—the
maintenance of the potential of redemption, as a function of critique, art or philosophy. See Taubes, The
Political Theology of St. Paul, 70.
28

52

Enters the Memory
The Truest bequest
Of hidden judgment.”30
In this sense redemption—though absent and indefinite in its arrival—is something
deferred. Regardless of its actuality, its potential still exercises influence upon the present
moment: “Oh, we must live all the same // Until your court examines us.”31 For Scholem,
redemption—though wholly other—can occur in an absolute and Messianic sense. All
action in the present must exist in pious anticipation (study) of this arrival—the time in
which Kafka’s crooked world will be made straight. There is hope in this deferral, in the
future possibility that a slight alteration could reveal the law in its totality. Hence
Scholem will critique Benjamin’s view that the true Law (or revelation) is absent in
Kafka’s world. It is absent, but not foreclosed as a possibility.
For Benjamin, this hope exists, but perhaps not for us. Hope in Kafka” world is
different: it exists only for those fringe figures, the assistants, the students, Karl
32

Rossmann. The figures endowed with “the small and nonsensical hope” —those for
whom the “nothingness of revelation” has come, and perhaps catch a glimpse of this,
33

“…nothing which makes anything possible.”

Hope comes only for those who ally

themselves wholly with immanence. For Benjamin, the law is not indiscernible, it is lost:
hence there is no “as-if” of redemption, only immanent “life.”
…you take the “nothingness of revelation” as your point of departure…I
take as my starting point the small nonsensical hope, as well as the
creatures for who this hope is intended and yet now on the other hand are
also the creatures in which this absurdity is mirrored…Whether the pupils
have lost it [the law], or whether they are unable to decipher it comes down
to the same thing, because without the key that belongs to it, the Scripture is
not scripture but life. Life as it is lived in the Village at the foot of the hill
on which The Castle is built.34

30

BSC, 124.
Ibid. 125.
32
Ibid. 134. Those for whom the “nothingness of revelation is intended,” that is those who take seriously
the nihilism of the present world, and do not hold out for redemption or some world to come, they simply
do their duty in the present moment.
33
Benjamin, “Franz Kafka,” SW 2: 813.
34
Ibid. 135.
31
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(For Benjamin) Kafka is uninterested in providing a model by which the last judgment
could be transplanted upon the profane, rather he begins to think redemption in a wholly
profane and immanent sense. Kafka depicts the impotence of Messianism (redemption),
while this non-existence fractures into the category of “life:” a newly awakened power of
35

“weak messianism” in Kafka’s individuals.

They remain upon the level of the profane

(immanence), and attempt to win “victory over that nothingness,” as Kafka attempted to
36

“…feel his way toward redemption.”

With this foreclosure of the redemption to come
37

one can perhaps gain a renewed sense of the present moment.
Excursus: Brod, Scholem and Benjamin.

“Martyrs do not underestimate the body, they allow it to be hoisted up onto the cross. In that way they are
like their enemies.” Kafka, The Zürau Aphorisms, #33, p. 33.

In 1938-39 Benjamin was working predominantly on Baudelaire, though he continued to
read (literature on) Kafka intermittently. In mid- June of 1938 he sent a review of Max
38

Brod’s Franz Kafka: A Biography

to Scholem, attempting to interest Salman Schocken

in a full-length book on Kafka. Though the endeavor failed, the letter depicts Kafka in a
somewhat divergent light than 1934. Benjamin presents Kafka (perhaps via Baudelaire)
as a thinker of the modern urban experience, one who witnesses the malaise of tradition
in the Metropolitan setting. One could read this essay as a mode of thinking the changed
relationship to tradition occurring in modernity. For Benjamin, Kafka uses tradition
against itself: “[he] does not simply lie down…rather cuffs tradition [via Parables] with a
weighty paw.”

39

In this employment of the parable, Kafka (and Benjamin) shock

tradition out of complacency, allowing it to be re-combined, and re-cited in the present
moment. One should not use the parable to clarify some “truth,” rather as a critical tool to
open the present for political action.
35

Not all come to this realization—of his hero’s perhaps only Karl Rossman, and the assistants and clerks
who do their duty as they can. Joseph K. fails in this realization, holding out for the revelation of justice
(The Trial), and a “way” to the Castle (The Castle)—failing in both endeavors.
36
BSC, 129.
37
Scholem is frustrated at Benjamin’s refusal to be explicitly religious and remaining on the “profane”
side. “You had the moral world right before your eyes with its abysses and dialectics.” BSC, 127. Though
one could argue that Scholem misses the possibilities of “profane illumination” Benjamin is advocating.
38
This letter was later published as “Some Reflections on Kafka” (in Illuminations) along with a review in
a similar tone, “Review of Brod’s Franz Kafka,” SW 3: 217-19.
39
BSC, 225.
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Following this, the letter turns savagely upon Brod’s treatment of Kafka, claiming
that Brod attempted a pious reading of Kafka for his own purposes. 40 Hence the work
41

contains little beyond “Kafkaesque ignorance and Brodeseque Sagacity,”
42

searching on the part of the biographer.”

a “…soul

Benjamin further criticizes Brod’s control over

the execution of Kafka’s estate: his attempt to “save” Kafka had proved destructive, due
to his inability to grant Kafka adequate distance, and his shrouding of Kafka in a mystical
religion. 43 Though not as polemical as his criticism of the mystical Goethe cult, these
considerations contain common imperatives for the development of a constructive view
of authorship: to allow the author to speak on his/her own terms, and to not impose a
category of myth (symbol) from outside so as to miss the struggle against myth in every
literary work.
Via Kafka and Brod it is possible to think through the question of correspondence
and its mutation into the execution of an estate: how will one be thought retroactively by
way of one’s correspondence or correspondents? Despite Brod’s elegy of saintliness,
Benjamin wants to emphasize that Kafka should be thought as a failure— “to do justice
to the figure of Kafka one must never lose sight of one thing: it is the purity and beauty of
a failure…One is tempted to say: once he was certain of his failure everything worked
out for him en route as though in a dream. There is nothing more memorable than the
fervor with which Kafka emphasized his failure.”

44

However it is this failure, or

incompleteness at the site of origin (Ch. 1), that allows the work to be endowed with
radically new senses via tradition, that is, experimented with via the formation of
constellations.
45

Given the circumstances under which Benjamin authored this statement, it is not
difficult to glimpse that Kafka’s failure is Benjamin’s own. In a sense Benjamin is

40

The main thesis of the work being that “Kafka found himself on the road to Sainthood.” Ibid. 218.
BSC, 216.
42
Ibid. 221.
43
“He [Brod] is clearly making an effort to be-little any future writing on Kafka” (ibid. 222).
44
BSC, 214. This idea evokes Kafka’s “Imperial Message,” in which the letter does not arrive, though the
recipient dreams it to completion; suggesting that its arrival is not what is essential.
45
It could be said that the conditions imposed by political upheaval, and exile marked Benjamin as a
“failed” intellectual. He was unable to complete many of his planned works (The Arcades, Baudelaire), yet
continued to work out of an understanding of the pure process (failure) of intellectual activity. Scholem is
41
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providing a means by which to approach his own elegy. He should not be thought as a
divine or complete thinker (Marxist or mystic), but rather as fragmentary, and
incomplete—one shrouded in failure and melancholy. With this rejection of totality
(transcendence) Benjamin managed to regain a sense of immanence: a “weak
messianism,” and a purity of means by which one could act and create in the present
moment, without reference to the future. This sentiment is echoed in one of the last letters
to Scholem: “Every line we succeed in publishing today—no matter how certain the
future to which we entrust it—is a victory from the forces of darkness.”

46

With this one

glimpses a certain sense of the pure process, which is Benjamin’s writing. It is not an
attempt at saintliness, or intellectual grandeur; rather the development of the autonomy of
thinking for the present moment. This could even be asserted as Benjamin’s identity as a
correspondent: his letters are not written for the Other, or some estate (as Adorno), rather
they are immanent and genuine attempts to encounter the Idea. As in Kafka’s “Imperial
Message,” the letter will perhaps never arrive, but it is the purity of means which counts,
the dream that will see it to its conclusion.
***

ii.

Studying Outside the Law

“Perhaps these studies had amounted to nothing. But they are very close to that nothing which alone makes
it possible for something to be useful—that is, they are very close to the Tao.” Benjamin, “Franz Kafka”
SW 2: 813.

Given the theological sentiment of the absent or indecipherable Law, the gesture of
“study” must undergo a fundamental metamorphosis. What form can study have if it is
taken outside the law?

47

Further, can such a model provide meaningful avenues of

similarly moved by this understanding, and his care for the estate of Benjamin can be seen in his Walter
Benjamin: The Story of a Friendship—the crafting of an image of “friendship” (contra Adorno) around the
figure of Benjamin.
46
BSC, 262.
47
For Benjamin this is also the question of “criticism” in modernity. How is the critic to relate to the text in
the absence of “truth” as the guarantor of meaning? As has been shown, Benjamin’s model of criticism
attempts to embrace the transience of history (tradition) within ever work. With respect to this, Benjamin’s
work can be said to anticipate many of the insights of deconstruction, see Weber, “An Afterlife of –
abilities: Derrida,” Benjamin’s –Abilities, 122.
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resistance to myth? In response to these questions, Benjamin draws attention to Kafka’s
Amerika (1927), a text oft overlooked, and tonally different from the rest of Kaka’s work:
“That Amerika is a very special case is indicated by the name of its hero… he undergoes
a rebirth and acquires a new name.”

48

“Joseph K,” is metamorphosed into the inquiring

and optimistic Karl Rossman, a man who attempts to get by in America, yet stumbles
upon the “nothing” which conditions all things in The Nature Theatre of Oklahoma (the
books final chapter). In one particular episode—after fleeing his (ex) assistant
Delamarche—he interrupts a student reticently studying: ““Am I disturbing you?” Asked
Karl, “of course of course”” yet it is unclear what has been interrupted, as the studies to
not seem to be getting anywhere.

49

In fact, the dimly lit environment, and the student’s

readiness to interact with Karl cast doubt on his diligence, and Kafka does much to
convey that the end (telos) of these studies may be beside the point. The student’s
gestures resemble a monotonous form of prayer, an ascetic repetition, which reaches far
50

beyond the normal range of “study.”

For Benjamin, these students are part of the interstitial class that inhabits Kafka’s
world, “…a clan which reckons with the brevity of life in a peculiar way.”

51

This

includes “the assistants”, the hunger-artists, the gatekeepers; those who attain a certain
quietus through the monotony and immensity of their tasks. Or it is these tasks which
keep them from being accused. As Benjamin is apt to note, it is these figures who
understand the logic of Kafka’s world—the way to The Castle, the law, or the means to
avoid The Trial—and this is because the elect only to do what is in their power. In an
extremely Taoist moment Benjamin writes regarding the students: “perhaps these studies
had amounted to nothing. But they are very close to that nothing which alone makes it
52

possible for something to be useful.”

48

In their foreclosure of “ends” (teleology,

Benjamin, “Franz Kafka,” SW 2: 800.
Kafka, Amerika, 262.
50
As Benjamin later asserts: “The crowning achievement of asceticism is study.” “Franz Kafka,” SW 2:
813.
51
Ibid. 813. This student is perhaps Kafka himself, as it is mentioned he is a clerk by day, and a “student”
by night; Kafka too was a clerk by day, writing stories (or studying) in the evening.
52
Ibid. 813.
49

57

revelation), these figures awaken the power of “life” in the present moment—of a life
lived as “means” for itself.
It is precisely because their gestures are “useless,” that they are the most
essential—because they do not aim for some future goal, they come to understand what
“life” could mean as lived for itself in the present. In their monotony they catch a glimpse
of the “nothingness of revelation”—the insight that “hammering is real hammering and at
53

the same time nothing” —that is, the space of construction that is the present moment.
Through repetitions such as “study,” or “hammering,” they come to understand
“nothingness” not as empty, but as something which could be filled with meaning
through human action, not divine revelation. In the reversal of the students (against
progress, telos) the messianism of Scholem is fractured into the weak messianism of
Benjamin.
Speaking to the possibilities afforded by this nothingness, Eli Friedlander writes:
“In the condition in which nothing can be achieved, fulfillment can only be realized in
54

what has already been achieved.”

Repetitions, such as study, move against progress (or

teleology), as Klee’s Angel of History, enacting a reversal in hope is placed in the past.
With this turn away from progress, the students ally themselves with the past (via the
present), yet as Benjamin’s “Little Hunchback” they do not overextend themselves
beyond what is necessary, rather they reckon to change only what is in their power. In
this sense they are Kafka’s messiahs, those who remain reticent, yet do not overreach
their redemptive capacities: “weak messiahs” par excellence.
For Samuel Weber, Kafka’s reversal recovers the pure Mittleilbarkeit (Ability-)

55

of

language: a language of means (life): one outside the law of religious doctrine, or ends as
such. This is the language Benjamin attempts to harness so as to adequately speak
(politically) of the present moment. This would entail the transmutation of “study”
53

Benjamin, “Franz Kafka,” SW 2: 813.
Friedlander, Walter Benjamin, 217.
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Weber stresses this as the “pure potential” of language as such, that is the “–ability” of language to
become “iterable” (Derrida) and re-inscribable. He further asserts that “pure-language” in the sense of
Benjamin’s “On Language as Such” is just this progression, or infinite translatability of language. See
Benjamin’s –Abilities, 53-95. In foreclosing future revelation one gains the “-ability” of reconstruction in
the present moment.
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outside the Law, and perhaps Kafka’s parables are attempts to enact this; to articulate a
life that could be lived at the foot of The Castle in the absence of doctrine or dogma.
After all Kafka’s parables take a swipe at the authority of the text—at myth—and through
a certain cunning of storytelling can aid in the maintenance of the present moment as the
site of construction. Such stories must always be retold from the perspective of the
present, employing the past in constellation so as to open the present as sight of
fulfillment. Speaking to this ability of the parable, Benjamin writes:
Kafka’s genius lay in the fact that he tried something altogether new: he
gave up truth [The Law] so that he could hold to its transmissibility, the
[parabolic] haggadic element. Kafka’s writings are by their nature
parables. But that in their misery and their beauty, that they had become
more than parables.56
In giving up truth, Kafka gained the possibility of trying something new—of
experimentation. As Brecht does, he sacrifices the plot (via the parable form) so that
individual gestures can become meaningful for a coming politics. In this context such
repetitive gestures gain a further revelatory quality: they become informative to the
habits that abound in modernity, the “optical unconscious” that conditions human action.
Through the interruption and repetition of gesture one glimpses the theatre that is played
57

at in Kafka’s world (and modernity): “The Nature Theatre (of Oklahoma).”

This

theatrical sentiment is exemplary of Brecht’s influence upon the piece in the latter half of
1934, and one can see that much of the piece entails a response Brecht’s imperatives
regarding Kafka.

iii.

Recovering Gestus: Brecht

“The true path is along a rope, not a rope suspended way up in the air, but rather only just over the ground.
It seems more like a tripwire than a tightrope.” Kafka, The Zürau Aphorisms, #1, p. 3.

Benjamin’s Notes from Svenbørg (1934) recount conversations and experiences with
Brecht surrounding the composition of the Kafka piece. Due to its dialogical form, it is
difficult to discern from whom each point is generated—thus the text itself could be
considered a text composed in correspondence. The importance of Brecht’s opinion is
56

BSC, 225.
In the text Benjamin subtly switches terms from the “The Nature Theatre of Oklahoma” (Amerika) to the
“Nature Theatre” (of Modernity). Evoking the perpetual theatre of modernity.
57
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emphasized throughout, and it is clear that Benjamin’s stay in Denmark heavily
influenced many of his conceptions of Kafka. For Brecht, Kafka was a great artist, yet a
failure in a more fundamental sense: there is great artistic merit, but it is overly mystical
containing little of practical value for resistance or politics. As Brecht argues, “[y]ou will
find a number of very useful things. The Images are good. The rest is just mystery
mongering. It is nonsense. You must ignore it. You cannot make progress with depth.
58

Depth is simply a dimension; it is just depth—in which nothing can be seen.”

For

Brecht, Kafka bestows little agency for politics, the image of which is a “…man who has
59

fallen at the wheels,”

60

who “… offers scarcely any resistance; he is wise.”

Benjamin is

clearly affected by Brecht’s biting remarks, which are directed against an esoteric thread
61

he sees running through both Benjamin and Kafka.

This mysticism beclouds the

materialist human agency Brecht perceived as necessary for political action. Given these
criticisms, it becomes possible to read much of Benjamin’s essay as a response to
Brecht’s imperatives—demonstrating that theology and materialism can be brought
together in a meaningful sense. As aforementioned, Benjamin’s theology restores a sense
of “pure-means” in the present, revealing the nothing, which would make any action
(political or otherwise), meaningful. Put otherwise, Kafka aids in recovering a certain
dignity of the present moment (“weak messianism”) which is essential for any “practical”
action.
In this sense, the discussions of “gesture,” and “theatre” throughout the piece
entail an attempt to bridge these two realms (theological, political), and the two figures
(Scholem, and Brecht) associated with these concerns. Providing an image of such a
resolution, Benjamin recalls the final scene from Amerika:
[In Kafka] …man is on the stage from the very beginning. The proof is the fact
that everyone is hired by the Nature Theatre. What the standards for
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Admission are cannot be determined…all that is expected of the applicants is
the ability to play themselves.62
Upon his entrance to the Nature Theatre, Karl becomes “transparent, pure, without
character,” an individual who is aware of nothingness of all things, or rather the theatre
63

that is perpetually being played.

For Benjamin, this summons Brecht’s “Chinese
64

Theatre” “…which is a theatre of gesture,”

in which actions are endowed with meeting

via their episodic context, they are a nothingness in themselves. Kafka’s stories should be
read as “plays” performed in the “Nature Theatre.” They do not have a definitive
symbolic (historical) meaning, rather an allegorical or episodic nature; relating not to a
65

specific idea, rather (self-referentially) to the practice of gesture or action as such. In
fact these gestures generate a narrative around themselves, and are perhaps the condition
of all narrative. As Benjamin asserts, “Each gesture is an event—one might even say a
drama—in itself. The stage on which this drama takes place is the World Theatre, which
66

opens towards heaven.”

The immensity of individual gesture in Kafka opens past the

individual story or parable which contains it, demonstrating the power of gesture itself—
“…the gestures of Kafka’s figures are too powerful for our accustomed surroundings and
break out into wider areas.”
(alienation effect):

68
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Reminiscent of the Brechtian image of “Astonishment”

the overtly dramatic nature of these gestures shocks one into an

analysis of the conditions of ones own Gestus, of the social relations constraining
“action,” while eluding to the modes by which they may be overcome.
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Thus it is seen that “studying” (theology) and “acting” (gesture) amount to the
same thing: a repetition which leads to a realization of the “nothing” which conditions all
possibility. For Weber, this element of repetition (or re-staging) allows a certain
perspective, or freedom regarding the possibilities of the present moment. In reinventing
a subject with a minimal distance from itself, one is able to regain a sense of sovereignty:
the possibility of a definitive action other than the course of things. As Kafka’s allegory
69

always contains the possibility of an “about-face”

at the last moment, we too discover

the singularity of the “now-time,” the existence of the present as the “true state of
exception” for sovereign action. This is the sense of Benjamin’s pronouncement in “The
Author as Producer” (1924): that the chance of Epic Theatre lies in its ability to
“…expose the present moment,”
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and the possibilities therein.

For both Brecht and Benjamin, modernity exposes the body to various forms of
reproduction (and automation) divesting it of its traditional models of support. Yet this
destruction of human “aura” opens the new possibility of experimentation—one gains
the possibility to reconstruct oneself, and tradition anew. It is this site of pure possibility:
of the nothing which makes everything possible, that Kafka’s gestures recover. The
students not only study the law in their gestures, but recover the difference of themselves
in their repetitions. Hence the inflation of the most minute gestures in Kafka’s work:
clapping can appear as “steam hammers,” (“Up in the Gallery”) and study can recover
the potential inherent in the present moment.
Thus the figure of resistance in Benjamin’s Kafka (and his thought in general) is
the assistant, student, or hunch-back: one who forecloses future revelation to return to the
space of construction in the present moment. As will be demonstrated in Ch. 3, such a
space of construction can also be accessed via constellations with possibilities in the
past. Such a re-thinking of the present moment is essential for Benjamin’s position on
utopianism, and perhaps his fundamental difference from Scholem and Adorno. In his
“Theologico- Political Fragment” (1921/37) Benjamin banishes Messianism (Utopia)
from the historical realm—“Therefore, the Kingdom of God is not the telos of the
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historical dynamic; it cannot be established as a goal.”

Hence politics must be practiced

as “nihilism,” as an embrace of our “weak messianic” capacities in the present against
the transience and decay of history. Jacob Taubes locates this separation as decisive—
Benjamin maintains the Messiah as wholly other, as something that cannot be hoped for
in the future.
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He does not falter on this distinction, as Scholem who holds the

possibility (postponement) of redemption over the present as an “as-if”; or as Adorno
who “aestheticizes the problem,” making redemption a function of criticism and aesthetic
appreciation. For Benjamin (as Kafka), the messiah was missed, hence Utopia must be
banished, so we are able to reclaim our capacities to act in the present moment. It is in
this sense that Benjamin cedes all transcendence and should be considered a wholly
immanent thinker. Taubes surmises this as follows, alluding to the dis-correspondence
between Benjamin and Adorno:
The drawbridge comes from the other side. And when you get fetched or
not, as Kafka describes it, is not up to you. One can take the elevators up to
the high-rises of spirituality—it won’t help…there is a prius, an a priori.
Something has to happen from the other side; then we see, when our eyes
are pierced open. Otherwise we see nothing. Otherwise we ascend, we
strive until the day after tomorrow. Adorno can’t let go. He’s an aesthete,
after all. Music then has a soteriological role. Neither Benjamin not Barth
could go for such naïve notions.73
III. Corresponding over Kafka: Adorno’s Response
“From the true opponent, a limitless courage flows into you.” Kafka, The Zürau Aphorisms # 23, p. 23.

In 1934 Adorno was elaborating his own views of epistemology via a reading of Husserl
(Against Epistemology), continuing to employ elements of Benjamin’s early method. By
December of the year he had read Benjamin’s Kafka, to which he pens a lengthy
74

response noting immediately the “extraordinary impression”

the work made upon him.

Despite his expression of philosophical agreement, there is a hint of melancholy in his
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response—a sentiment that he was too late to influence the essay in the sense Brecht and
Scholem were able to do.
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The exact character of Adorno’s influence upon the essay is
76

difficult to discern. Adorno had written on Kafka in 1925,

in which he described Kafka

as an inverse theologian, viewing our earthly life (photographically) as a negative image
from the standpoint of redemption. Through this Adorno insists on a “secret coded
character of our theology,”

77

centered on the absent law which aligns him with

Benjamin’s considerations. Yet from the preceding exegesis it is evident that Adorno is
mistaken on this point: Benjamin is not advocating a negative theological reading of
Kafka (as Scholem does), but rather a reclamation of the concept of “life” with its
resonances for action in the present moment.
This dis-correspondence anticipates a later dissonance surrounding Baudelaire
(1938-39) and the importance of “dialectical mediation;” as Adorno criticizes
Benjamin’s concept of “nothingness” and wants to transcribe it back to Hegelian
territory (“being as nothingness”). For Adorno, Benjamin does not mediate his
considerations properly as, “images pass as lightening without interpretation.”
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This

hinges fundamentally on what Adorno terms Benjamin’s “insufficient grasp of the
archaic:” the idea that the world of “myth” must be interpreted (dialectically) from the
standpoint of enlightenment, or history—a thesis Adorno heavily advances regarding
Benjamin’s Arcades (Ch. 3). Hence Adorno is criticizing Benjamin’s description of the
law via mythological categories—Adorno argues that Benjamin simply presents such
categories, and fails to provide a model by which they might be resisted.
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Hence

Adorno will view Benjamin’s Kafka as an “incomplete” work, a precursor to the larger
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Arcades Project in which the relationship between the “Archaic” (myth) and “Modern”
(enlightenment) would be clarified. What is essential is that Adorno will not grant
Benjamin’s (Brechtian) resolution of Kafka’s work, instead holding fast to early
distinction between “critique” and “commentary.” It is not enough for Benjamin to
simply “present” (comment upon) the myths of Kafka’s world, rather the critic must
decode the precise points at which political action could take place. Further, one must
endow the subject with (enlightenment) agency with which to overcome such myths. For
Adorno, the critic possesses the enlightened key to “decoding” the work of art.
In reference to such a denial of subjective agency, Adorno explicitly critiques the
Brechtian “nature theatre”: “Kafka’s novels are not screenplays for experimental theatre,
since they lack in principle the very spectator who might intervene in such
80

experiments.”

However, with this Adorno is closer to Brecht’s critique of Kafka than

he would concede, declaring that Kafka is not bestowing agency upon the individual,
rather demonstrating their situation at the mercy of larger forces. With this a final point
of discord is broached: Adorno’s Kafka is fundamentally a writer of modernity in a
materialist sense, in that he exemplifies the reified context of all social relations, while
for Benjamin no specific epoch can be discerned. Hence for Adorno, “What we see in
Kafka’s gestures is the self-liberation of the creative which has been deprived in the
81

language of things” —Kafka is a thinker of Marxist sentiment who attempts to break
reification by any means possible. Despite this, Benjamin’s influence upon Adorno is
clear, as many of these points will be taken up again in Adorno’s 1954 “Notes on
Kafka,” where they can be treated with a broader historical scope.
Benjamin does not shy from acknowledging the impacts of Adorno’s criticisms: “I
have not only read your letter, I have studied it,”

82

and goes on to concede that the essay

does contain an insufficient grasp of the “archaic”—that “myth” must be articulated in a
more robust (enlightened) sense. That is, he must seek to determine the historical
specificity of the myths he will describe. Despite this acknowledgement, the divergence
between the two thinkers will only grow over the coming years, specifically in the debate
80
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surrounding dialectical methodology in Benjamin’s work on Baudelaire (1938-39). Yet
at this point (1934) it is clear that even a proclaimed “agreement on philosophical
fundamentals”

83

contains a deeper and growing dis-correspondence. Despite divergences

and disagreements, Benjamin remarks with great optimism as to the community of
readers that has grown to surround the text: “A kind of musical image has come to
surround it [the piece] and from which I still hope to learn something.”
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At this point

there is a realization that correspondence (constellation) is able to hold together
difference along with agreement.
IV. Adorno’s Kafka (1952-54)
“We are instructed to do the negative; the positive is already within us.” Kafka, The Zürau Aphorisms # 27,
p. 27.

Adorno returned to Kafka during 1952-53 with the essay “Notes on Kafka” published in
his 1955 collection Prisms. Though the circumstances of his engagement are different,
the essay demonstrates the post-history of Benjamin’s Kafka, and the re-direction of its
insights towards Adorno’s own model of criticism. Prisms,
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was a fundamental text in

the establishment of Adorno’s “critical style;” describing the image of the “Prism,” he
writes: “… the world is perceived through a medium, namely the various objectifications
treated in it which are brought to the point of transparency.”
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The essays contained treat

literary and cultural figures (Huxley, Kafka, Spengler, Proust), and establish Adorno’s
belief in literature as a “…protest against a social situation that every individual
experiences as hostile, alien, cold, oppressive.”
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Aesthetics is established as decisively

against mechanical reproduction. The opening essay “Cultural Criticism and Society,”
develops the position of the “critic” as taking a stand against the dominant “cultural
industry.” Beginning with the imperative of immanence to tradition developed in
Benjamin’s Trauerspiel, the critic must employ elements of tradition to reveal the
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ideological supplements mystifying the present moment—breaking “the spell” of
reification. This exemplifies Adorno’s employment of Benjamin’s methodology for the
purposes of critical theory, employing literature and aesthetics to reveal and displace the
estranged world. This perspective is surmised in the final aphorism (Finale) of Minima
Moralia (1944): “The only Philosophy that can be responsibly practiced in the face of
despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from
the standpoint of redemption.”
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The critic must create constellations by which to rethink

the current context of social relations. Though Benjamin’s “mystical” elements are
excised, redemption comes to mirror a Christian eschatology, in which the prophetic
critic will redeem the world. Despite somewhat of an allegiance on the question of
historical materialism, their conceptions of the role of the “critic” in the literary struggle
are decidedly different; for Adorno the critic must bring enlightenment revelation, while
for Benjamin, the parabolic quality of the work must be heightened.
For Adorno, Kafka should be read as all great literature (or art): as a protest against
the dominant order of things. As already seen, this entails reading Kafka as a critic of his
own time, of the alienation of social relations in capitalist modernity; not as a “subarchetypal” (mythical) thinker of action as Benjamin argues. This is perhaps due to the
fact that Adorno lived to see Kafka surpassed by figures such as Beckett and Joyce, and
his work incorporated into the new theologies of existentialism. Over a larger historical
scope a different “truth content” emerged vis-à-vis Kafka’s work—and perhaps he did
89

not grasp the full range of alienations described by a thinker as Beckett.

Due to this,

Adorno’s reading should not be dismissed as merely symbolic, rather as employing a
larger historical scope recognizing the historical aspects of Kafka’s analysis that Brecht
and Benjamin only glimpsed.
The personal nature of Adorno’s Kafka is highly evident, from the utilization of his
own experiences, and its dedication to Gretel, Kafka embodied many of the
estrangements Adorno experienced while living in exile. To Rudolf Hirsch he explained:
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“I have the feeling that I have written something that more or less corresponds to what I
must expect of myself.”

90

Most personally striking is his use of Benjamin, with whom he

both mourns and corresponds, attempting to re-kindle Benjamin’s Ideas in his present
moment. In what follows Adorno’s reading will be elucidated against the backdrop of
Benjamin’s 1934 essay, where it will be demonstrated that Adorno is not simply
parasitic, but rather develops Kafka (in correspondence) in his own unique way.

i.

Words and Things: Kafka and the Language of Reification
“The fact that the world is only a constructed world takes away hope and gives us certainty.” Kafka, The
Zürau Aphorisms # 62, p. 63.

Adorno begins with Benjamin’s idea of Kafka as a parabolic writer (Haggadah), and the
fractured relationship of these parables to the Law (Halakhah), yet contra Benjamin, this
Law can be glimpsed for it is the law of capitalist social relations. Through the
superstructure of Kafka’s alienated individuals, one can come to understand the
structural laws of Capital.
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Adorno locates in Kafka’s language an effect similar to the

“alienation effect” [Verfremdungseffekt] in Brecht, by which aesthetic distance is
collapsed, and one is thrust back upon one’s material conditions—“It was just this
92

hopeless effort he demanded…irritating the reader out of aesthetic contemplation.”
And further:
His texts are designed not to sustain a constant distance between
themselves and their victim but rather to agitate his feelings to a point
where he fears that the narrative will shoot towards him like a narrative in
a three dimensional film. Such aggressive physical proximity undermines
the reader’s habit of identifying himself with the figures of the novel …As
in fairy-tales, their fate serves not to deter but to entice. As long as the
world has not been found the reader must be held accountable.93

This shattering of aesthetic distance awakens the reader to a world which has become the
Hell of perpetual sameness, as Tittorelli’s paintings (The Trial), all has become
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reproducible, and resistance and conformity are inextricably linked.

94

For Adorno’s

Kafka, “history becomes hell, and Kafka’s world becomes the moment at which the
95

chance to save it was missed.”

Yet for Adorno, it is the language of Kafka that entails the embodiment of hope:
“If there is hope in Kafka’s work, it is in those extremes rather than in milder places, in
the capacity to stand up to the worst by making it into language.”
“…there is nothing mad in his prose,”
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Contra Walser,

as Kafka reacts in the spirit of Enlightenment

against Myth, attempting to rationally articulate the grotesque elements of his world.
Against theological readings of Kafka, Adorno asserts him as one who affirms a certain
sublime concept of reason (or enlightenment), as a last effort against the storm of
progress. In so doing Adorno essentially reads Benjamin’s Kafka essay as
“commentary”—that is, as simple description of mythological elements, to which
enlightenment criticism must point the way beyond.
Yet this turn to language is difficult, given that in Kafka, words become things
with utter regularity. Humans become the “identities” placed upon them, as Gregor
Samsa (The Metamorphosis) literally embodies the phrase, “these traveling salesmen are
like bugs.” Language is at the point of becoming the total expression of un-truth
(capital), and must be redeemed via its non-identical or gestural elements (à la Beckett).
Adorno sees this in Kafka’s linguistic turn away from horrendously grotesque elements
(as in A Country Doctor), and his incorporation of gesture as a mode of expression.
Gestures embody this pure visibility of language that shoots beyond itself: a language
98

that embraces both words and things to express something of the world around.

It is

only with this realization of reification, that one gains the ability to refashion language:
“[e]verything in Kafka is directed to that crucial dimension when humans realize they are
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not themselves, but things.”
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In realizing reification, one perhaps gains the minimal

distance for it to be overcome. Adorno returns to this model in his late work Aesthetic
Theory, emphasizing the minimal expressive character of things: “If the Subject is no
longer able to speak directly, then at least it should…speak through things, through their
alienated and mutilated form” (AS, 118;78).

ii.

Hope for us Critics: Adorno’s Eschatology
“Belief in progress doesn’t mean belief in progress that has already occurred. That would not require
belief.” Kafka, The Zürau Aphorisms # 48, p. 49.

For Adorno, Kafka’s world is the wholly immanent context of capital; like
Beckett’s Endgame, it seems to present no eschatology—“Nowhere does the horizon
open.”
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This realization of immanence to capital—of the awareness of contemporary

social relations—as opposed to idealist utopias, is essential to Adorno’s thinking. The
realization that there is no hope is itself the negative image of redemption, as it forces
one to be realistic about contemporary social relations. Such destructions of utopia mark
Adorno’s divergence with thinkers such as Ernst Bloch: “Above and beyond this one
could perhaps say in general that the fulfillment of Utopia consists largely in a repetition
of the continual same “today.””
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The Utopias of capital are essential for its

reproduction, hence the rational destruction of these myths are essential to its
overcoming. Yet after this, one is left with the figure of “the critic,” one who seems to
stand both inside and outside the world, both immanent and transcendent.
After developing such a language by which to speak of alienation, Adorno utilizes
Kafka in critique of these ideological systems. In Kafka’s world work has become utterly
useless, humans are granted work as a grotesque form of charity (as The Penal Colonies,
lieutenant), or perhaps stay on “…out of habit.”
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Mysticism is not an aspect possessed

by individuals, but is the defining feature of the conditions of domination. Thus the true
danger of Joseph K. (In both The Trial and The Castle): as a rational (enlightened)
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subject he has the power to break the spell of reification (myth), by meeting authority
with simple rational questions—his attempts to “survey” the perfect Castle, and his
attempt to get justice on his side pose a threat to the mythical order of things. Ideological
systems desire nothing that does not resemble them; hence the stranger always poses a
danger, and must be integrated (or worse), so as to legitimize the current state of
things.
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For Adorno, there will not be a theological redemption, as Kafka’s god is a

Deus absconditus; nor a heroic overcoming, as K. becomes guilty in his attempt to get
justice on his side. It is only the method of cunning, of reason articulated against myth;
as Kafka’s Odysseus (“The Silence of the Sirens”), one must cede victory at the outset so
as to slip through the cracks—“the subject seeks to break the spell of reification by
104

reifying itself.”

This is the model of the assistants, Odradek, and the women in

Kafka’s world: only those who have become non-exchangeable have a chance to survive.
In becoming wholly “identical” the possibility of “non-identity” is glimpsed—that
identities can never be total is perhaps the small hope of Kafka’s world.
It would seem with his abolition of redemption Adorno reaches the same
conclusion as Benjamin’s “Theologico-politico fragment”—redemption (the future) is
banished, so one must act accordingly in the present moment. Yet recalling Taubes”
statement, Adorno is not a thinker of “weak messianism”, rather an “aesthete,” one who
is unable to totally banish the possibilities of messianic redemption. As a critic, he
aestheticizes the problem, turning emancipation into an “as-if” contingent on the critic
as a position outside the current order of things. Or rather, he asserts that art, if read
correctly provides the possibility of redemption, while for Benjamin, not even this is
assured. This is seen clearly in “Finale” (Minima Moralia), where Benjamin’s wholly
absent theology is transformed into the (Christian) redemptive eschatology of the Critic.
As Scholem, who holds the future judgment over the current order of things, Adorno
holds critical redemption over the present. Though he comes close to Benjamin’s
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immanence, he withdraws to the aesthetic and the function of the critique—it is as if the
Messiah can be coaxed to come, not at the first, but perhaps the last critique.
In a primary sense, the two converge with a shared understanding of the potentially
radical potential hidden in tradition, though for Adorno, this has more to do with art as
such (or dissonant art), than it does with the specific character of Kafka’s work. For
Benjamin, Kafka provided a means by which to think through an alternative resolution
for his concept of criticism: a means of employing criticism to open the present moment
as the site of the “now.” He was further captivated by the specificity of Kafka as a
thinker of immanence with respect to resistance to the law: Kafka did not hold out for
future revelation, but sought to demonstrate the possibilities of action in the present.
Such a conception of the present is foreclosed for Adorno due to his insistence on a
Christian eschatology of redemption, based on the messianic function of the critic. Such
divergent notions of temporality will prove decisive in the coming chapter.
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3.

Correspondences of Modernity: Adorno, Benjamin and the
Dialectical (Materialist) Method*

“The guests that come last to the table should rightly take the last places; and will you
take the first? Then do some great and mighty deed—the place may be prepared for you
then, even though you do come last. You can explain the past only by what is most
powerful in the present.”
–Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, 40.

“July 4. Last night. Brecht (during a conversation about Baudelaire): “I am not, to be
sure, against the asocial—I am against the non-social.””
-Benjamin, “Diary Entries” SW 3: 337.
“Nevertheless, Baudelaire’s rebellion is always that of the asocial man: it is at an
impasse”
-Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 1939 Exposé.

*A version of this chapter was presented as a Theory Session (under the same title), at the University of
Western Ontario, in February, 2016.
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I. Philosophico-Biographical Panorama
“To write history means giving dates their physiognomy.” -Benjamin [N11, 2]

Upon the realization of “Absolute Spirit”—the telos of his phenomenology of
consciousness—Hegel speaks of Spirit (history) “emptying itself into time,” which then
progresses cinematically as a “gallery of moving images,” each containing within itself
1

(as a monad) the fullness of world spirit. At this point, the progression of Spirit
“recollects” [erinnern] itself in all its moments—the reconciliation of subject and object,
nature and history, past and present: the resolution of the messianic and the historical
realms. Hegel infers that the process must begin again (or was a ruse from the start)—that
the fullness of the Absolute persisted in each of spirits individual moments; each existing
as an immanent state of perfection.
Some years later (1839), the Daguerre Panorama burned down amidst the Parisian
2

Arcades. Prior to this it had provided viewers with a similar experience of the end of
world history—history had been realized in Paris, the capital of Modernité, and viewers
could experience natural images of such as progression within the “second nature” of the
Arcade. Smelling a ruse, Marx would deride such projections as ideological
phantasmagoria (fetishes), mere holograms of capitalist exchange relations inverted and
writ large. Such images were simply narcotic, thus should not distract one from the
material nature of social relations. Yet for Baudelaire, such images contained within them
a collective resonance, a flash of a new collective power afforded by a curious mix of
nature and technology—“These things, because they are false, are infinitely closer to the
3

truth.” Thus the chiasmus of the 19th century: should such expressions, phenomena and
1

Hegel describes the “cinematics” of this as follows: “History is a conscious self-mediating process—
Spirit emptied out into Time; but this externalization, this Kenosis, is equally an externalization of itself;
the negative of the negative itself. This Becoming presents a slow moving succession of Spirits, a gallery of
images, each of which, endowed with all the riches of Spirit, moves thus slowly just because the Self has to
penetrate and digest this entire wealth of its substance.” Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 492.
2
Panorama’s where proto-cinematic devices into which viewers could gaze (seated around it circularly),
viewing projections of natural landscapes, and distant empires from the comfort of urban modernity.
Daguerre (famous for his photographic “Daguerre-types”), operated the main Panorama in early 19th
century Paris.
3
Baudelaire quoted in: Benjamin, The Arcades [Q4a,4]. Benjamin elaborates the constellation between the
“Panorama” and the dialectical image: “The interest of the panorama is seeing the true city—the city
indoors. What stands within the windowless house is true. Moreover, the Arcade, too, is a windowless
house. The windows that look down on it are like loges from which one gazes into its interior, but one
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wish images be derided as ideological ruse—as the eternal return of the same—or as
furnishing the potential for something genuinely new, of the potential for new forms of
thinking and collective experience? It is such an antinomy that Benjamin attempted to
span in his later writings (1937-40).
***
On August 28, 1938, Benjamin sent Max Horkheimer the completed text of “The Paris of
the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” intended for publication in the forthcoming issue of
the Institute’s journal [Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung], one that would include Adorno on
Husserl, and Grossman on Marx. The tonal dissonance of Benjamin’s piece alluded to the
growing divergence between his concerns and those of the institute, though monetary and
political circumstances had forced him to rely on them for financial and intellectual
support. The essay itself, along with the infamous written commentary provided by
Adorno, explicitly describe the intellectual positions Benjamin held in his late work
(1937-40), notably, the idea of the dialectical image. Benjamin intended this essay to be
the second chapter of a proposed book on Baudelaire (Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet
4

in the Age of High Capitalism), “[a] book…meant to set down the decisive philosophical
5

elements of the Arcades project in what I hope will be definitive form.” The essay (and
Adorno’s response) can be read to illustrate larger affinities in Benjamin’s thinking in
general. The first of these affinities being the current state of The Arcades (in 1938), and

cannot see out these windows to anything outside (what is true has no windows; nowhere does the true look
out to the universe.).” [Q2a, 7], 532. See more generally “Convolute Q: The Panorama”
4
Though it was never completed, it was intended to have 3 parts: (1) Baudelaire as Allegorist; (2) The
Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire; (3) The Commodity as Poetic Object. Though only the second
chapter was completed, fragments for the Arcades provide “ciphers” as to the direction this project would
take (see “Convolute J: Baudelaire,” or “Central Park” (SW 4: 161-199) or “The Study begins with some
Reflections on Les Fleurs du mal” (SW 4: 95-98). The first section (alternately titled “Idea and Image” in
Correspondence) would treat the idea of “correspondences” in relation of allegory to a theory of “Modern”
Art. The Second (completed, though alternately termed “Antiquity and Modernity”) treats the revelation of
Antiquity in Modernity. And the Final section (alternately “The New and the Immutable”) would examine
Baudelaire in constellation with Blanqui and Nietzsche, as a thinker of the “new” with respect to the
Eternal Return (or the eternal return of the different).
5
Benjamin to Horkheimer, 28.9.1938. BC, 573. And, further: “…that it is becoming an extensive treatment
in which the most important motifs of the Arcades converge” (ibid. 556).
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its relation to Benjamin’s studies on Baudelaire: was an inquiry into the figure of
Baudelaire to encompass the concerns of The Arcades more generally? More
fundamentally, could Benjamin’s methods of immanent criticism—in which a work (or
figure) is unfolded so as to “reflect” its historical circumstances—be utilized for the
whole of the nineteenth century? Related to these internal movements is the relationship
of Benjamin’s thinking (and The Arcades) to Adorno and the Institute more generally.
Beginning with the Königstein Program (1929) through to Benjamin and Adorno’s 1937
meeting in San Remo, the institute expressed considerable interest in the completed
project, provided Benjamin could formulate his concerns with adequate theoretical rigor.
This hinges on the relationship between the Institute and Benjamin more generally, his
reliance on their “financial support” forced him to engage with projects related to their
concerns (notably, his 1937 “Edward Fuchs” Study), though the influence of such
necessities upon the direction of his thought cannot be deduced with certainty. It is
common parlance to analyze this dispute from the perspective of Benjamin’s
disagreements with the Institute’s intellectual positions, specifically its brand of
“historical materialism.” This is emphasized by pointing to the explicit philosophical discorrespondence in Benjamin and Adorno’s letters. However, such commentary misses
6

the emergent affinity of Benjamin’s concerns with those of the Institute , alongside side
the essential role Adorno played in the development of Benjamin’s theoretical
formulations (specifically with respect to the Arcades).
In what follows, Benjamin’s “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire”
(1938) will be analyzed as exemplary of his late method of criticism (II). Alongside The
Arcades, this essay will be read as exemplary of Benjamin’s dialectical image: (IV), a
model which emerged out of a convergence of Marxism and theological concerns. In
unpacking the dialectical image, Benjamin’s immanent criticism of both Marxism, and
surrealism will be noted, alongside the historiographical ramifications of such a method
6

During 1937-38 Benjamin increasingly expressed and pursued solidarity with the Institute, particularly by
way of Adorno. This is likely due to economic necessity, and philosophical convergence. According to
Scholem, Benjamin expressed concern regarding several of the Institute’s positions regarding theology, and
“actual” Marxism, though both seemed in agreement that Adorno had the interests of his thought in mind.
This was echoed by Scholem after his visit to New York in 1937. See, Scholem Walter Benjamin. 215-16.
Also see Benjamin’s “A German Institute for Independent Research” (SW 3: 307-17), which speaks
favorably of the Institute’s program of critical theory in general.
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(III). In analyzing Benjamin’s method of criticism, a convergence will be noted between
his early and late work: both entail an attempt to develop an immanent model of
criticism, and a questioning of the representation of particular phenomena via the realm
of Ideas. Following this, Adorno’s criticisms of Benjamin’s method can be analyzed; in
the context of their larger correspondence these objections can be seen not only as
justified, but as important in the development of Benjamin’s theory of criticism (V).
Adorno’s own negative dialectic can be read as a continuation of such a project along
greater systematic and philosophical lines (VI).
7

If one focuses specifically on Adorno’s response to the first Baudelaire essay, his
criticisms seem unnecessarily harsh and strangely personal in nature, especially given
Benjamin’s political and financial circumstances. However, this apparent “discorrespondence” has a lengthy history, and seen in repose with the rest of their
correspondence, Adorno’s response is justified from the perspective of his thinking. The
“origins” of this dispute are difficult to locate, yet three main plateaus of explicit
theoretical confrontation can be distilled: Adorno’s response to Benjamin’s 1935
“Exposé” (Arcades); the correspondence surrounding Benjamin’s “Work of Art in the
Age of Mechanical Reproducibility” (2nd edition, 1936); and the 1938-39 dispute
surrounding Charles Baudelaire (1st and 2nd editions). Yet reading the two in the context
of correspondence entails that the relationship goes back even further, into their shared
conceptions of a philosophical program (Königstein, 1929), and respective readings of
the history of philosophy. Hence what appears in isolation as the site of radical
divergence—dis-correspondence—is in fact a trace of a larger philosophical engagement
that had been in development for the past decade. This late period sees Adorno and
Benjamin crystallize into correspondents of difference: held together as interlocutors
while holding divergent philosophical views. In this sense, the two no longer “agree,” but
rather confront in an almost dialectical fashion, removed from the spell of sameness they
are able to exercise genuine criticism of each other’s formulations. In holding to his own
conception of “critique” (informed by Benjamin’s Trauerspiel), Adorno is able to

7

As Agamben does in “The Prince and The Frog,” Infancy and History. Susan Buck-Morss’s The Origin of
Negative Dialectics (148); provides a better gloss of the complexities, and origins of the exchange. The
present study will elucidate the exchange with respect to the valences of correspondence.
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exercise a legitimate structural imperative to Benjamin throughout the 1930s, namely that
he articulate his dialectical image in a clearer, and more systematically (socially) defined
manner. Hence if this dispute is seen “in correspondence,” a fuller image of each in their
respective intellectual positions can be developed.
Related to these considerations is the question of intellectual biography, along
with the question of auteurship in general: to what extent can history be read out or, into
an individual work, or text? This is particularly relevant when considering Baudelaire as
a figure in the 19th century: how should one relate his work to the historical context in
which it was written? The relationship of works to their material circumstances
concerned Benjamin throughout much of his work, as has been demonstrated throughout
these considerations. Beginning in 1924 (“Goethe’s Elective Affinities”), he criticized
Gundolf’s biographical creation of a mystical “Goethe cult” which reduced historical
complexity to mythological inspiration. Instead Benjamin favored a “constructive” idea
of authorship which sought to illuminate the work in the context of history and tradition
(its “pre”/ “post” history)—the text is related, but not reducible to its historical
circumstances.
Such affinities are relevant for Benjamin’s reading of Baudelaire, but should also
be taken as imperatives for a contemporary approach to these thinkers. It cannot be
understated that these thinkers found themselves immersed in events which would later
become “world historical” (especially in this later period)—the crises diagnosed in their
work (of lyric poetry, aesthetics) should be seen as inextricably linked to the crisis of
modernity unfolding around them. Regarding the 1938 Baudelaire essay, Benjamin
writes: “I do not have to tell you under what circumstances I worked on this project over
the last two weeks. I was in a race against war,” and to Adorno, he notes “…the collision
8

of historical events and editorial deadlines.” Despite this, Benjamin seems to discourage
an overtly historical reading of his work: “I have made every effort to keep any trace of
9

these circumstances out of the work, even in its external aspects.” Regardless of his

8
9

Benjamin to Adorno, BC, 574.
Ibid.
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intention, the epochal significance of this essay is highly evident—it is a treatise on
historicism, and lyric poetry at the precise moment of their impossibility.
It is this constellation of circumstances and experiences which must be considered
in approaching “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” (along with Adorno’s
response) and Benjamin’s late work more generally. In what follows, the essay will be
unpacked, analyzing Benjamin’s use of the figure of Baudelaire to “express” the 19th
century; following which broader questions can be posed related to Benjamin’s
historiography (the dialectical image), and the relationship of such theoretical concerns
with Adorno’s own.
II. Baudelaire (As a Figure in Benjamin’s Work)
“Assuredly, therefore, he [Baudelaire] was not a saviour, a martyr, or even a hero. Be he had about him
something of the mime who apes the “poet” before an audience and a society which no longer needed a real
poet, and which grants him only the latitude of mimicry.” -Benjamin, “Central Park,” SW 4: 166.

As early as 1914 Benjamin (then twenty-two years old), began translating individual
poems from Baudelaire’s cycle Les Fleurs du mal, a project he undertook intermittently,
and which crystallized in his 1923 translation of Tableaux parisiens prefaced by the
famous statement “The Task of the Translator.”

10

The essay presents “translation” as a

practice which recognizes the mediation, or distance, between the “way of meaning” of
two texts. Translation entails a questioning of mediation or distance, inquiring as to the
historical distance between the translator’s own time and that of the work. For Benjamin,
this entailed an inquiry into the distance between his own Weimar Era and that of the
Second Empire, one which illuminated a strange affinity between the two epochs. The
capitalist modernity of the twentieth century understood itself in constellation with its
own “pre-history” in the nineteenth century, hence to understand the origin of such
pathologies (the crises of modernity) their historical emergence must be located in “prehistory” [Vorgeschichte]. Given Baudelaire’s presence in his epoch, he provided
Benjamin with a prematurely developed image of trajectories which would become fully
realized in the twentieth century, namely the crisis of modernity, and the destruction of
10

Benjamin’s “translation” and reading of Baudelaire move decidedly against other receptions at the time.
T.S Eliot employed Baudelaire as one who romantically overcame the alienation of the “wasteland,” while
Stefan George emphasized a pro-fascist and archetypal reading of Baudelaire in his translation. Against
this, Benjamin emphasizes Baudelaire as a poet embodying his social context in both form and content.
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experience therein. As a monad, he could be imminently read to deduce the dreams and
pathologies of his age, and it is this epochal significance which accounts for his
prevalence in Benjamin’s Arcades (see Convolute J).
In addition to this historical affinity, Benjamin felt an immense personal
correspondence with Baudelaire: as broke Bohemians exiled from their respective times,
they both wandered The Arcades (or archives) of Paris at the precise moment when the
Flâneur would become an impossible figure.

11

They turned to poetic existence, and

sought epic experience (Erfahrung) in the midst of a generalized “poverty of
experience”—when the independent man of letters was being replaced by its mechanical
reproductions. Indeed, one could locate a certain becoming Baudelaire in Benjamin’s life
and work: he sought actively to recreate many of Baudelaire’s experiences in his own
time, this is seen most notably in his experiments with hashish,

12

and continual residence

in Paris. Yet such experiments should not simply be regarded as idle curiosity, or
nostalgia, rather as genuine attempts to perceive his own time dialectically. To see it in
constellation with another epoch of the past, giving voice to the dreams of the nineteenth
century, while examining how these had become a nightmare in the present. Benjamin’s
fundamental interest in Baudelaire was as a cipher to his historical epoch, a poet of urban
capitalist modernity who embodied the spirit of his times, often against his expressed
intentions.

i.

The Poet of Modern Life: Representing Modernity

“For the perfect idler, for the passionate observer, it becomes an immense source of enjoyment to establish
his dwelling in the throng, in the ebb and flow, the bustle, the fleeting and the infinite. To be away from
home and yet to feel at home anywhere; to see the world, to be at the very center of the world, and yet to be
unseen of the world. Such are some of the minor pleasures of those independent, intense and impartial
spirits, who do not lend themselves easily to linguistic definitions.” –Baudelaire, The Painter of Modern
Life.

11

For Baudelaire, this occurred when Haussmann redesigned the city (1857-70) (widening the streets) so as
to make the erection of Barricades impossible. Inadvertently this made the aimless wandering of the
Flâneur difficult, if not impossible, as the city was re-designed in a utilitarian direction. Haussmann’s
redesigns however did not prevent the rise of the Paris Commune in 1871. Benjamin’s wanderings in the
Paris archives where made difficult, due the onset of the war, and the invasion of France by the Nazis.
12
Much of Benjamin’s experiments with Hashish can be read as attempts to recreate Baudelaire Artificial
Paradises (1860), or to invoke a similar thematic of “intoxication.” See Marcus Boon, “Walter Benjamin
and Drug Literature,” in Walter Benjamin on Hashish.
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Baudelaire’s “Painter of Modern Life” (1863) heralded Constantine Guys as the artist
with the courage to represent modernity—“the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent,
13

the half of art whose other half is the eternal and the immutable” —the splitting of
(aesthetic) experience, the replacement of genius by fashion, the space in which all that is
solid melts into air. In this sense, Guys was a “modern” artist. He did not dwell in the
aura or a nostalgia for the past, but turned his attention upon his own time: “The pleasure
which we derive from the representation of the present is due not only to the beauty with
which it can be invested, but also to its essential quality of being present.”

14

For

Benjamin, it was not Guys, but Baudelaire who should be thought as the “poet of modern
life;” one who undertook the heroic task of (re)presenting modernity— “In Baudelaire’s
terms, nothing in his own century come closer to the task of the hero of antiquity than the
task of giving form to modernity.”

15

Yet Baudelaire did not simply describe such

transformations on the level of content (as Hugo), rather he embodied them in his
struggle with representation, providing a physiognomy of his age in both form and
content. He did not describe the emergent commodity form, or the decline of auratic art,
16

but embodied the process (perhaps against his knowledge) on the level of form.

The

allegorical nature of his poetry mirrored the evacuation of meaning surrounding him, and
the struggle of the individual against such a process. In an early lecture on Baudelaire,
Benjamin likens him to a photographer, one presenting “negative” images of modernity
to which only he possesses the means to read. Yet perhaps these backward facing images
can be read allegorically—on the level of both form and content—to provide an image of
the nineteenth century.

ii.

The “Image” of the 19th Century in Baudelaire.
La Nature est un temple où de vivants piliers
Laissent parfois sortir de confuses paroles;

13

Baudelaire, “The Painter of Modern Life,” 24.
Ibid. 25.
15
Benjamin to Horkheimer, BC, 557.
16
For Benjamin, Baudelaire embodied the Second Empire in both form and content in that his lyrics
attempted to preserve the “epic experience” [Erfahrung] of modernity that was in fact the destruction of
experience and particularity under the commodity form (“shock experience” and the dissolution of
Erfahrung into Erlebnis). Baudelaire described in epic terms an era in which such meaningful expressions
where no longer possible. Baudelaire bestowed an epic “form” upon an alienated and atrophied “content.”
14
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L”homme y passe à travers des forêts de symboles
Qui l”observent avec des regards familiers -Baudelaire, « Correspondances ».

For Benjamin, the poetic formulation of the nineteenth century must begin with an
experience of immanence: of the immersion in the crowd, from which there can be no
transcendent(al) point of view—one is always jostled backwards by the newly emergent
masses (the Other)—this is the experience of modernity as such. Baudelaire is one who
“developed” an afterimage of this encounter with the “crowd”—a negative image of the
“shocks” and crisis experience [Schockerleibnis] which caused the disintegration of
17

Erfahrung into Erlebnis.

In other words, Baudelaire attempted to “experience” the loss

of experience that occurred in modernity. Baudelaire presents a prematurely developed
“after-image” of his own age—he saw modernity as already “antiquated,” as a ruin—an
age become old via the perpetual new of the commodity form, a perpetual hell of the
return of the same. Baudelaire would be read as the tragic poet of this new antiquity for
an age to come. As a dialectical image, Baudelaire can be read for insights into the
developments and pathologies of the century—a negative image of the century (as
already ruined) emerges under his allegorical gaze. Following his early imperative of
unfolding history from within the work (“The Concept of Criticism,” 1919) Benjamin
describes his aim as follows:
If I might use one image to express what I am planning, it is to show
Baudelaire as he is embedded in the 19th century. The Impression he left
behind there must emerge as clearly untouched as that of a stone that one
18
day is rolled away from the spot on which it has rested for decades.
Here, one glimpses the Janus faced nature of Benjamin’s project: Baudelaire must
be understood (cited) within the 19th century. Yet the century is best critically
unfolded—in its dual character as both dream (utopia) and nightmare
(repression)—under the melancholy gaze of Baudelaire’s prose.

17

19

It should be

Erlebnis refers to fragmentary “shock” experience, while Erfahrung entails a more significant
experience, persisting in memory—of something “lived through,” not momentarily experienced. See
Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” (SW 4: 313-355), which elaborates the alterations of
experience in modernity.
18
Benjamin to Horkheimer, BC, 557 (Emphasis mine).
19
This is perhaps a latent critique of Engels, for whom “the 19th century was a creation of Balzac.”
Benjamin would likely contend it was Baudelaire, in that his poetry allowed the construction of “critical
moments” which were covered over by realism.
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emphasized that such a reading does not take place on the level of content—
Baudelaire did not provide a sociological or political analysis of his time (as Marx,
or Hugo did), rather he embodied these forces on the level of form. Baudelaire is
the image or cipher of a bourgeois conscious in languish with itself, raging against
growing standardization, and the revolt and repression of the century.
There is little point in trying to include the position of Baudelaire in the fabric
of the most advanced position in mankind’s struggle for liberation. From the
outset, it seems more promising to investigate his machinations where he was
undoubtedly most at home: in the enemy camp. Very rarely are they a
blessing for the other side. Baudelaire was a secret agent—an agent of the
20
secret discontent of his class with his own rule.
Baudelaire’s texts stage the dramas of his age: the rise of the newspaper, and novel—the
changing shape of authorship in general,

21

with its dedicated “readers” (subscribers);

prostitution and its dispersal of Eros throughout the crowd. Most fundamentally, the
commodity, with its standardization and mystification of all aspects of life. Even in his
later turn to l’art pour l’art, Baudelaire did not resist such tendencies, rather immersed
himself in them, channeling their intoxicating power. As Benjamin writes, “Baudelaire
knew the true situation of the man of letters: he goes to the marketplace as a flâneur,
supposedly to take a look at it, but in reality to find a buyer.”

22

Specifically in the

posthumously published (1869) collection of verse poems Le Spleen de Paris (Les Fleurs
du Mal), nowhere are these dramas articulated as content; the crowd is rarely mentioned,
23

rather has merged with the setting, becoming expressed as “nature.”

An affinity is

broached here with Lukács” notion of “second nature,” which describes the reification
20

Benjamin, “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire” here-after: (PSB). SW 4: 92, fn. 300.
The 19th century saw the rise of the Novel as a prevalent literary genre; alongside the “newspaper” which
created a new type of dedicated reader (the subscriber). See Benjamin, “The Newspaper”; “The Author as
Producer.”
22
Benjamin, PSB. SW 4: 12.
23
In the final cycle of the 1869 Les Fleurs du mal, “La Mort,” Baudelaire depicts the poets final voyage
(specifically “Le Voyage”), one which reflects upon the epic territory the poems have traversed. For
Benjamin, though the voyage occurs in a natural setting (into the sea), there is reason to suspect its true
setting is modernity (specifically the city), the sea can be read as the crowd into which the poet of modern
life (Baudelaire) begins his final voyage. Benjamin reads the “voyage” upon the rhythm of the sea as poets
voyage upon the shocks of modernity, As Baudelaire writes: “Un matin nous partons, le cerveau plein de
flamme,/ Le cœur gros de rancune et de désirs amers,/Et nous allons, suivant le rythme de la lame,/Berçant
notre infini sur le fini des mers” (168). The affinity is evident here with baroque Trauerspiel where history
merges with the setting and must be read as “natural history” by the critic.
21
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[Verdinglichung] of consciousness so that capitalist social relations appear as “natural”
(independent of human interaction). Capital reproduces itself not only through
commodity exchange, but via the naturalization of such repetitions, such that they appear
as a fated, natural, and mythical force.

24

This forest of signs and symbols (the crowd, the

streets, the city) comes to replace nature as that which is eternal and natural, it reverts to
the mythical realm of “pre-history,” against which human action (history) must take
place. Yet as “second nature” (myth), it is not nature in the Hegelian or Marxist sense
through which the human is able to realize himself (via labour); rather it provides a falseconsciousness of the perpetual same, a governance of humans by the forces of “prehistory.” In a vulgar materialist sense, this could be demonstrated to mirror the processes
of the economic “base” (growing standardization, mechanization), on the superstructural
(cultural) level via standardized and mechanized cultural products—the emergence of
“Mass Art” (film, photography, the novel) for the newly created “masses” (the public,
das Mann).

25

Already in the 19th century, Benjamin saw a movement away from such a
mimetic, or straightforward relation between material and cultural products. With the
pervasiveness of the commodity form things appeared as “distorted” as products began to
take on a life of their own. Thus the emergence of “phantasmatic experiences,”

26

the

pervasiveness of the commodity form leads to the generalized “fetishism of
27

commodities” described by Marx,

though as Margaret Cohen

28

notes, Benjamin’s use

of the phantasmagoria (technology) is meant as a latent critique of the Marx’s Camera
24

As Benjamin writes: “Within the crowd, nature exercises its fundamental right over the city” PSB, SW
4:36. This issue will later become prominent in Adorno, specifically in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944)
in which enlightenment regresses into a mythical “rationality of domination”—or urban modernity
regresses to nature.
25
Victor Hugo is the embodiment of this for Benjamin, for who the masses where his “constitutes.” Much
of Benjamin’s presentation of Baudelaire is enacted against Hugo, who explicitly addressed such concerns,
but did not embody them on the level of form, as Baudelaire.
26
The Phantasmagoria was an optical, light projecting device which employed smoke and mirrors
(alongside the audience’s fantasies) to create frightening, and often demonic scenes.
27
“The commodity-form, and the value relation of the products of human labour within which it appears,
have absolutely no connection with the physical nature of the commodity and the material relations arising
out of this. It is nothing but a definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for
them, the phantasmagoric form of a relation between things” (Capital, 165), Benjamin’s specific usage of
the term comes via Adorno’s 1937 In Search of Wagner, specifically Ch. 6, “The Phantasmagoria.”
28
See Margaret Cohen, Benjamin’s Phantasmagoria.
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Lucida—of the simple presentation of culture as an “inversion” of the economic base. For
Benjamin, the phantasmagoria accounts for the element of fantasy present in commodity
consumption, the mystical experience with “the new” and technology. “The world
dominated by phantasmagorias, is—to use an expression from Baudelaire—
Modernity.”

29

Commodities become mystical fetishes in themselves—distorting their

relations to their material production—taking on a life of their own, and intoxicating the
consumer. Hence Benjamin’s decisive move away from Marx, who provides little
analysis of consumption, focusing instead on the sphere of (re) production.

30

If

Benjamin’s late work is to be employed for the services of “political economy” it would
be with respect to his analysis of consumption. Thus, for Benjamin, any analysis of
cultural production in the 19th century must take into account such mystical and
(dis)enchanting aspects of the commodity form.
The pervasiveness of the commodity form in all aspects of life has further
implications on the level of consciousness, leading to a generalized “reification” of
thought—all “use values” are subsumed under the dominant logic of exchange. For
Simmel, such economic standardization is mirrored on the level of consciousness: as a
response to the “shocks” (Nervenleben, Schockerlebnis) of modernity, consciousness
31

develops as a “protective organ” against the onslaught of affective experiences one finds
in the metropolis. One has to create “standards” against the environment, and these are
overwhelmingly based on the predominance of intellectual calculation (Verstand, blasée
attitude) over the use-values of everyday life. For Cacciari, this rational abstraction
mirrors that of capitalist commodity exchange itself (rational “exchange value” over
affective “use value”)—the processes of capitalism are laid bare on the phenomenal
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Benjamin, The Arcades 1939 Exposé.
Exceptions to this can be found in Marx’s work, specifically the “fetishism of commodities” (Capital Vol
1.), alongside isolated segments of Capital Vol. 2 (“Part III: The Reproduction and Circulation of
Aggregate Social Capital”). Overwhelmingly Marx (as most classical political economists) focuses on the
sphere of production (supply), as opposed to consumption (demand).
31
As Simmel writes: “The deepest problems of modern life flow from the attempt of the individual to
maintain the independence and individuality of his existence against the sovereign powers of society,
against the weight of historical heritage and the external culture and technique of life” (The Metropolis and
Mental Life, 9).
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level—“The shock-existence which the passer-by has in the crowd corresponds to the
“existence” of the worker at the machine.”

32

As Cacciari elaborates:

The crowd, as well as the Metropolis that provides its structure, thus both lead
back to the moment of production, to labor, mirroring one another as each
other’s common formulation…rather than relating the factory types to social
types and the laws of circulation, Benjamin sees the society itself as laying bare
33
its own origin. The Image of shock reveals its own class status.
It may appear that the notion of phantasmagoria is in contradiction with such
presentation—yet the point for Cacciari (and Benjamin) is that forms of consciousness
are themselves distorted representations of social conditions (phantasmagorias), not in a
determinate sense, but in that they furnish traces of social conditions. For Benjamin, this
manifestation of social relations on the level of appearances and consciousness becomes a
key concern for “theory;” utilizing Baudelaire he illustrates how critique should operate
in a time when, “Peoples [and things] inner qualities can be deduced from their outward
34

appearance.”

Given rationality’s role in domination, one cannot assume a

straightforward enlightenment model of critique, and his writings on Baudelaire can be
read as commentary on the possibility of a theoretical (or sociological) method which
applies categories to phenomena from a perspective in remove. It is in this sense that one
should read his comments upon Baudelaire and the “detective story.”
The detective story—originating in Poe, and translated to Europe by
Baudelaire—grew out of a discontent with urban life. Modernity is experienced as a
disparate ruin of the individual, a series of shocks, but we find solace in the “truth” the
detective discovers: that the criminal, as individual will be caught, or located via his
35

individual traces.

It is the story of the commodity form, of the victory of rational

articulation (the intellect) over and against the emotional affects of the everyday—that
the plot will win out against irrationality. One can see traces of the “detective” in much
32

Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” SW 4: 333.
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Benjamin notes the emergence of the detective novel alongside “les intérieurs” in which one could leave
“traces,” that is fragments or marks of individuality. See The Arcades, Convolute I, “The Interior, the
Trace.” Speaking to the illusory and ideological character of the detective story Benjamin writes: “This is
an indication of how the detective story, regardless of its sober calculations, also participates in the
phantasmagoria of Parisian life” (PSB. SW 4: 22).
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critical theory: one who is able to abstract beyond this ruin of particularity to a
transcendent(ental) logic which explains the phenomena presented. Yet Benjamin notes,
Baudelaire was “too good a reader of de Sade” to fully identify with this detective; his
subject is shattered by shocks, fetishes, and intoxication. In the crowd each is a detective,
seeking his/her individual “new” or commodity, and every street corner is the “scene of
the crime,” the site of the destruction of that individual. The detective (who searches for
the unique, the aura) is replaced or reproduced by the pure immanence of modernity
itself, which allows for no “outside” from which theory can gaze, and all are the usual
36

suspects.

Benjamin’s Baudelaire is one keenly aware of this, upholding the figure of the
“poet” over and against the detective theorist—one who is able to maintain a semblance
of individuality via poetic existence, “…enjoy[ing] the incomparable privilege of being
able at will, to be himself and another.”
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The poet confronts the (dis)enchantment of the

world with poetry, allegorically raging against phantasmagoria. This is the idea of
“correspondance” in Baudelaire’s work: within the “second nature” of capital (emptied of
signification by the commodity form), the subject is able to allegorically “awaken” the
world anew, endowing such ruins with poetic evocations. In so doing, the subject is able
to maintain a semblance of autonomy against the forces of standardization, though as
Benjamin asserts. such a chance is slight, and such gestures have much in common with
the tragic hero of antiquity who battle, who battles fate: “the hero is the true subject of La
38

Modernité. In other words, it takes a heroic consciousness to live in Modernity.”

Instead of battling the fate of the gods, and the necessity of nature, the modern poet
battles the “second nature” of modernity; comprised of both the semblance of nature that
39

is the crowd, and the generalized fate of mechanical reproduction.

The modern heroic

task is bearing the immanence of modernity, of finding a way to overcome this neo
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As Benjamin describes in his “Little History of Photography” (1931), under the photographers gaze
every street corner becomes the “scene of the crime,” that is the site where the individual was destroyed, as
individual, in favor of the larger mass. SW 2: 527.
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Baudelaire, The Parisian Prowler, 21.
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Benjamin emphasizes that “Baudelaire wanted to be read like a classical poet,” for an age to come which
would see his age as antiquity—as Benjamin would see the 19th century as the “antiquity” or pre-history of
the 20th century (ibid. 45).
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baroque epoch, from which there is no perspective of remove, and traces of history flit by
in the crowd (as Baudelaire’s À une passante). In his becoming Baudelaire, Benjamin
clearly saw this heroic task as an imperative for criticism; remarking on the changing
function of “critique” in modernity he writes:
Criticism is a matter of correct distancing. It was at home in a world where
perspectives and prospects counted and where it was still possible to take a
standpoint. Now things press to closely on human society. The “unclouded,”
40
“innocent” eye has become a lie.
Within this immanent context, one must embrace distortion—the ambiguous and Janus
faced nature of the “truth” of modernity: that chances of redemption are slight, and may
perhaps arrive too late. A new importance is now thrust upon language (allegory), and the
immanent refraction of commodities and cultural products so as to reveal the distorted
and slight image of Utopia. Despite the affinity with antiquity, this task is not tragic in a
classical sense—where the hero is sacrificed creating an ethic for a time to come—rather,
“…[h]eroic modernity turns out to be a Trauerspiel in which the hero’s part is
41

available.”

One is sacrificed to history (perhaps a worse fate), and it is unclear if one

will be rescued from the “ruin” of an era. Benjamin understood the immensity of this
task, and ceded that suicide and ruin hang over the individual in this era. The dark
fashions of modernity mark the funerary hell of the eternal return; “we are all attendants
42

to some kind of funeral,”

namely the one for ourselves (as individuals) at the hands of

standardization and larger social processes.

iii.

Resistance and Gesture
“If an agitator is to achieve lasting results, he must speak as the representative of a body of
opinion…Engels must have realized this on his first visit to Paris.” [a17, 1]

Despite such bleak prospects, there are heroes in this era, but they are not of the
revolutionary type one would expect—not the Marxists but the “Bohème’s”—those
“provocateurs” who plotted against the Second Empire of Napoleon III. Benjamin begins
his 1938 essay by associating Baudelaire’s verse with such types; both embody an
ambiguous, and mystery mongering sentiment, but above all, a spirit of revolt. Such
40
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figures are placed in repose with Marx, who found such provocateurs, and professional
revolutionaries (Blanqui) “dubious”— “bourgeois revolutionaries” who did not
understand their own class status. Yet, for Benjamin such conspirators provided
physiognomies of their age, embodying a generalized feeling of revolt, and attempts to
liberate “gesture” from growing standardization. Baudelaire embodied this spirit on the
43

level of language, as a “provocateur:”

Another would light a cigar next to a powder keg, to see, to know, to tempt fate,
forcing himself to display proof of energy, to play the gambler, to experience
44
the pleasures of anxiety, for nothing, through caprice, from idleness.
What disturbed Marx about such provocations was their Janus faced, or doubled nature:
“It had an ear for the songs of the revolution and also for the “higher voice” which spoke
from the drumroll of the executioners,” and further “…[Baudelaire’s] verse supported the
oppressor though it espoused not only their cause, but their illusions as well.”
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Though

they resisted the existing order, their lack of “collective” (Marxist) awareness forestalled
the development of class consciousness. What Marx saw as unprincipled Anarchism,
Benjamin saw as a scathing criticism of such collective possibilities. That the atrophy of
consciousness (Erfahrung into Erlebnis) in modernity, had destroyed such explicit
political solidarities, and perhaps it was only through a semblance of “spontaneous”
gesture that a subject could express itself consciously. The “crowd” was not unified, but a
perpetual rabble of competing interests, disparate passers-by on the street
[Straßenpublikum].
Both of Benjamin’s essays on Baudelaire (submitted to the Institute) can be read
in this sense: as treatises against such unified notions of class consciousness.

46

In fact

much of Benjamin’s general inquiry into the 19th century entailed a recognition of the
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As Susan Buck-Morss argues: “Rather than affirming the empirical consciousness of the worker, he was
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necessarily false: if the proletariat could not experience reality… it could not become aware of its own
objective position…urban existence thus worked against the development of class consciousness” (The
Origin of Negative Dialectics, 161).
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disjuncture between “social reformers” (Fourier, Saint Simon, Marx), and the actual
consciousness of individuals— a recognition that such theorists were unaware of the
alterations brought upon consciousness by modernity, and the position of their own ideals
in such movements. Adorno will later chastise Benjamin’s employment of psychoanalytic
categories (in the Arcades), specifically that his notion of a collective “un-conscious,”
forecloses the dialectical possibilities of class consciousness. However, here Adorno is
correct despite his intentions: Benjamin is asserting such dialectical narratives to be out
of sync with the collective “shocks” of modernity, and theory must instead develop a
mode of politics in rapport with such atrophies: a mode of theorizing which understands
the collective nature of such shock experiences.
The “Gestus” of these provocateurs is a familiar concept in Benjamin’s work,
recalling his reading of Kafka’s “Nature Theatre” where: “Each gesture is an event—one
might even say a drama—in itself” and further, “…the gestures of Kafka’s figures are too
powerful for our accustomed surroundings and break out into wider areas.”
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The

“astonishment” [Verfremdungseffekt] and sometimes violent nature of these gestures has
the capacity to shock, and reveal social conditions in the viewer (Brecht). Yet they are
not defined according to a given political paradigm (Marxism) as they are in Brecht; they
are spontaneous, and sometimes conducive to “unethical” political programs. The notion
of “Divine violence” (via Sorrel) embodies this ambiguity—a gesture that is both outside
the law, and not definable by it—a “law creating” violence that instantiates its own logic.
It should be noted that this violence has much in common with the (destructive) practice
of citation.
Baudelaire did not provide a critique of his age, nor a consistent model for
political action—he was not a “social poet” as Pierre Dupont—rather, he enacted the
greater task of representing (in the sense of Darstellung) modernity in its contradictory
formations. He presented his age (on the level of form), and the contradictions and
ambiguities of consciousness therein. In doing so, in becoming modern, he created a
citable history of gestures capable of stopping the day. In preserving in language the
heroic gestures of his time, Baudelaire provides a model for a critical historiography. As
47
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Benjamin writes, “To interrupt the course of the world that was Baudelaire’s deepest
48

intention.”

Yet he does not do so through a grand revolutionary gesture, rather through

preserving something of the gestures of others in language. In a memorable passage,
Benjamin cites an account of Blanqui’s “inventory” of his anonymous troops, a heroic
gesture un-known in its own era. Benjamin then comments: “Baudelaire’s poetry has
49

preserved in words the strength that made such a thing possible.”

That is, Baudelaire

represented (or cited) it in language.
This poetic practice (of episodes, citations) opposes that of “linear historiography,”
which covers over the epic moments of history with its plots. Baudelaire and Benjamin
preserve such citations, those that could be brought to “the now,” blasting it open with
critical potential. Further, this is a form of historiography in rapport with the fractured (or
episodic) consciousness of the century, one which gives such consciousness a critical
turn.
[traditional historiography] … cover[s] up the revolutionary moments in
the occurrence of history. The places where tradition breaks off—hence its
peaks and crags, which offer footing to one who would cross over them—
it misses. [N9a, 5]
It is important that Benjamin places such gestures in repose with Marxism—after all it
was the “provocateurs” who erected the first barricades in the Paris Commune—the first
to lash out in resistance to sovereign power. Marx himself modeled the “Dictatorship of
the Proletariat” on the Paris Commune (1871), which was occupied predominantly by
Anarchists and Blanquists, those who scorned a sober notion of class consciousness by
their heroic gestures of individual resistance. Baudelaire provides a means by which to
reclaim such gestures from the narratives of Marxism. Perhaps Benjamin’s assertion to
Horkheimer: “This [2nd Chapter] is perquisite of a Marxist interpretation, but does not on
its own fulfill its conception…,”

50

can be read along these lines: that Marxism entails the

appropriation of a spontaneous heroism (gestures of resistance), by a unified notion of
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“class”, and a dialectical methodology— the replacement of theoretical immanence by
transcendent categories—“primitive accumulation” par excellence.
III.

Drawing the Bow: Benjamin’s dialectical (Materialist) theology
“Nor should we adhere too strictly to the words of Marx, who often uses terms only figuratively.” –
Benjamin [N, 17]
“…But in remembrance [Eingedenken] we have an experience that forbids us to conceive of history as
fundamentally a-theological, little as it may be granted to us to try to write it with immediately theological
concepts.” -Horkheimer [N8,1]

At this point it is possible to turn to a broader analysis of Benjamin’s dialectical method
—one which attempts to span the opposing poles of materialism (Brecht, Adorno) and
theology (Scholem)—and informs the specifics of his engagement with Marxism in his
late work. Such a presentation is necessary given the limited theoretical statements
surrounding his work on Baudelaire (the exception being the “Addenda” to the 1938
piece), an issue that would become prominent in his correspondence with Adorno
surrounding the piece. In reference to the composition of his 1934 Kafka essay, Benjamin
penned the following to Scholem, an image which could be stretched across his thinking
more generally: “It remains to be seen whether I will ever be able to arch the bow so that
the arrows zings into flight…The Image of the bow suggests why: I am confronted with
two ends at once, the political and the mystical.”
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Benjamin’s later thinking (1937-40)

marks an attempt to induce such a flight, to utilize theological notions of temporality in
the service of politics, and the practice of history more generally. As can already be
glimpsed, such an image speaks to Benjamin’s attempt to apply his early linguisticcritical concerns to the sphere of politics, and concrete historical phenomenon. The
success of this method cannot be judged deductively, and Benjamin’s employment of an
“image” eludes to the non-conceptual nature of such a resolution. In fact, the disjunction,
or tension between these two elements will be demonstrated as the critical power of this
method.
Due to his death in 1940, much of Benjamin’s late methodology remains
ambiguous. One is left with an array of fragments, the key to which has been lost, yet
from these it is possible to glimpse dominant trajectories. Such theoretical ambiguities
51

Benjamin to Scholem. BSC, 143.

92

will be taken up extensively in his (now famous) correspondence with Adorno
surrounding the 1938 Baudelaire essay (V), and provide valuable texts by which to
further elucidate this methodology. The 1940 “Theses on the Concept of History,” is
often times read simply as a methodological treatise for the practice of history; however;
given Benjamin’s commitment to an immanent model of criticism, the 19th century must
be read on its own terms, that is by the light it provides for itself. Thus it will be argued
that it is in Benjamin’s work on Baudelaire (and the corresponding Arcades) that one
receives a true image of the application of his historical methodology.

52

Synchronic to

the development of this method are Adorno’s objections to Benjamin’s surrealist and
Brechtian tenets (V); these will be dealt with following a discussion of Benjamin’s
dialectical image, though they should be seen as relevant imperatives in its development.
In what follows, Benjamin’s late dialectical method will be elucidated, laying the
groundwork for an interrogation of the dialectical image. The first two sub-sections (i/ii),
deal with Benjamin’s refashioning of Marxist and surrealist categories, along with his rethinking of Marxist eschatology, both of which should be seen as immanent criticisms
necessary for Benjamin’s re-elaboration of the 19th century in the dialectical image (IV).
Section i, deals with the specifics of Benjamin’s later engagement with Marxist
categories, presenting a reading of The Arcades, as a spanning of surrealism and
materialism, following which, it examines the way Benjamin re-thinks Marx’s
base/superstructure distinction. Section ii, deals with Benjamin’s re-thinking of Marxist
eschatology as essential for the development of his own “critical” historiography, and
formulation of a genuine conception of “progress.” This will entail a reading of
Benjamin’s “Theses on the Concept of History” (1940), alongside the “Addenda” to the
first Baudelaire essay. Once such a framework has been presented, the final exegesis of
Benjamin’s dialectical image can proceed.
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As John McCole argues, Benjamin’s “Theses on the Concept of History” (1940) negates much of the
active potential he accords to history in the “fragmentary” Arcades project—Baudelaire should also be
thought as a figure from which one can gain an active sense of his historical method, that is of the the
possibility of re-writing history from the perspective of the present. As McCole writes: “The Image of
history as a piling up of ruins itself derives from the allegorist gaze in the Trauerspiel study. In the Arcades
project, Benjamin projected an image of history both rich and threatening. “On the Concept of History,”
however tends to level those differences; in the end, each rebus yields the same image: history is the simple
dismal permanence of catastrophe” (The Antinomies of Tradition, 303).
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i.

Benjamin’s “Historical Materialism”

“Must the Marxist understanding of history necessarily be acquired at the expense of the perceptibility of
history? Or: in what was is it possible to conjoin a heightened graphicness to the realization of the Marxist
method? The first stage in this undertaking will be to carry over the principle of Montage into history.” AP
[N2, 6]

Benjamin’s engagement with Marx and “historical materialism” can be termed both
ambiguous, and un-orthodox, one marked by an emphasis on “theory,” as opposed to real
world instantiations (German SPAD, Soviet Communism). As early as Moscow Diary
(1927), he expressed skepticism to Marxism’s rigid (aesthetic) orthodoxies, and the
hierarchies endemic to party leadership. Despite this, references to “historical
materialism” permeate his later writings—though his usage cannot be claimed as the
materialism of Brecht, or that of the Institute—and one is left speculating as to why he
maintains the term.
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Given Marx’s role in many events of the nineteenth century, he is

cited throughout The Arcades (Convolutes N, X, a, k); and such quotations demonstrate a
substantial turn towards materialist models in his later work, as these fragments are dated
later than earlier surrealist considerations. However, as T.J Clark argues, Benjamin cites
many “cliché passages” from Marx (the “fetishism” of commodities (Capital Vol 1.),
man’s relation to nature (1844 Manuscripts)): demonstrating a shallow knowledge of
political economy informed by secondary anthologies compiled by Hugo Fischer, Karl
Korsch and Otto Rühle.
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It is known that Benjamin shifted The Arcades (and his

thinking more generally) in a materialist direction throughout the 1930s; though Clark
questions if this engagement came at the expense of the depth of his early thought? One
could likewise post the opposite question: was Benjamin materialist enough, or did he
lapse into the mystical categories of surrealism? Perhaps most fundamentally, did
Benjamin’s move towards materialism constitute a “break” in his thinking?
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Susan Buck-Morss, argues that this has to do with Benjamin’s care regarding “over-naming” and a desire
to “redeem” Marxism, as a concept—that is re-appropriating its critical aspects. On the danger of “overnaming,” Benjamin writes: “They have nothing to say with such an urgency that it could determine the
coining of their words,” “On Language as Such” SW 1: 65. See further, The Origin of Negative Dialectics,
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Clark goes further asserting the “Marxist turn” in the Arcades to be a detriment to the project as a whole:
“…Marxism got in the way of the wonderful poetic-ethnological simplicity of the Arcades Project as first
conceived in the later 1920s. It muddied, multiplied, and mechanized the projects original outlines; so that
finally, essentially Marxism can only be seen as a cancer on Benjamin’s work.” (32) Scholem echoes
statements such as this, expressing his dismay that Benjamin abandoned theology in favor of materialism.
See Walter Benjamin the Story of a Friendship, specifically “Crises and Turning Points” (1930-32).
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On this topic, scholarship and commentary widely diverges: one camp claims
materialism to have been a detriment to his early theological, and linguistic interests (T.J
Clark, Scholem, Adorno); while another derides Benjamin’s “mystery-mongering” and
55

underdeveloped understanding of political-economy (Adorno , Wolin, Brecht). Firstly,
both camps are misguided in assuming a turn to Marxism necessarily involved a break
with his earlier immanent model of criticism— this rests on a misunderstanding of
Benjamin’s method as a whole, and the relationship of such a method to historical
materialism (Ch. 1 & Ch. 2). Secondly, both camps fail to recognize the immanent
relationship of his early method to the material treated—that in redeeming baroque
Trauerspiel, Benjamin resurrected its concept of allegory, employing it (as the Idea,
constellation), in an analysis of the epoch. Likewise, in immanently writing the history of
the 19th century, Benjamin sought to work through and “redeem” [retten] elements of its
previous historical instantiations (Marxist historiography, positivist historiography) into
his own dialectical image. In elaborating the 19th century through images such as
Baudelaire, and The Arcades, Benjamin sought to immanently “re-constellate” its
previous historiographical instantiations, working through, and not wholly disregarding
them.
Parenthesis: The Passagen-Werk as Immanent Critique
At this point a reading of The Arcades will be presented: demonstrating it as an immanent
working through of surrealist categories that Benjamin will refashion in a materialist
direction. This refashioning will prove essential in the development of Benjamin’s own
historiographical model, and will also be shown to contain affinities to his early model of
criticism (Ch. 1.).
Following the failure of his 1937 study on Klages and Jung, Horkheimer had
suggested to Benjamin that a “materialist study” of Baudelaire that would be of interest to
the Institute. At this time Benjamin was also extensively engaged with his Arcades
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The many valences of Adorno’s response to this question will be un-packed in section (IV), though
provisionally he can be placed in both camps as one who holds that Benjamin is not Marxist enough, but
also that this “pseudo-Marxism” is a detriment to his earlier interests and categories of criticism. Scholem
held a somewhat similar view, worrying that Benjamin’s theological insights would be destroyed by a
materialist conversion.
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studies, and attempted to use Baudelaire to set down the major motifs of the PassagenWerk: “I already foresaw this tendency of Baudelaire to configure itself as a sort of
miniature model [Miniaturmodell] of the book [Passagen-Werk] in conversations with
Teddie [Adorno]. Since San Remo, this has been confirmed to a greater degree than I had
thought…”
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Despite this desire, the Baudelaire study gained an autonomy of its own,

leading many to speculate that Benjamin intended the study to replace the Arcades. Yet
as will be shown, both Baudelaire and the Parisian Arcades are immanent images by
which one can “read” the nineteenth century. Both refract the century differently, though
each is equally valid (or legible) as a dialectical image and should be seen as a
continuation of Benjamin’s immanent model of criticism.
Much of the aforementioned chiasmus regarding Benjamin’s Marxism hinges on
how one reads his unfinished Passagen-Werk, or what form did Benjamin intended to
present the “wish-images” of the century in. Should the work be seen as a Surrealist
montage of found objects; or as an attempt to articulate a broader political economy of
the 19th century, one extended to include the phantasmagorical aspects of the commodity
form, amending Marx with an analysis of consumption? Examining the methodological
genesis of the project (1927-40), it is clear that these views are not necessarily mutually
exclusive, as Benjamin attempts to harness elements of surrealist dream exposition in his
development of a materialist historiography.
The Passagen-Werk itself (specifically in its early phases) can be read as an
attempt to present the collective experience of modernity (in both its conscious and unconscious resonances), articulating the utopian and regressive elements of such an
experience. The Parisian Arcades (as structures) represented a threshold between
“public” and “private” (“Passages”), symbolic of an evacuation of “interior” space
endemic to the century in general. Through new technological capacities (photography,
etc.), and techniques of construction (iron, glass), humanity was “awaking” to its new
productive abilities: its (material and intellectual) aptitude to construct a new collective
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life for itself; to live in Scheerbart’s utopian “glass house,” a collective world without
57

individual traces.

Benjamin believed that technology, if fused with a collective political

sentiment, could provide a radically new relationship to nature—one overcoming of
capitalist alienation (see “To the Planetarium:” One Way St. SW 1: 486-47.). Public forms
of art and technology (architecture, cinema) provided models for a new “public” forms of
consciousness, in rapport with current technological capacities.
Benjamin saw such capacities in a philosophical sense as well: collective-utopians
as Marx and Fourier sought to abolish private (“bourgeois”) modes of thinking in favor of
collective political practice (see Theses on Feuerbach, 1845). The century’s political
upheavals (1848 Revolutions, the Paris Commune (1871,) and subsequent repressions
(The Second Empire) illustrated the potentials and failures of such capacities—the fact
that humanity was jerking into awakening, but still found itself under the sway of myth.
For Benjamin, the intoxicating power of consumer capital and the commodity form as
phantasmagoria prevented humanity from realizing such collective futures. The Arcades
themselves can be read as the “dream house” of the century: symbolic at once of a
collective awakening of technological capacities, and the co-option of this same potential
by the phantasmagoria of the commodity, so that instead of building the classless
society, the 19th century built shopping malls (“The Arcades”). Benjamin witnessed the
final failure of such realizations—at the end of the “long nineteenth century” (17891914), in the destruction of experience that was wrought by the First World War. For
Benjamin, this marked the definitive failure of such projects, as the 20th century had been
unable to harness such capacities to move beyond myth.
For Clark, after this failure Benjamin’s task became a “collective dream
interpretation:” an attempt to understand why the 19th century failed to enact such
fantasies—why the revolutionary collective moment that should have occurred was
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Paul Scheerbart, was a utopian novelist of much interest to Benjamin throughout his life, notably his
work “Glass Architecture” (1914) which was influential to many in the Bauhaus, along with his novel
Lesabéndio, which described a transparent science fiction future—of the possibilities of fusing technology
and nature. Benjamin was interested in applying many of his categories to politics, and did so in a lost
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missed.

This entailed reading the 19th century as a “ruin” of history, a past of missed

opportunities that the 20th century would do well to understand. To understand why the
construction of such Utopias failed, Benjamin turned to architectural theory, specifically
employing the work of Sigfried Giedion (Building in France 1928), who argued that
advancements in building technologies (iron construction, glass), often corresponded to
“regressive” styles and excessive ornamentation in terms of design—that architects failed
to come to terms with their technological capacities. Benjamin read this on a larger scale,
working through humanities inability to come to terms with its own capacities—why the
technological capacities of modernity regressed to the ornament of The Arcades. For
Benjamin, such utopian capacities where not wholly lost, but existed in fragments of the
past—condemned to the wreckage of history by new narratives of progress. The task of
The Passagen-Werk entailed a sifting through such wreckage: as a “ragpicker” Benjamin
attempted to (re) collect [erinnern] the dream elements of the past, working through the
pathologies of their failure, while attempting to import them into his present moment. The
Arcades should be read as a collection (citation) of such elements. In attempting to
harness the power of such utopian dream energies, Benjamin develops a clear affinity
with surrealism. A genealogy of this engagement will now be sketched.
Throughout the 1930s Benjamin continued his immanent criticism of romantic
categories through what he deemed to be their contemporary instantiations.
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This

entailed confronting the “intoxicated” practices of surrealism with the more robust
framework of historical materialism. However, these early moments should not be seen
as “overcome,” rather as sublated [aufgehobt], as Benjamin incorporated insights of
surrealist presentation into his “materialist” historiography. He criticized surrealism’s
“pernicious romantic prejudices” via materialist structure, while overcoming materialist
determinism through the “transposition of montage into history.” [N2, 6] In this sense
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Adorno’s Negative Dialectics (1966) would enact a similar analysis: attempting to understand why
idealism had failed to realize itself in Materialism; or rather, why Marx’s imperatives in the Theses on
Feuerbach, had not been taken more seriously en masse in the 19th century. See “Preface” &
“Introduction.”
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McCole argues that much of Benjamin’s work can be seen as an immanent working through of
Romanticism, and the issues Benjamin had with the German youth movement, continuing the imperatives
developed in his 1919 “The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism.” (See Ch. 1). This also entailed
a working through of (pseudo-) romanticism via its 20th-century instantiations, namely Proust, Klages,
Jung, and surrealism. See The Antinomies of Tradition, 63-115.
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The Arcades comes to us as a “montage” of two conjoining aspects of Benjamin’s
thought; surrealism and materialism, broaching an affinity between the two.
In surrealism, Benjamin saw the potential to apply his early model of criticism to
concrete objects in the world, decoding not the myths of textual authority, but the myths
surrounding objects in the social world of modernity. It is this engagement which
establishes a gradual tonal shift (contra break) in his writing: a movement away from the
esoteric (or textual) domain of his early method, to the exoteric realm of historical truth
60

informed by surrealism and materialism.

From his early writings, Benjamin explored the relationship of works to materialsocial conditions, reading texts as ciphers of history even when history appeared absent.
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Alongside this is Benjamin’s persistent imperative of immanent criticism: “to illuminate a
62

work only by the light the work itself provides.”

A proper unfolding of the work does

not introduce an “outside” to the text, but rather develops its concepts and formulae so as
to provoke “reflection” (Ch. 1). These two imperatives may seem somewhat
contradictory: how can one elaborate the expression of material circumstances in
authorship without introducing anterior formulae? The solution to this antinomy lies in
Benjamin’s re-thinking of the concept of “origin” [Ur-sprung] along historical lines (See
Ch. 1.). Here an entity’s emergence as itself—that is into “recognisability” and
tradition—is fundamentally historical, and the precise site of this must be “read” by the
critic. Much of Benjamin’s early writings can be read as the elaboration of such a
method— “[to] forge ahead with the whetted axe of reason” [N1,4]—immanently
reflecting upon a text historically, so as to uproot myths of textuality and overturn the
illusion of the autonomous work of art, along with the symbolic (mythical) notion of the
author. As a method of criticism, it would be fair to characterise these endeavours as
60

Scholarship often emphasizes the “Marxist turn” in Benjamin’s thinking, though following McCole,
Missac, and Buck-Morss this should be seen more as a tonal shift, as an application of early epistemic, and
textual methods (esoteric) to concrete political and historical events (exoteric). This chapter will
demonstrate the shared commitment to immanent critique in both.
61
As is done in his Trauerspiel study, where nature is read as the “second nature” of the baroque.
Describing Benjamin’s method, whereby detached elements where read as “historical” Missac writes:
: “…however autonomous it may appear to be and however cleanly detached from any context, retains the
traces of its origins, and it is simply a matter of discovering and interpreting them.” Walter Benjamin’s
Passages, 42.
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Benjamin, “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” SW 1: 151.
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“epistemic” (critical in the Kantian sense),though Benjamin recognized an affinity of
these modes with historical materialism.

63

Benjamin was attempting to develop a method

of “historical-philosophical” analysis by which one could unfold a text historically,
immanently reading history out of the work, against myths of autonomy.
It was in his engagement with surrealism (“Dreamkitsch” (1925), and
“Surrealism” (1927)), that Benjamin first recognized the possible applications of his
method to “concrete” objects—artifacts existing in the material world that could be
demonstrated as surrounded by the mythologies of modernity. Benjamin praised the
64

surrealist endeavour to “…pursue images, wherever they may occur”

evacuating the

division between art and life. Through its interrogation of kitsch, dreams, and intoxicants,
surrealism endeavoured to demonstrate the myths that abounded in the city, alongside the
alterations of human consciousness wrought by technology and atrophies of experience.
However, Benjamin expressed skepticism about surrealism’s irrationalist- romantic
insistence on “intoxication” (Drugs) as a way to disrupt experience, favouring instead a
“profane illumination:” a mode of dialectical criticism capable of disrupting experience
in a similar sense. This critique marked Benjamin’s movement away from the major
(romantic) tenets of surrealism, and his redirection of their insights in a materialist
direction.
***
This utilization of surrealism can now be demonstrated to have substantial import for
Benjamin’s rethinking of Marxist categories, specifically his re-thinking of the
“base/superstructure” binary along the lines of the phantasmagoria. Louis Aragon’s The
Parisian Peasant (1926) provided the inspiration for the early drafts of The Arcades—then
conceived as a shorter work (with Hessel) “Paris a Dialectical Fairyland” (1927)—yet
Aragon, like many other surrealists, fell victim to the same mythologies they identified in
modernity, regressing to being a zealot of pre-historical archetypes. For Benjamin, such
mythological formulations must be analyzed historically—through a dialectical struggle
against such forces of pre-history—the myths of the present must be shown to have an
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See his 1931 letter to Rychner quoted in Ch. 1.
McCole, The Antinomies of Tradition, 211.
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“origin.” An affinity is evident with his earlier analysis of Kafka’s world as that of “prehistory,” yet throughout the 1930s he began to move this analysis in an explicitly Marxist
direction, targeting capitalism as a generator of such mythologies. This entailed the
development of a more historically situated critique of the specificity of the myths of the
19th century; a movement away from the archetypal mythologies presented in Kafka (Ch.
2). As will be demonstrated in section V, this lack of historical specificity was a repeated
point of contention for Adorno, and one can speculate as to the influence he may have had
in such transitions.
Such a specific origin was located in the mythical cult of capitalism, which
enslaved humanity, placing it at the mercy of the larger dynamics of mechanization and
technology (see “Capitalism as Religion,” 1921). Benjamin would employ surrealist dream
interpretation, alongside “historical materialism”—though it was a materialism rid of
economic determinism, employed in an analysis of myth. Surface mythologies would be
“read” as “expressions” [Ausdrucken] of the grander dream theatre of capital. Through this
method Benjamin forms an affinity with Marx’s analyses of the “base” (economic) and
“superstructure” (cultural), asserting that mythological cultural formations (objects, works)
reflect broader mythologies and regressions in society. As Benjamin writes in the 2nd
edition of his “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility” (1936):
Since the transformation of the superstructure proceeds far more slowly than
that of the base, it has taken more than half a century for the change in the
conditions of production to be manifested in all areas of culture…the
dialectic of these conditions of production is evident in the superstructure,
65
no less than the economy.
Despite this terminological use, Benjamin by no mean employs the base/superstructure
relation in a structuralist or determinist sense, and as the above quotation illustrates
Benjamin essentially collapses the distinction: as phantasmagoria, capitalism presents
itself in individual phenomena, which can be read by the critic. Adorno and Scholem will
later remark that such a direct reading, or association, between base and superstructure is
a “cloudy spot” in Benjamin’s thought, one in need of more robust theory. Yet, if one
takes seriously Benjamin’s imperatives for immanent criticism, there can be no
65

Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility,” SW 3: 101.
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transcendent position from which one can understand economic reality as a whole—only
particular phantasmagoric phenomena. These phenomena can be “read” to provide traces
of broader economic trajectories, but no definitive correlation can be drawn, only an
affinity.

66

Thus in the essay on the “Work of Art…,” Benjamin will deduce broader

pathologies of reproducibility, and the destruction of aura, immanently, from individually
reproduced works. Benjamin associates a historical trace to commodities, and cultural
products: they must be given sense as expressions of certain historical forces. As
“Trauerspiel” emerged out of the broader mythos of baroque eschatology, “mechanical
reproduction” had a historical emergence in capitalism. Speaking to the distortion of such
relations, Benjamin writes:
Marx lays bare the causal connection between economy and culture. For us
what matters is the thread of expression. It is not the economic origins of
culture that will be presented, but the expression of the economy in its
culture…the attempt to grasp an economic process as perceptive Urphenomena [Ur-geschichte] [N1a, 6].
As McCole notes, the German Ur-geschichte (pre-history, myth) contains a valence
untranslatable in the English: though it does connote “myth,” it is not the antiquated
realm of fate (a-historical), rather a sphere of myth that is un-aware of its own mythical
character—myth disavowing its historical origin (“ideology” in Marx). In this sense it
could be characterized as “regression,” or “repression” (Freud), as myth which represses
its historical trace. The task of criticism for Benjamin, becomes the combatting of such
myths via a dialectical encounter with the object; its historical traces must be exposed so
as to achieve autonomy with respect to mythology governing it. Exemplary of this is the
category of “fashion” in The Arcades: its incessant quest for the “new” is exposed by
Benjamin as a hell of the eternal return of the same. As a child is held after school and
condemned to repeat as punishment, so the 19th century is held in bedazzlement by the
“same” masquerading as the “new.” History is hidden by the “naturalization” (“second
nature”) of the commodity form, and the Arcades present a passage downward into a
mythological state. Benjamin will emphasize the affinity of nineteenth-century
66

Thus in the 1935 exposé Benjamin will “montage” aspects of the base and superstructure in startling
contrast—the rise of the Arcades is associated with that of the textile trade, and alterations in architecture—
the reader is left to speculate as to the specifics of the relation. Yet the relationship is also demonstrated as
“re-citable” from different historical positions as new perspectives are afforded.
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consumerism with that of the baroque, as both transform history into nature, and damn
individuals to the fated necessity of their own epoch. It should be emphasised that surface
phenomena are not reduced to “symbolic” manifestations of particular material
conditions, nor is the relation causal (or inverted à la Marx), rather it is read, and
associated by the critic. Benjamin describes such a critical awakening as follows:
The Question is this: if the base determines the superstructure in what might
be called the material of thought and experience, but this determination is not
simply a mirroring, then how—quite apart from the question of its originating
causes—is it to be characterized? As its expression [Ausdruck]. The
superstructure is the expression of the base…just as for the sleeper a full
stomach is not mirrored but expressed by the dream content, although the
stomach may causally “determine” that content. As first the collective
expresses its conditions of life. Those conditions find their expression in
dreaming and in awakening their interpretation. [K2,5]
The task of the Arcades becomes the articulation of these collective “dream-images,”
recognizing at once their regressive character (as aspects of capital), yet also the
collective capacities inherent in them—that collective myths could be “awakened”
historically and utilized in the construction of a new future together. It is essential to note
that Benjamin is not providing a straightforward “ideological critique” (as Adorno),
rather analyzing such myths historically so as to awaken their “re-cite-ability” as history;
this should be seen as a fundamental point of divergence. The articulation of such images
will be defined as the task of the dialectical image, but at this point it has been shown that
such a method does not mark a decided break with his early concern of “illuminating the
work by way of the light it shines for itself.” It is, simply, a shift to a larger historical
focus. The nineteenth century must be brought to bear upon itself, reflected (or refracted)
in its own contradictory light. The two “objects” by which Benjamin enacts this
reflection are the Parisian Arcades and the figure of Baudelaire. Both present the century
in its contradictory and Janus faced light: its promises of collectivity and prosperity,
alongside its regression to the mythologies of consumerism. With his immanent
presentation of the century, Benjamin is also working through the categories of Marxism.
At this point his criticisms of Marxist historiography more generally can be
demonstrated.
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ii.

Marxism and History, or overcoming Marxist Eschatology.

“Doctrine of Blanqui: “No! No one has access to the future…the revolution alone, as it clears the horizon
will reveal the future…Those who pretend to have in their pocket a complete map of this unknown land—
they truly are madmen.” [a20a,5]

With his utilization of an immanent mode of analysing the century (via the object),
Benjamin continues his working through of Marxist methodology, and the radicalism of
his own view comes into repose when articulated against the orthodoxy of Marxist
historiography and eschatology. Such a re-thinking of historiographical temporality will
be shown as essential in the development of Benjamin’s own dialectical image. In the
“introduction” to the Grundrisse, Marx asserts what could be deemed the fundamental
Marxist historical perspective:
Bourgeois society is the most developed and most complex historic
organization of production. The categories which express its relations, the
comprehension of its structure, thereby allow insights into the structure and the
relations of production of all the vanished social relations of production out of
whose ruins and elements it has built itself up…Human anatomy contains the
67
key to the anatomy of the Ape.
The problem with this assertion is not so much the latent determinism (natural
metaphors), or the “Base/Superstructure” binary, but rather Marx’s allegiance with
historical progress: that History de facto entails a liquidation of “myth,” an enlightened
understanding of a previous era. Such historicist narratives also emerged in the nineteenth
century (Hugo, Comte, Turgot), and for Benjamin, history must be wrested away from
such diachronic linear narratives; in fact, he goes so far as to assert that such narratives of
progress (or future revelation) are themselves part of the mythologies governing the
present. As was shown in Chapter 2, such temporalities mortgage the present for some
future revelation. Historicism must be revealed for what it is, an opium of the masses, an
intoxication of the century hiding the baroque realities of political repression.
68

In typical German fashion,

Marx saw in the (French) 19th century an immense

and progressive energy (as witnessed in the 1848 Revolutions), yet chastised their lack of
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Marx, Grundrisse, 105.
For Rebecca Comay, the German experience of the French revolutionary élan is essential in the
development of Idealism, and of much of the 19th century. While the French rushed forward with romantic
revolutionary fervor, German thinking tended to advocate a revolution of the mind (as the protestant
68
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theoretical understanding—their inability to grasp the true “materialist” determinations of
history had allowed for Louis Bonaparte’s 1851 coup d’état and the creation of the
Second Empire. A new mode of revolutionary thinking must be developed, one that deals
with the specters of the past and present:
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please;
they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under
circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past. The
tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare [Alp] on the
69
brain of the living.
For Marx, the converted protestant, a redemptive eschatology frames his response to the
traumas of the past: though unfinished and still weighing upon the present, the future
revolution will bring a redemption and judgment upon previous epochs, one must act in
the present so as to enact the movement of “world history.” As Marx continues:
The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot draw its poetry from
the past, but only from the future. It cannot begin with itself, before it has
stripped off all superstition in regard to the past. Earlier revolutions
required world-historical recollections in order to drug themselves
concerning their own content. In order to arrive at its content, the
revolution of the 19th century must let the dead bury the dead. There the
phrase went beyond the content; here the content goes beyond the
70
phrase.
Marx provides a revolutionary model for the present in which actors are motivated by the
image of their “emancipated grandchildren”—the past will take care of itself, the
revolutionary concern is with the future. Engagement with the past is virtually equated
with necromancy; such nostalgia is unnecessary, as a model of emancipation has been
found in historical materialism. For Jacob Taubes, such a Christian eschatology is

reformation had done). See. Mourning Sickness: Hegel and the French Revolution. Such a tendency is
present throughout Benjamin’s thinking, specifically his attempt to appropriate surrealist energies in a more
“theoretical” direction.
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Marx, “Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” The Marx Engels Reader, 595.
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Ibid. 597.
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endemic to much of the western philosophical tradition, Marx being no exception, and in
fact an exceptional case.

71

Taubes views the main culprit of this as Hegel, whom he sees as secularizing (not
overcoming) the Christian narrative. For Hegel, history becomes the conquest of
revelation in the sense of “Absolute Spirit;” and in true protestant form, this Absolute can
only be represented “negatively” through the labor of the individual, toiling in alienation
in hope of predestination. However, as readers of Hegel well know, how secular his
Phenomenology is remains to be decided. For Marx too, the overcoming of such
alienation was the goal of history: man had fallen into nature, and could overcome this
exiled alienation through the labor of history. For Marx, redemption will come through
the messianic “proletariat”—with is Christological abolition of itself it will redeem
humanity into the classless society. As argued in Chapter 2, such futural eschatologies
mortgage the present, robbing it of its power as the “true state of exception.” However,
Benjamin will concede that Marx proved an important step in the secularization of
messianism, though he did not go far enough in ridding himself of Christian dogma. In
his 1984 seminar on Benjamin’s “Theses on the Concept of History,” Taubes eludes to
the theological “reversal” Benjamin enacts upon Marx, evoking the citations from the
Eighteenth Brumaire: “Benjamin, on the other hand, presents what-is-past not as a
nightmare, but rather as an element, where what-is-past is charged with the presence of
the now. Precisely what Marx rejects as “necromancy,” is for Benjamin the guarantee the
72

revolution will happen.”

In response to such eschatologies, Benjamin’s late work entails the formulation of
the “weak messianic” practice of the historian— “…to show what a historical
materialism would be like which has annihilated within itself the idea of progress”
[N2,2]—a practice based on a citation, and a redemption of the past, not a faith in some
messiah to come. Yet it is with such a reversal that the past is able to enact meaningful
imperatives upon the present. In essence, Benjamin enacts a reading of the first quotation
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See “The Eschatology of Marx and Kierkegaard” (184), and “On the Nature of Eschatology” (3) in
Occidental Eschatology.
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Taubes, “Seminar Notes on Walter Benjamin’s ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History,’” hereafter
“Seminar Notes,” 194.
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from Marx’s Brumaire against the second: the past weighs upon us, yet if rescued from
transience and decay, its weight contains the power to cleave open the present moment. If
the myths of the present can be located as “originating” in the past (via genealogy), or if
present concerns are recognized in constellation with the past, the present can be thought
as a newly exceptional site. One cannot assume some future enlightenment, rather must
carefully work through the myths governing the present moment, following them into the
past. Hence Benjamin will pose the question, “…must the Marxist understanding of
history come at the expense of an experience of history?” [N2,6] It is precisely such an
engagement, or experience of the past, that materialism denies, ceding all concerns to the
future. The doctrines of historical materialism must be “worked through” so as to develop
a practice of history adequate to particular objects and figures. This is particularly true for
the practice of aesthetic criticism, and a model must be developed that allows the work to
be experience as embedded in its own time. Such a practice was undertaken in
Benjamin’s essay on Baudelaire (1938)—a figure who illustrates the futility of a
conventional “Marxist” readings of history, and in the “Addenda” to the piece Benjamin
elaborates his own method of criticism. A reading of this will now be undertaken.
Traditional Marxist methods of criticism begin with a “transcendental” theory of
capitalist development, based on a linear understanding of the dialectical progression.
They then apply such a methodology to historical objects, claiming to locate it “in truth,”
as the product of a certain set of social relations—the object is revealed, or “decoded”
due to our knowledge of these social relations which we can read into the object. This is
due to the “developed” nature of one’s (present) methodology as seen in the quotation
from Marx’s Grundrisse: that one has a better understanding of previous epochs simply
due to one’s diachronic position, and is aware of the “materialist” determinations within
another epoch.
For Benjamin, such a method applied to Baudelaire destroys him as a thinker. As
has been shown, he was one who refracted his context, testifying against his own class,
and embodying the myriad of complexities that was his age: “…what contravenes is
precisely that when we read Baudelaire, we are given a course of historical lessons by
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bourgeois society.”

Baudelaire presents a developed (negative) image of his own time

and one must recognize him in relation to this context (and how this context is handed
down to us by tradition), not as straightforwardly determined by it.

74

Despite his

“bourgeois” position, Baudelaire’s insights provide valuable refractions of the century
which cannot be done away with too hastily. For Benjamin, given that there is no history
in which the past is citable in all its moments, one must begin (inductively) with “…the
Object riddled with error, with doxa.”
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The critic must “read” the valences of meaning

surrounding the object: recognizing it as it is embedded in its own time, and the means by
which it is transmitted to us by the stream of tradition (“pre/post history”). In the process
of transmission the work acquires a new sense, and in so doing gives a new sense to the
works preceding it.
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Benjamin describes the commitment to immanence in his model of

criticism (“historical-materialism”): “sundering truth from falsehood is the goal, not the
point of departure of the materialist method.”

77

In beginning with the object, criticism

must not proceed with generalized derisions of works as “bourgeois,” it must not reduce
the work, but must seek to heighten central motifs present therein. Further, it must seek to
deconstruct the various post-histories with which the work is endowed, through an
analysis of the history of reception—that is, by thinking through the historical dynamics
of origin. As Benjamin elaborates:
The sources flow as abundantly as one could wish, and where they converge
to form the stream of tradition, they flow along between well-laid out slopes
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Benjamin, PSB, SW 4: 64.
Benjamin’s conception of Baudelaire has much in common with Adorno’s conception of Art’s relation to
its own time: “[art] becomes social by its opposition to society, and it occupies this position only as
autonomous art. By crystalizing in itself as something unique to itself, rather than complying with existing
social norms and qualifying as “socially useful,” it criticizes society as merely existing” (AS, 335). In this
sense Art is a “cipher” to existing social conditions, but does not mirror them deterministically. For Adorno
however, this has more to do with “authentic” art, than the specificity of Baudelaire as a thinker, a
distinction which is clearly demonstrated in his “On Lyric Poetry and Society,” which argues for the critical
potential of lyric poetry more generally.
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as far as the eye can reach. Historical materialism is not led astray by this
spectacle. It does not seek the image of the clouds in this stream, but neither
does it turn away from the stream to drink “from the source” and pursue
“the matter itself” behind men’s backs. Whose mills does this stream drive?
Who is utilizing its power? Who dammed it? These are the questions that
historical materialism asks, changing our impressions of the landscape by
78
naming the forces that have been operative in it.
The historian must not only analyze history, but the writing or citation of history: “Who
is writing,” who is driving the dominant narrative? And further, is such a narrative a
historicist justification of the perpetual same, or a “non-identical” (critical) history
endowed with the capacities to “stop the day?” For Benjamin, it is enough to see
Baudelaire as a late romantic symbolist poet, rather as one who presents possibilities and
images from his own time which can be seized upon in constellation. Baudelaire came to
Benjamin within a preconceived notion of the 19th century, which Benjamin
deconstructed so as to think the century in an active sense. Baudelaire’s complexity as an
individual testified against his full codification within any dominant narrative, he
remained constantly “non-identical” to each attempt at narration, and it is this disjunction
which points to divergent historiographical possibilities.
Such questioning of reception, and of historical progress leads to the more
fundamental question: whom is history for? The above quotation from the Addenda
evokes the later phrase from Benjamin’s “Theses:” “There is no document of history that
is not at the same time one of Barbarism;” the proletariat, as the detritus or kitsch of
history remains constantly non-identical to the dominant narrative. Whether or not its
labor drives world history, its non-identical position allows it to question the dominant
narrative of progress from the perspective of a critical, or citable history. If it awakens to
its ability to question, or cite against the dominant narrative, it poses the ability to stop the
day, to pull the emergency brake on the locomotive of progress. With this stoppage, the
question can be posed as to what a “true” conception of progress would look like, one
liberated from positivist eschatology.
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Ibid. 63. It should be noted that much of this quotation is a re-writing of Brecht’s “Questions from a
Worker Who Reads.” Referring to the importance of a history of reception in Marxism, Benjamin writes:
“For it is an illusion of vulgar Marxism that one can determine the social function of a material or
intellectual product without reference to the circumstances and the bearers of its tradition” (ibid. 64).
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Parenthesis: Progress
“An Fortschritt glauben heißt nicht: glauben daß ein Fortschritt schon geschen ist. Das wäre
kein Glauben” –Kafka, Zürau Aphorisms.
Every Page a Victory
Who cooked the feast for the victors?
Every ten years a great man.
Who paid the bill?
So many reports
So many questions.
-Brecht, Questions from a Worker Who Reads.

Benjamin’s criticisms of “progress” are not simply relevant in themselves; rather, they
are an integral part of broader aspects of his thinking. Primarily, a questioning of
progress leads to his recasting of history (and temporality more generally) along “weak
messianic” lines. Secondly, there has been much scholarly emphasis on Benjamin’s
thinking with regard to the past—to the extent that he is often presented as an esoteric
“soothsayer” who provides little of import for present-day politics. This is decidedly not
the case, as Benjamin criticizes the positivist conception of progress so as to formulate a
genuine conception of progress: one founded on the idea of “happiness,” and the
satisfaction of material needs, a minimal ethics permeating his late writings. Though
presented as distinct, these two concerns are intricately related: through a criticism of
“progress” (historicism) Benjamin will formulate a new citable model of history which
allows for the redemption of the dreams of previous epoch.
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For Benjamin, Marx was right to point out the “ideal” nature of Hegel’s system:
that the conquest of the “real as rational” emphasized metaphysical estrangement over
and against “material” (economic) alienation. For Marx, progress should be re-directed to
this substrata, and the establishment of a classless society. As aforementioned, this
marked a secularization of many of the religious elements of Hegel’s system: essential is
not the realization of the metaphysical Absolute, but rather the satisfaction material
needs, the historical conditions for which Marx thought to be possible at the time of his
writing. As Brecht would later put it: “Food first, then Morality,” material needs should
79

Eluding to this point, Hamacher writes: “Benjamin’s critique of progress—an element of his philosophy
of history that currently receives little respect from its admirers—is only radically understood if it is
grasped as a critique of time as a transcendental form of perception and thus of the empty form of
experience that progresses in it.” “Now”: Walter Benjamin on Historical Time,” 48. Hence an
understanding of Benjamin’s critique of progress is essential for his own messianic conception of history.
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be thought as primary. For Benjamin, “…Marx secularized the idea of messianic time,
and that was a good thing”

80

Absolute spirit could now be conceived a set of concrete

conditions occurring in history, the movement for which could be achieved at the proper
“revolutionary situation.” However, as Taubes and Benjamin pointed out, Marx did not
escape Hegel’s (Christian) eschatology, in which the coming of the messiah (revolution)
covers over histories critical moments—“…if history is written with a view to a goal or
81

telos, all epochs are merely preludes.”

For Benjamin, such materialist imperatives for history were a step in the right
direction; the problem began with the elevation of this materialism to the status of an
ideal by the Leninists, and German SPAD. This elevation culminated in the idea of the
“revolutionary situation” (or “state of exception”): the idea that revolutionary judgement
would come from beyond (as revelation) as the inevitable telos of the historical dynamic,
and that the proletariat, as the “motor of world history,” would (necessarily) abolish itself
in the establishment of communist society. For Benjamin, such determinism culminated
in the Acedia of historicism: the inability to engage meaningfully with the past, and
ceding of autonomy to the necessity of the world historical dynamic; “…the connection,
if not the equation, between historical time and the dialectic provided a first class
82

guarantee against an optimism that would induce passivity.”

Such historicist readings

of Marx reverted to the same idealism which Marx’s philosophy was established as a
critique of—it was supposed to elevate material need and suffering, yet recreated the
same conditions by creating passive subjects at the mercy of history. It is against this
determinist dynamic that Benjamin will “pull the emergency brake;” providing a
messianism “…distributed across history and generations,”

83

revealing the present as the

perpetual “state of exception” for political action. Following Derrida (Spectres of Marx,
1993), Benjamin could be asserted as providing a “messianism without a messiah,” a
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materialist concept of history purged of Christian eschatology. He does not reject
Marxism outright, but immanently works through, and refashions its concepts.
Brecht’s Measures Taken (1927) depicts the horrors of such teleological notions
of justice: the communists urge the passing over of immediate suffering in favour of
global revolution—the measures that must be taken to ensure the revolution. In response,
Benjamin’s historical materialism should be seen as a, “step by step…opposition to what
84

is plausible in historicism,”

a purity of means, over and against the ends of communist

society: a critique not from the outside (transcendent), but from an insistence on the
originary radical gesture of Marxism, on the immediate and weak messianic capacities
(immanent) within our grasp as opposed to the grand teleological narrative.
Benjamin begins Theses IV citing Hegel to declare his Brechtian imperative: “seek
85

for food and clothing first; then shall the kingdom of God be given to you.”

For Taubes,

this thesis should not be read as crass materialism, but rather as an assertion of the
intertwined nature of spiritual and material things, along the line of the biblical Sermon
86

on the Mount (Matt 5: 7).

On a basic level, this entails a redirection of progress towards

material concerns; yet with this simple imperative, Benjamin questions the entire
narrative of progress proposed by universal history, asserting that true progress has not
yet occurred. Progress should first be considered in a material sense, if these concerns
have not been met, history cannot be considered an advance beyond nature. Yet in a
religious sense, there is a spiritual valence to the alleviation of material suffering. As
Taubes writes:
Benjamin is interested (in) understanding [or critiquing] the concept of
progress as a bourgeois concept that has nothing to do with (a) religious,
theological, messianic, apocalyptic concepts, and (b) with historical
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materialism. Everything is lost for Benjamin, if you don”t understand the
87
concerns as primary.
Taubes goes on to criticize those, such as Tiedemann and Wolin, who simply interpret
such imperatives as Marxist. For Benjamin, they do have a materialist dimension—yet it
is the metaphysical relationship of concern that is of primacy, the theological importance
of the fulfillment of material needs, the ethical obligation to perform what is in one’s
88

power.

With such an imperative for “true progress” Benjamin inaugurates a tradition which
will continue throughout the Frankfurt School (specifically in Dialectic of
Enlightenment): progress in the form of “universal history” is the conquest of barbarism,
the slaughter bench of history. As Adorno will later write, “No universal history leads
from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot to the atom
bomb.” (ND, 320) Progress thought in a universal, or ideal sense results in the
domination of nature, and the regression of enlightenment upon itself. For Adorno, to be
rid of such mythical narratives would be a step towards “progress:”
Progress means: to step out of the magic spell [Myth], even out of the spell
of progress, which is itself nature, in that humanity becomes aware of its
own inbred nature and brings to a halt the domination it exacts upon nature
and through which domination by nature continues. In this way it could be
89
said that progress occurs where it ends
Here Adorno allies himself with Benjamin: the true myth of positivism, or progressive
historicist narratives, and perhaps modernity itself is that progress has not yet been
made—poverty abounds, and myth still weighs upon the modern subject— “As long as
there is still one beggar there is myth.” [K6, 4] Here the constellation between the
evacuation of myth and the material alleviation of suffering becomes evident: critical
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theory must historically destroy myths of progress so that a genuine conception of
progress can be formulated.
As aforementioned, positivist eschatology is suspect for Benjamin, entailing the
messianic idea that the future will redeem past suffering (à la Marx). Against this
Benjamin will forward his own immanent method, with the imperative that, “a genuinely
messianic face must be restored to the concept of classless society and, to be sure, in the
interest of furthering the revolutionary politics of the proletariat itself.”
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This new vision

will be founded under the vision: “Nothing is progress which does not mean an increase
of happiness…” [N13,3], recalling his Thesis II, “…our image of happiness is thoroughly
91

tied to our image of redemption” —progress can occur in fulfillment of spiritual and
historical needs as well, in the rescue [Rettung] of the dreams of previous epochs by the
present generations “weak messianism.”
As in his “Theologico- political fragment” (1921/39)—where Benjamin forwards
a “profane” model of redemption— theses II & III emphasise a secular model of
redemption, a “secret heliotropism” existing between generations. “Happiness” expresses
the affect that is felt in the constellation of two epochs, or rather the fulfillment of
possibilities across time. As in Proust, “happiness” arises from the memory of wishes
fulfilled from the past, of the actualization of past potentialities. Judgement day is
perpetually occurring

92

as the present moment is ripe with opportunities for happiness—

with the opportunity to preserve (in language), and fulfill the possibilities [Einlösungen]
inherent in the past.
As Hamacher notes, the progression of history is just this progression of
possibility to actuality: history is moved by the surplus of the possible, by the possibility
that missed opportunities could be actualized: “[Weak] Messianic power is therefore
nothing other than the implicit hypothesis of the missed possible that there has to be an
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instance to correct the miss, to do the undone, to regain the wasted and actualize the has93

been possible.”

For Benjamin, one must “awaken” to the fact that “…at any point in

time one exists at midpoint of history,”

94

that one has the ability to redeem radically

divergent possibilities from the past so as to significantly alter the trajectory of history. In
fact, it is such “weak messianism” that is the motor of world history. In his 1919
“Concept of Criticism,” Benjamin alludes to this fact, quoting Schlegel’s Athenaeum
fragments: “The revolutionary desire to realize the kingdom of God on earth is the
95

elastic point of progressive civilization and the beginning of Modern history.”

For Benjamin, progress is not simply the advance over previous generations, rather
our ability to redeem their dreams in our present moment: we progress to the extent that
we have taken their possibilities upon ourselves, that we do not remain bound by the
mythologies of the past. In this sense the nineteenth century has not advanced
significantly beyond the baroque, as myth continues to abound even in the capital of
modernity. Yet due to the radical immanence of history—that “[t]he past only exists
96

when it is resurrected in the present.” —there is an essential importance placed on the
preservation of these possibilities inherent in the past, as that which does not exist for the
present moment threatens to be lost forever. Hence The Arcades does not present a
triumphant (or linear) history of the working class, rather synchronic and epic moments
of their history are cited, allowing their imperatives to be brought to the present. This
emphasis on synchronicity and citation, over and against linearity and progress, is
endemic to Benjamin’s own dialectical methodology, with is metaphysical emphasis on
the immanence of history with respect to the present moment—we only understand the
past to the extent it is translated in the present. Contra Marx (of the Grundrisse), epochs
are not understandable because of our diachronic position, rather certain epochs share
secret affinities which are conducive to constellations of legibility—there are certain
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moments at which “we awake” from a given context and are able to re-think historical
objects, as their mythological ciphers can now be read historically. We come to
understand that their possibilities can be fulfilled in our time. Referring to such an
“awakening” to interpretability he writes:
The Utilization of dream elements in Awakening is the textbook case of
dialectical thinking. For this reason, dialectical thinking is the organ of
historical awakening. Each epoch not only dreams the next but also, in
dreaming, strives toward the moment of waking. It bears its end within itself
97
and unfolds it—as Hegel already saw—with cunning.
With the overcoming of progressive narratives one can “awaken” to the true power of
dialectical thinking, to the power of a “critical” practice of history in the present moment.
The problem with progressive, or linear historical narratives is that they deny the
autonomy of the present as the true state of exception, and further deny subjective agency
to actors in the present—they are thought as passive receivers of tradition, who must
simply surrender to a larger wheel of progress. Against this Benjamin will advocate a
“setting the table for the past” [N15, 2], akin to Nietzsche’s history written by the “man
of action” in the present moment. This method of citing history stands against the
empathy and acedia endemic to historicism—a mode of action in the present nourished
by knowledge of the past—a model for which will be found in Benjamin’s dialectical
image.
IV. The Dialectical Image
“The true image of the past flits by.” –Benjamin, SW 4: 396
“History breaks down into images, not into stories.”-Benjamin [N3, 1]

At this point the ground has been laid for an exegesis of Benjamin’s “dialectical image.”
However, given that this method arose from within the 19th century, an exposition of this
method has been undertaken latently throughout this chapter, specifically in the reading
proposed of Baudelaire (II). In what follows, its major tenets will be clarified, noting in
particular its relationship with Benjamin’s oeuvre, particularly its (dis) correspondence
with his early model of criticism. Specifically, that he continues to hold an immanent

97

Benjamin, The Arcades. 1935 Exposé.

116

model of criticism, though he collapses his distinction between “commentary” and
“criticism” into the practice of “citation.”
It is useful to recapitulate the genesis of Benjamin’s thought throughout this
project. Cacciari notes that Benjamin’s thought is marred by a “Frage der Darstellung:”
a questioning of the “representation” of particular phenomena, alongside the role of
“presentation” in philosophical argumentation.

98

As stated in his 1918 “Program for a

Coming Philosophy,” Benjamin sought to provide a mode of thought that could at once
represent particular experiences, while maintaining a systematic character—a careful
consideration of language, and philosophical presentation would provide a means to do
this. In the “Epistemo-Critical Prologue” (Trauerspiel) this took the form of the “Idea”—
immanent linguistic constellations of particular phenomena, which allowed justice to be
done to them in their particularity, while redeeming them into the realm of “truth” (Ch.1).
As demonstrated (Ch. 2 & 3), Benjamin’s later writings should not be seen as a Marxist
“break” from these early concerns, rather a redirection of such questions to concrete
historical concerns: to a questioning of the representation [Darstellung] of historical
expressions [Ausdrucken]. The dialectical image will be the means by which Benjamin
will undertake such concrete, and historical (re)presentation. Though he succeeded in
overcoming much of the determinism inherent in historicism, and Marxism—providing
instead an “experience” of the past in the present moment—the specifics of his immanent
methodology lacked clear outlines, and the consistency of an orthodox theory of
criticism. Specifically, could one gauge the “truth” or limitations of such a methodology?
Had Benjamin truly moved beyond surrealist juxtapositions into the realm of concrete
historical truth?
Benjamin himself will concede the ambiguity of his formulations, and throughout
his later work formulations of the dialectical image do vary. Of these late writings
“Edward Fuchs, Collector and Historian” (1937), “Convolute N” of The Arcades, along
with the 1940 “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” can be read as explicit
methodological statements on the matter. While the 1938-39 studies on Baudelaire, and
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the Passagen-Werk in general can be read as explicit applications of such a method,
despite theoretical variation, one does possess a certain horizon of possible applications.
Throughout the 1930s Adorno repeatedly urged Benjamin to clarify and “systematically”
revise his methodology, and their correspondence contains many of Benjamin’s most
explicit statements on his method. It will be argued that their correspondence allowed (or
forced) Benjamin to articulate his method in a more systematic (opposed to experiential)
fashion. If one is to define Benjamin’s work as the conquest of a certain representation of
the Idea, then Adorno’s objections need to be seen as pivotal in the development of
Benjamin’s thinking as such. In what follows, Benjamin’s dialectical image will be
formulated in response to these concerns, following which Adorno will be noted as an
essential figure in the development of such a methodology in a more systematically
defined direction (V). This is largely due to the imperatives Adorno upholds based in
Benjamin’s own early model of criticism, imperatives which allow one to see the (dis)
correspondence of Benjamin with himself: his continued commitment to an immanent
model of criticism, though altered many of his early distinctions. Given that many of
Benjamin’s late writings were written for the Institute (“Edward Fuchs,” 1937), or with
the Institute in mind (“Theses…” 1940), such systematic imperatives need to be
considered alongside his work. Benjamin was well aware of their divergent theoretical
understandings, hence his formulations should be seen as deliberate provocations or
criticisms of the Institute (and Adorno), not as simply esotericism, or intellectual
carelessness. Above all, he is attempting to demonstrate the possibility of reading history
in an active sense, a possibility he felt was foreclosed by the Institute’s more orthodox
categories. It is this commitment, or historical sense, that decidedly sets Benjamin apart
from those associated with the Frankfurt School.
The theoretical inconsistency, or ambiguity of Benjamin’s dialectical image(s) has
often been noted in commentary: Max Pensky describes it as a “…theoretical promissory
note,” and despite its numerous textual instantiations Tiedemann asserts it as “never
[having] achieved terminological consistency.
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From the perspective of a conceptual

articulation this diagnosis is correct, yet this also covers over the fundamentally
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experiential (non-systematic) character of Benjamin’s method—indeed Benjamin’s
method is an attempt to incorporate such “downcast” (or “subjective”) elements into a
historical methodology. In this sense, much of Benjamin’s thinking can be described as a
linguistic struggle with (re) presentation [Darstellung over Begriff], or rather a struggle
against such explicit conceptual thinking (specifically those found in idealism)—an
attempt to blast open rigid formulae in favor of a genuine “experience” with the past. As
mentioned at the outset, such a struggle is present throughout Benjamin’s work, though in
his early writings such a struggle took place in the epistemic or textual domain, with an
esoteric conception of “truth” based on textual affinity; his later work can be seen as an
attempt to extend such analysis to a broader range of historical phenomena (the 19th
century, modernity), which necessitates the incorporation of the insights of historical
materialism to his earlier insights: in this later domain, “truth” takes on an exoteric
valence in that it must correspond to explicit social and historical conditions. Or rather, it
must emphasize the “now” as a site of possibility for the practice of history. When
presented in repose with the whole of his thought, one may glimpse a methodological
(contra conceptual) consistency. Criticisms of Benjamin on the mysticism of his
categories perhaps focus too narrowly on Benjamin’s later writings (1937-40), missing
the broader telos of his work as a whole, an attempt to articulate a broader conception of
(historical) experience, the later instantiation of which is found in the dialectical image.
Much of the difficulty in defining the dialectical image revolves around
Benjamin’s aversion to explicit methodological statements—that the dialectical image is
itself an “image.” For Missac, Benjamin did not conceptually articulate his main
formulations, rather demonstrated them as images, taking upon himself the photographers
imperative to “…stop saying and start simply showing.”
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The domain of truth for the

“Image” is different from that of the concept—while the former finds its guarantee in the
domain of material and historical associations, the later remains within the sphere of
philosophical consistency. It is through such thinking in Images, that Benjamin can
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extend his theoretical program into domains not previously explored by philosophy. In
his “Program for a Coming Philosophy,” he writes: “…in addition to the concept of
synthesis, also that of a certain non-synthesis of two concepts in an other is bound to gain
increasing systematic importance, since outside of synthesis another relation between
thesis and antithesis is possible.”
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Commenting on this passage, Sam Weber (50-51)

notes that such a “non-synthesis” is afforded by the Image: the ability to bring competing
concepts, or trajectories together, allowing both to be maintained in their autonomy and
tension. Benjamin’s resolution of the theological and materialist aspects of his thinking—
via the image of the “bow”—is one such example. The “dialectical-image” itself calls to
mind such a tension: in the Hegelian dialectical movement, the “Image” is that which
remains on the level of intuition, that which is singular—flashes and associations,
Schelling’s “night in which all cows are black”—that which has not yet been raised to the
level of Reason. The dialectic connotes the relation of objects to each other, the process
by which individual moments (as Augenblick) are mediated in the greater historical
process. Following Freud, the image can be thought as the level of substitution, of
affinity and correspondence, over and against the conceptual reason which moves the
dialectical process. In the “dialectical image,” the singular is held alongside the greater
historical movement, a process involving both “…the flow of thoughts and their arrest as
well.” As “dialectical” each image contains within itself the richness of its epoch (as
Hegel’s “Absolute knowing”), each is a phantasmagoria of a greater historical process.
The dialectical image provides a means of seeing history within one’s own epoch—the
greater historical process in singular instantiations. Proceeding allegorically, the critic
perceives his own era as already “ruined” with respect to the greater historical process—
the myths of the present are revealed to be historical in origin. In citing one’s own era in
constellation with that of another one can reveal the historical traces hidden in the present
moment, opening the way for political action. Such images must be chosen carefully, as
one must construct as a monad, as vision of the hopes and dreams of a previous epoch.
In a provisional sense, the dialectical image can be defined as a practice of
citation, and construction, a new mode of thinking which awakens the potential(s)
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of the individual to re-write history in the present moment–a practice (or –ability)
that occurs in language, and with respect to language, yet accords the possibility for
political action. For Benjamin, such a model allows the critic to allegorically
experience history, and in doing so recover its power for the present moment. As
seen previously, this necessitates a destruction of the progressive dialectical
narrative (of orthodox Marxism) in favor of the “downcast” or detritus elements of
tradition—as a “ragpicker” who analyzes the small (utopian) fragment capable of
blasting open the continuum of history. The Arcades themselves do not feature
(prominently) the grand historical events of the nineteenth century (1848
revolutions, Franco-Prussian war); rather it contains a montage of found objects, of
commodities that contained wizened within them the dreams and nightmares of the
century. As phantasmagoria, commodities point at once to the context of capitalist
exchange, yet also to the collective fantasies these objects excite, a glimmer of
“…the utopia that has left its trace in a thousand configurations of life, from
102

enduring edifices to passing fashions.”

For Benjamin, it is such immanent

utopias which must be seized upon, and allegorically elevated out of their downcast
position.
The employment of allegory in Benjamin’s late work represents a substantial
change from his view of it in Trauerspiel. The devaluation of meaning is no longer the
effect of baroque sovereignty, in the 19the century: “the devaluation of the world of things
in allegory is surpassed within the world of things by the commodity.”
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Capitalist

exchange acts allegorically towards individual commodities: divested of their singular
significance (“use-value”), they are endowed with meaning only via exchange
(“exchange-value”) with the divine money commodity. In “Imperial Panorama,”
Benjamin broaches the relationship between capitalism and the evacuation of meaning in
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the object,

a tendency one sees repeated in his work on surrealism, specifically with

respect to “kitsch” and the “revolutionary power of the outmoded.” However, one should
be skeptical about a straightforward equation of allegory with the dialectical image;
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such a conception misses the “truth content” of the dialectical image (which exists in
language), instead fetishizing the ruin, and the exchangeable nature of signification. In
sum, the dialectical image does have an allegorical dimension, in terms of the subject
writing history, though if reduced to this pole it misses the “objectivity” of Benjamin’s
images.
It will be argued the dialectical image contains within it two moments: a
“destructive (critical) moment” by which an object is wrested from the stream of tradition
alongside a “constructive moment” (write-ability) by which the critic constructs the
dream of a previous epoch in language (as a monad).
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Intertwined with these is a

moment of “legibility”, by which a previous historical moment can be decoded in
constellation with the now. In “Convolute N,” Benjamin evokes the dialectical image as
follows, a quotation which will be unpacked throughout this section:
It’s not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present
its light on the past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes
together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other words,
image is dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the present to the
past is a purely temporal continuous one, the relation of what has been to
the now is dialectical: is not progression but image, suddenly emergent—
only dialectical images are genuinely images (that is, not archaic); and the
place where one encounters them is language. [N2a, 3]
Central to this passage is the appearance of the image in language—it is not seen in a
phenomenological, or even cognitive (Kantian) sense—it appears, or rather is read in
language, in the mode by which language constructs phenomena into an idea. What is
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essential to note is that both constructible and destructive moments occur in language,
and language informs the limits (or truth content) of these images.
Dealing first with the “destructive” (or even “deconstructive) side of this image,
Benjamin remarks that “image is dialectics at a standstill”—thinking in “images”
contains within it the ability to stop the dialectic in a temporal sense, to stand against the
storm of progress, awakening a new form of historical experience: “recollection”
[Erinnerung, Eingedenken] as opposed to the “remembrance” of historicism.
In a primary sense such a gesture entails a “stoppage” in the dialectic as it is
described in Hegel and Marx—one does not mediate an antagonism (or constellation)
into reason or a linear historical progression, rather maintains the moment of tension,
opening space for individual action. This stoppage interrupts the Christian eschatology of
both thinkers—the idea that redemption (revolution) will enter upon time and history in
the form of “Absolute Spirit;” for Benjamin, following Kafka: it is a summary judgment
in perpetual occurrence. As aforementioned, what disturbed Benjamin about these
positivist and determinist narratives was that they denied the capacities of individuals and
collectives to act in a meaningful sense in the present—instead they must wait until the
time is “right,” ceding autonomy to larger dynamics. As Benjamin writes, “Nothing has
so corrupted the German working class as the notion that it was moving with the current.
It regarded technological development as the driving force of the stream with which it
107

thought it was moving.”

The dialectical image is a destruction of such diachronic

temporality: rejecting historicist notions that the past can be grasped linearly (as an
“eternal image” that will “will not get away from us”), or contains “states of exception”
that can be utilized to educe redemption. For Benjamin, such messianic moments must be
recognized “synchronically;” as always already occurring, in the judgment and
fulfillment of possibilities across time. This entails a re-awakening of the present moment
as the “true state of exception”, a synchronic temporality afforded by Benjamin’s practice
of citation (or use of language); a gesture which allows one to open the present anew, to
experience it as the “time of the now” [Jetzt-zeit] as opposed to a “moment” [Augenblick]
in a grander historical progression. “The historical materialist cannot do without the
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notion of the present which is not in transition, but in which time takes a stand [ensteht]
and has come to a standstill.”

108

Given the embeddedness of objects within the stream of tradition, there is no
standpoint of remove by which can write (contra “theorize”) history—historical objects
come to us as always already embedded in a context of interpretation. Hence the
necessity of a “destructive” (deconstructive) moment: one must wrest an object from
tradition, citing it anew, destroying the progressive traces of the original context. In doing
so one cites it as a dialectical image—a textual commodity (monad) embodying certain
pathologies—certain hopes, dreams, and utopian elements—as a mode of presenting the
epoch in the work, and the work as it relates to the epoch. In Convolute N, Benjamin
cites a remark regarding Michelet: upon reading quotations from his oeuvre, one forgets
that they are encompassed within a larger work. Citation employs its own logic—as
Kafka’s gestures “break out and provide a new context”—quotation provides an insight
into the pure ability of language as such, of the practice of construction independent of a
goal or telos. For Friedlander, quoting reveals the secret affinities inherent in language—
by wresting the object from its context of use—one is forced to confront the objectivity
(lack of “possession”) of the historical object, and a truth of language more generally:
one does not express oneself through language but rather in language. “Lacking the
context motivating the utterance, the question of its truth value can be bracketed, and the
way of meaning, which, when the utterance is used in this setting, is all but hidden,
109

surfaces with all its particular and striking traits of expression.”

Citing a text elsewhere

reveals the hidden affinities always already operating in language, the “intentionless
truth” of language. For Benjamin it is such an intentionless character which insures that
history can never be written in a final sense, that it will always resound differently in
divergent constellations. Through the montage of “intentionless elements” one catches a
glimpse of the “truth” beyond intention, of the hidden affinities and contexts of legibility
shot through history.
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Throughout his work Benjamin employed quotation carefully as a means of
provocation and shock, a practice akin to Brecht’s “Alienation effect”
[Verfremdungseffekt]: “Quotations in my work are like robbers by the roadside who make
110

an armed attack and relieve an idler of his convictions.”

On December of 1925, he

remarked to Scholem that he had switched the epigraph of his Trauerspiel study so as to
leave readers “with their mouths hanging open,”

111

a practice of writing meant to induce

astonishment in the reader, to awaken them from their pre-suppositions regarding the
subject, or a certain epoch of history, and emphasizing the possibilities inherent in the
present to radically re-think tradition—citation reveals that history exists in the present
(as language), alongside the possibility of it being “re-written” or “recited.”
To emphasize this possibility, the critic must utilize a historically informed
“destructive character,” to destroy the work (or totality) so as to reveal the potentialities
inherent within it: “What exists he reduces to rubble, not for the sake of the rubble, but
112

for the way leading through it.”

Such a character is exemplified by Nietzsche’s

historical man: he who selects (collects, and even gambles) with the past based on what is
most relevant to the present, emphasizing the allegorical “ability” to re-write history in
the present. Throughout The Arcades, Benjamin employs such a practice, specifically
regarding “revolutionary” and working class history (see Convolute a: “Social
Movements”). He does not provide a history of triumph, or of inevitable victory; rather
destroys the diachronic narrative so as to present a history of “poss-ability.” Such
histories provide one with an “epic element;” with potentialities of the past which elicit
an imperative upon the future, allowing it to become a moment of possible fulfillment in
the present, an explosive gesture (akin to Baudelaire, and Blanqui) which blasts open the
continuum of history. With such a practice, the line between “construction” and
“destruction” is blurred (as in the Hegelian Aufhebung), and at this point it becomes
possible to describe the constructive aspect of Benjamin’s model. Regarding quotation,
Benjamin writes the following in his 1931 Kraus study:
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To quote a word is to call it by its name…In the quotation that both saves and
punishes, language proves the matrix of justice. It summons a word by its
name, wrenches it destructively from its context, but precisely thereby calls it
back to its origin. It appears, now with rhyme and reason, sonorously,
congruously, in the structure of a new text…In citation the two realms—of
113
origin and destruction—justify themselves before language.
It is in the practice of quotation that one first encounters the hidden affinities
(“legibility,” write-ability) inherent in language as such which allow history to be thought
actively from the perspective of the “now,” in fact Benjamin will go so far as to assert,
“To write history means to cite history.” Apropos Kraus, the practice of citation opens the
present [Jetzt-zeit] as the moment in which history will be decided; in quoting one at once
(re) establishes the “origin” of the past, rescuing elements from the detritus of history, yet
also condemns other elements which are not brought to bear upon the present. This is the
true sense of Benjamin’s “Copernican Revolution” [K1, 2] with respect to historical
perception—as Kant forwarded the “subject” as the condition of possibility for perceptual
experience—Benjamin does with respect to historical experience. The subject(s) in “the
now” is the condition of possibility for history as such, what they choose to cite in the
present moment is rescued, yet what is not threatens to flow into the abyss of history.
The literature has perhaps overemphasized this pole of Benjamin’s method,
presenting him as a historiographical relativist whereby any present has the (allegorical)
ability to radically “re-write” history. There are in fact limits to such historical
construction, which relate specifically to Benjamin’s formulation of the “Now of
recognizability” [Jetzt der Erkennbarkeit

114

]—the “secret heliotropism” existing between

generations, by which a work is unfolded throughout history. The present is not granted
enlightened authority over the past; rather certain moments are shot through with
moments of “legibility”—an awakening from certain myths, so as to be able to decode
them in the past. Benjamin elaborates this with an image: “The past has left images of
itself in literary texts that are comparable to those which light imprints on a
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Benjamin, “Karl Kraus,” SW 2: 454.
Erkennbarkeit connotes both actualization and cognitive realization, a realization with both objective
and subjective components—this goes against the historicist idea of “the way things really are”
(objectively). Hence history as such has both objective and subjective elements. Here Benjamin is making
quite a radical claim about the temporal nature of every realization—that there is not “cognition for all
time”; only at specific moments, and as a function of subjective experiences.
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photosensitive plate. Only the future poses developers active enough to bring these plates
out perfectly” [n15a, 1]. At certain points an epoch has enough historical awareness so as
to realize the historical origin of myths which abound in both the present, and the past—
however oftentimes such realizations come “too late;” only after one myth has ended, and
another begins. This also relates to Benjamin’s work on romanticism, by which criticism
unfolds the work historically, exposing its reverberations in both the realm of “pre” and
“post” history. As demonstrated in Ch. 1, such elements are not “external” to the work,
they are an integral part of it via the dynamics of “origin,” hence higher completions of
the work can potentially occur many years after the fact. Through re-citing, or recollecting a work from the past, one can in fact make a work “historical;” as Benjamin
describes: “It becomes historical posthumously through events that may be separated
115

from it by a thousand years.”

For Samuel Weber, what is essential is the moment of “legibility” of these
images: the instant in which one “awakes” from the myths surrounding objects/epochs
and they are able to be interpreted anew. Given immanence to history, there are times at
which the object is “too-close,” too shrouded in “aura,” and subjects are un-able to
recognize the historical elements therein. As early photographs appear “cloudy” today in
the light of digital media, so do previous epochs become legible in a radically different
sense by way of events which follow them. Once one has moved beyond such myths,
they can be cited as historical, and “re-constellated” anew.
Given this emphasis, on “readability” and “citability” a further importance is
thrust upon language—one must preserve a certain dignity of philosophy (Philology)—a
conception of language which is able to do justice to particular experiences, both
historical and otherwise. One has an ethical obligation to preserve the possibilities
inherent in the past, not only for our particular moment, but for those to come. A moment
may arise when such a possibility will become necessary for citation by a future epoch.
Receptions of Benjamin also tend to over determine the past against the present,
though for Benjamin, the opposite is true: it is the past which can provide the spark for
awakening the true capacities inherent in “the now.” The past and the present must be
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brought to bear on each other in constellation: “…to seize the essence of history, it
suffices to compare Herodotus and the morning newspaper.”

116

. It is this tension between

the past and present which at once endows the present with the essential task of
preservation; yet also presents it with an imperative to comprehend its own
mythologies—to comprehend one’s own age in history, questioning if one has in fact
made progress beyond such past mythologies. Referring to this, Benjamin writes the
following in 1931:
The problem is not to portray works of literature in the context of our
times but rather to bring the age which recognizes them—which is our
age—to representation in the age in which they originated. Literature
thereby becomes an organon of history; and to achieve this, and not to
reduce literature to the material dimension of history, is the task of the
117
literary historian.
This point cannot be overstated: it is the constellation (or dialectical image) which births
“the now”— “awakening” it to its status as the “true state of exception”—not the
opposite where the subject simply “writes history from the present moment.” The past
compels, in the sense of an imperative, its collection and re-citing in the present. One
must begin with the historical object, citing it as “tigers leap” into the past, revealing the
present moment as a messianic moment of judgment. If one does not begin with history,
Benjamin is presented as a theological mystic, asserting the power of the subject over all
the past. Benjamin’s historian is a “weak messiah,” who possesses only a minimal ability
to redeem what is in his power. One must cede autonomy to the past, and recognize one’s
weakness with respect to, a recognition that “truth…is bound to a nucleus of time lying
hidden within the knower and the known alike” [N3, 2].
All of these imperatives must be held to in the moment of “construction” (writeability): the mode by which the dialectical image is presented, or history is written in a
critical sense more generally. “Thinking means for him [the critic]; setting the sails [N8,
1], and “words are his sails” [N10, 1], this moment links together Benjamin’s early
imperatives with respect to the (theological) dignity of language, with his later political
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concerns for concrete political truth; an understanding of the myths in which one is
ensnared so that resistance can be enacted. This entails constructing images which best
demonstrate the hopes and dreams of an epoch, alongside their historical (material)
emergence, and regression into myth. The image of the Arcades can at once be read to
illustrate the technical capacities of an era (iron and glass architecture), the material
emergence of such constructions (the textile trade, consumerism), and the regressive
aspect in their existence: that the immense possibilities of a communal and collective life
regressed into the myth of the consumer, that true progress had not yet been made beyond
“pre-history.” Adorno asserted that Benjamin intended The Arcades as a whole to consist
solely of quotations (See “Portrait of Walter Benjamin”)—many have disputed this claim,
holding that the project necessitated minimal commentary or criticism on the part of
Benjamin. Yet in repose with his dialectical image one can see how this practice of
citation contains within it both such dimensions—a preservation and negation
(Aufhebung) of the past dealing at once with its “material” and “truth” content.
If one were to extract a “political” project from Benjamin’s work it would perhaps
lie in his reading of Baudelaire’s cycle “The Ragpickers” Wine” with its figure of the
“ragpicker.” Mirroring the Poet, hunch-back, and Historian, the “ragpicker” sifts through
the dregs of a society marred by the sign of progress. As a melancholic, he sees no
significance in the ideals of his age—rather focuses on what is immediate (immanent)
and accessible to him—one who searches for the secret correspondances which lie in
ruin around him. The image of the “hunch-back” or “weak-messiah” is prominent for
Benjamin—these are not the historians (like Marx) who herald the coming revolution;
rather they sift through the rubble (or Archive), to find that small fragment of hope, or at
least a semblance of heroic subjectivity in modernity. This is perhaps the true meaning of
bestowing an Erlebnis with the weight of an Erfahrung: endowing something
fragmentary with cosmic significance.
V. Correspondence
“I would simply like to emphasize my idiosyncratic dislike for the Idea of the authentically empirical.”
-Adorno to Benjamin, ABC, 301
“In this context I shall say only that to my mind the accusations that have been made against Adorno and
his critique are ludicrous.” -Scholem, Walter Benjamin, 216
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Following his submission of his Baudelaire piece (1938), Benjamin penned the following
to Adorno: “I felt I was racing against the war, and, despite choking anxiety, I
nonetheless experienced a sense of triumph when I finally wrapped up the flâneur after
118

almost 15 years in gestation, and just before the end of the world.”

The letter goes on

to describe the relation of the essay to the book on Baudelaire (of which it was the
“second chapter”), and the Arcades more generally.
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Tonally, the letter evokes an

atmosphere of understanding and complicity (with both Adorno and the Institute), as to
how the Baudelaire project, and The Arcades more generally would unfold. Benjamin’s
120

congeniality makes Adorno’s delayed response resound more solemnly

—one which

has become infamous for the supposed disregard Adorno shows to both Benjamin’s
121

essay, and the materiality of his personal situation.

Speaking on behalf of the Institute,

he informs Benjamin that the piece cannot be published in his current (methodological)
state, yet personally intervenes in recommending the withholding of publication for
Benjamin’s “own sake,” though many have enlarged this academic critique into a
personal attack.
Several remarks are necessitated at this point: firstly, upon reading the essay
(specifically the “Addenda”), it is evident that Adorno does miss some of the points
Benjamin is making (specifically with respect to “Marxism”). Further, one could argue
that Adorno simply misses the fact that the essay was intended as a “2nd Chapter,” hence
should be seen as “prefatory” for the “social resolution” which would come in the 3rd
Chapter. Or from a more orthodox view of critical theory, one could just as easily deride
Benjamin as a stubborn “mystery-monger” who deliberately denied the Institute’s
imperatives. Such assessments are perhaps hasty at best, and intellectually dis-honest at
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worst—all miss the complexity of this encounter, the numerous affinities, histories,
correspondences hidden within it. If thought from the perspective of “correspondence”
this dispute emerges as a pertinent intellectual encounter—as the crystallization of the
two as “correspondents”—with each presenting their views in stark repose: a debate
hinging on dialectical methodology, and the practice of “theory” as such. Though
Adorno’s objections may seem un-necessarily harsh, or un-founded; it should be
emphasized that his objections and views have a lengthy history in the two’s
correspondence throughout the decade. Most of this centered on methodological debates
relating to The Arcades—to the extent that Adorno’s statements can be justified from the
perspective of correspondence. Similarly, many of Benjamin’s most explicit
methodological statements come in the form of these letters, in which Adorno
persistently urges him to clarify his thinking in a more systematic matter.
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Given

Benjamin’s aversion to theoretical pronouncements, his letters to Adorno can be seen as
some of his most explicit methodological pronouncements related to his late
methodology. Thus to articulate the full valences of Adorno’s critique it must be seen in
constellation with his response to Benjamin’s 1935 Exposé for the Arcades, and his
criticism of the second (Brechtian) edition of Benjamin’s “Work of Art in the Age of
Mechanical Reproduction” (1936). Both works articulated the methodological framework
of The Arcades at the time.
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In what follows Adorno’s main objections will be

presented, following which they will be articulated in the larger context of
correspondence, alluding to a larger (dialectical) methodological gulf between
“dialectical images” and the “negative dialectic.”
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“Systematic,” should not be taken in an orthodox architectonic manner, but refers to Adorno’s
imperatives that Benjamin not be wholly immanent with respect to the century, instead employing social
categories to explain particular phenomena—as Marx’s (Hegelian) analysis of the commodity, or Weber’s
employment of ideal types.
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The 1935 Exposé was commissioned at the request of Pollock and Horkheimer so the Institute could
have a grasp of the “central motifs” Benjamin intended to include in the Arcades; hence it is not a draft or
outline, but a performative “miniature model” of how Benjamin’s methodology would be enacted on the
Arcades material. Seen in constellation with the 1939 Exposé one can chart Benjamin’s changing views
with respect to the methodology of The Arcades. The 1936 essay on the work of art interrogates the “posthistory” of aesthetic pathologies beginning in the 19th century (l’art pour l’art, “reproduction”) as
becoming “legible” in the 20th century. This essay employs the dialectical image as a historical method, by
which to read the 19th century. For more on the relation between these essays and The Arcades, see Wolin,
An Aesthetic of Redemption, 173-198.
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Much of this dispute centers on the notion of the dialectical image (or “historical
image” for Adorno), a chiasmus which returns to the origins of their correspondence (Ch.
1), and their mutual projection of a shared origin. Throughout the 1930s Adorno held
somewhat of a static notion of the “historical image,” one routed in Benjamin’s early
distinction between “material” and “truth content,” and his own 1931 “The Actuality of
Philosophy”. The task of criticism entailed an elaboration of the social mediation
endemic to the object or work. Locating it “in truth” entailed recognizing the material,
and ideological aspects of its constitution. His 1937-38 work on Wagner emphasized the
“social character” of Wagner’s music—that his music was a phantasmagoria, to the
dissonance of the bourgeois tradition, and the reversion of this tradition into the “hell” of
fascism. Likewise, with his essay “On Jazz” (1936), Adorno interpreted the individual
jazz figure, as emblematic of the faux spontaneity of the individual under capitalism. As
he grew closer to the Institute (joining officially in 1938), his model of criticism became
increasingly Marxist in tone, a mode of understanding figures and works within
commodity capitalism.
As has been shown, Benjamin’s dialectical image is not such a static entity, but a
dynamic constellation which took on a variety of senses throughout the decade—and
could be considered a sublation of it different instantiations. Most notably is Benjamin’s
abandonment (or combination) of his distinction between “commentary” and “criticism,”
in favor of a mode of montage presentation (citation) which provokes “shock” in the
reader. Hence when Adorno will criticize Benjamin’s formulations as “lacking
mediation” he is upholding his own view of the early Benjamin (1924) against the
Benjamin of 1938. He is citing Benjamin against himself. In effect this entails denying
the influence of Brecht and surrealism upon Benjamin’s formulations, and a latent
attempt to force a monogamy on correspondence. Likewise, in his response Benjamin
will cite Adorno’s 1933 Kierkegaard study as exemplary of his own early methodology,
citing Adorno against himself. In this sense, much of this late dispute can be explained by
the divergent images the two held of each other, and what they deemed to be the goal of
their respective projects.
The years 1938-39 where tumultuous and uncertain times with respect to
Benjamin’s intellectual allegiances. He was at once beckoned by the Institute
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(specifically Gretel and Theodor Adorno) to travel to New York; by Scholem to travel to
Palestine (to work on Kafka), while residing in Paris (to work on The Arcades); and
summering in Denmark with Brecht. It was a moment in which he was between many
“correspondents,” and each location held the possibility of a different direction in his
thinking. Adorno was concerned—perhaps somewhat legitimately—that such polarities
would lead Benjamin to sacrifice his intellectual rigor for the “political correctness” of
Brecht, or Surrealism, hence took it upon himself to attempt to steady Benjamin against
such assaults. Adorno sought to ensure that Benjamin held to his prima philosophy (his
early work), of articulating an expanded conception of experience systematically, a
project he felt Brecht substantially jeopardized—to the extent that one could argue that
Adorno would rather The Arcades and Baudelaire fail than become Brechtian.

124

The 1938 dispute centers on the question of style, or rather what form an analysis of
Baudelaire (or a figure) in the 19th century should take. As has been noted, Benjamin was
committed to an immanent mode of criticism by which the mode of apprehending the
object (the Idea) arose from the object itself. Following Benjamin’s insistence on the
question of Darstellung ((re)presentation) as fundamentally to philosophy, such formal
considerations cannot be divorced from methodological considerations. In the
Trauerspiel, he resurrected allegory as a mode of apprehending the mourning plays of the
baroque (as “constellation”), for the 19th century he elaborated the shock experience of
modernity into the “dialectical image,” and utilized it as a mode of apprehending the
125

century.

Given Adorno’s insistence on introducing aspects from the social totality, his

method cannot be considered wholly immanent to the object it apprehends, and as a
result he is not able to endorse Benjamin’s dialectical image. In a sense he employs the
methodology described in Chapter 1, upholding a distinction between “commentary” and
“criticism” against Benjamin’s late “citational” dialectical image. Adorno will deride
what he felt to be Benjamin’s insistence on “materialist philology:” that formally,
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Adorno’s aversion to Brecht is difficult to fully comprehend, in one sense they are extremely similar—
and one could read an “alienation effect” into Adorno’s writings on music, specifically his insistence on
Schoenberg’s a-tonal schemas as shocking the listener out of complacency. Above all Adorno was averse
to Brecht’s dogmatic insistence on “orthodox materialism,” and his inability to think through the
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Benjamin simply “presented” facts as they appeared without mediating them in social
totality. In contrast, Benjamin will assert his immanent method as emblematic to the
immersed character of the century itself. Despite this affinity between form and content,
Adorno does not reject the “content” of Benjamin’s study wholly; in fact, he urges
Benjamin to elevate and formally revise several of the main motifs (The Flâneur, the
“man of the crowd.”), which Benjamin will do for his 1939 revision “On Some Motifs in
Baudelaire.” This final dispute should be viewed as an interrogation of theoretical
methodology as such, with the two presenting divergent views on how “criticism” should
relate itself to a historical epoch.
Adorno’s letter of November 10, 1938 illustrates his main objections to Benjamin’s
essay. Though written in “correspondence” Adorno claims to speak on behalf of the
126

institute (Horkheimer, and Löwenthal

), while his criticisms echo earlier concerns

regarding Benjamin’s attempt to combine materialism and theology. For Adorno,
Benjamin’s attempt resulted in a lapse into “mysticism” and “positivism.” His main
objections are surmised in the following quotations:
1) “I regard it as methodologically unfortunate to give particular manifest
features from the realm of superstructure a “materialist” turn by relating
them immediately to the corresponding features of the substructure. The
materialist determination of cultural traits is only possible if it is
mediated through the total social process.”
2) “The theological motif of calling things by their names has a tendency to
reverse into the astonished presentation of simple facts. If one wished to
speak very drastically, one could say that the study has settled at the
crossroads of magic and positivism. That spot is bewitched. Only theory
could break the spell—your own determined, good, speculative
[dialectical] theory.” (ABC, 282-83)
In attempting to bridge the realms of “materialism” and “theology,” Adorno worried that
Benjamin resorted to a naïve immediacy which entailed a solidarity with the existing
order of things (2)—a phenomenological “astonished presentation of simple facts,” which
mirrored the phantasmagoria of commodity fetishism. Though aware that Benjamin
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“I speak not only for myself, unqualified as I am, but also for Horkheimer and the others when I say that
we are all convinced that it would benefit “your” production…if you surrendered to your own specific
insights and conclusions without combining them with other ingredients [Marxism]” (ABC, 284-85).
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tended to keep (explicit) theoretical statements to a minimum,
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Adorno is skeptical to

the direct relations Benjamin established between the economic “base” and
“superstructural” level (1). Specifically, Benjamin’s interpretation of Baudelaire’s “L”
âme du vin” (and its “Ragpicker”), which he associates directly with Marx’s tax on wine,
and further elevates to the image of the “critic” in modernity as such. Adorno worries that
such a motifs lapse into romanticism, depriving such empirical phenomena of their true
“historical weight,” and that Benjamin fails to understand the poem in relation to a
historical-political context “…at which even the useless had become subject to
128

exchange.”

For Adorno such individual motifs must be theorized within the “total social
process” (1 & 2). Benjamin must mediate his dialectic between the “material” (base) and
“theological” (superstructure) spheres by way of concrete dialectical historical analysis.
For Adorno this would entail immanently searching Baudelaire’s text for “ciphers” of his
material situation, attempting to construct a concrete link between Baudelaire and his
historical situation (which one “imposes” upon the object). Instead, Adorno felt Benjamin
had simply presented both poles, without attempting to establish a relation between the
two,
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his “Dialectic [was] lacking one thing, mediation.”

For Adorno, Benjamin is

too immanent with respect to the history of the nineteenth century— his “Motifs are
assembled but not elaborated”—Benjamin’s mode of presentation simply presents a
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Adorno writes: “As a true connoisseur of your writings I know very well that your oeuvre does not lack
precedents for your procedural method” (ibid. 284). Adorno in many ways endorsed Benjamin’s method as
an approach to individual figures (Kraus, Kafka), though he was perhaps skeptical to the employment of
such a model to the whole of the 19th century (via Baudelaire).
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135

catalogue of the century, of individual commodities and figures all endowed with
aura.

131

Put in the terms of his own thought (Ch.1), Adorno felt that Benjamin gave
excessive “priority to the object,” to the extent that he denied the subjective capacity of
the individual to resist such social relations, resulting in a positivist justification of
existing capitalist reality. This mirrors Adorno’s criticisms of phenomenology, and the
Lebensphilosophie of figures as Simmel: that in their presentation of the “givenness” of
the world, or of social phenomena, they deny the historical index of current reality—that
individual phenomena are mediated by greater historical and social factors which must be
considered. If one does not subscribe a historical index to the myths which abound, one
risks lapsing to “behaviouralism,” a justification of the same myths one describes. Here
132

Adorno will uphold the figures of Weber

and Marx, those who attempt to describe

particularities within a broader social historical framework (as Marx does in his analysis
of the “commodity form”). Yet as was demonstrated in Ch. 2, such a perspective upholds
the critic in a perspective of remove from that which is being analyzed, he or she has
access to both the universal, and the particular, from a strangely un-defined social
perspective. With such critiques of Benjamin’s method, Adorno does not understand the
methodological dexterity of the dialectical image; distinguishing his method from
phenomenology (specifically Heidegger), Benjamin writes:
What distinguishes images from the “essences” of phenomenology is their
historical index. (Heidegger seeks in vain to rescue history for
phenomenology abstractly through “historicity.”) …For the historical index
of images not only says that they belong to a particular time; it says, above
all, that they attain to legibility only at a particular time…Every present day
is determined by the images that are synchronic with it: each “now” is the
now of a particular recognizability. [N3, 1]
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Ibid. 281; and further: “…can such “material” as this patiently await interpretation without being
consumed by its own aura?” (281).
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It would be interesting to compare Adorno’s insistence and utilization of Weber, with Benjamin’s
employment of Simmel. Adorno was highly critical of Simmel in this instance: “I cannot help feeling here
that you invaluable Arcades project requires much more cunningly fashioned instruments than quotations
from Simmel can provide” (ibid. 392). Though Benjamin thought of Simmel favorably, citing him as the
“first Bolshevik” cultural theorist.
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For Benjamin then, each “image” (citation, motif) caries within itself a “historical index,”
a moment at which it becomes “legible” in the gaze of another epoch; or more radically,
that it becomes historical only via events that come after it. Thus as dialectical images,
Benjamin’s motifs on Baudelaire are carefully create constellations, poised in dialectical
tension with the “now” [Jetzt-zeit] that comes to understand them as “legible.” It is only
as past events (as “ruins”) that one can understand the true significance (or legibility) of
Baudelaire’s experiences; Adorno misses this fundamentally in his equation of
Benjamin’s method with “phenomenology.” Through the creation of immanent
constellations, the critic must construct a monad adequately representing the whole of an
epoch, as it is experienced, not as it is perceived from a transcendent theoretical
perspective. Benjamin cannot describe the “total social process” because of this
perspective because of his commitment to immanence. In modernity, one is immersed
within the crowd, with explicit material economic indicators are wizened out of sight.
One grasps such truths only in fleeting instances—as Baudelaire’s women passing in the
crowd (À une passante)—and for Benjamin an immanent analysis of modernity must
mirror this experience. Benjamin associates Baudelaire with Blanqui, and prostitution
with the evacuation of eros and the changing economic status of women. Such citations
and associations provoke astonishment and speculation on behalf of the reader, inviting
him or her to establish the connection, but above all, to experience the past.
From the preceding exegesis of the dialectical image it is clear that Adorno misses
the complexity inherent in Benjamin’s conception of the phantasmagoria— a certain
mimetic (or direct) relation comes to exist in the capitalism of the 19th century—that the
total social process (base) comes to present itself, via the commodity form, on the level of
the empirical. It is such a temporal index of legibility that will allow Benjamin to counter
Adorno’s objections that his motifs lack historical specificity, that they simply reference
some archetypal past. Given that myths become “legible” in constellation with certain
epochs, they can be said to have a specifically historical character.
Despite this, Adorno’s (formal) objections are not wholly un-justified, nor should
he be seen as a traditional Marxist in his own right. Adorno rightly points out many of the
weaker constellations in Benjamin’s analysis, that several of the relationships Benjamin
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attempts to establish do not succeed. Further, Adorno felt that Benjamin had forgone his
early distinction between “commentary” and “criticism,” lapsing into a mode of “mere
presentation of facts,” in which the critic no longer played an active role, but simply
surrenders autonomy to irrationalist or surrealist forces. From the standpoint of political
praxis, one could argue Adorno is right, that Benjamin’s images did not provide the
critical shock necessary to “awaken” readers to the potentials of “the now.” Yet one
could equally argue that Adorno’s model dealt in categorical abstractions, and was unable to provide an actual “experience” with the past. In discussing this debate, Richard
Wolin will note that the two models are not mutually exclusive, that one could employ
elements from each, perhaps the creation of such experimental constellations is the task
of our present?
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In order for such constellations to take place, the conventional image of Adorno
as a contrarian Marxist objector to Benjamin must be broken. Adorno’s criticisms should
134

not be read as simply advocating a reified “base/superstructural” model (as Agamben

),

rather his objections aim at the heart of dialectical methodology as such. As a more
orthodox Hegelian, Adorno will maintain both the “universal” and “particular” (“subject”
and “object”), exploring the interrelation of each without a “positive synthesis” (his
“negative dialectic”), or a reconciliation of the two extremes.

135

The most concrete

example of this would be Adorno’s own aphoristic Minima Moralia (1944-47), which
begins with Adorno’s subjective experiences, only to demonstrate the “primacy of the
objective,” that is the presence of universal social categories in subjective thought and
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See Wolin, An Aesthetic of Redemption, 163-207. Benjamin’s motifs could be said to “fail” in that they
are unable to “shock,” or come to rapport with the present, yet has been argued throughout, the “truth” of
these motifs is not so much at issue for Benjamin, rather the “write” or “cite-ability” of history. It is
precisely because of this potential for failure that Benjamin’s method can be deemed “critical:” in
resurrecting an object on the verge of disappearing (or becoming out-molded), one demonstrates that
history can remain relevant, and can be re-written from the present. Hence Benjamin will speak of the
“moment of danger” endemic to the practice of history (Thesis 17), that moments not grasped by the
present may be lost forever.
134
See “The Prince and Frog: On the question of Method of Benjamin an Adorno,” Infancy and History. In
defending Benjamin, Agamben present Adorno as one who holds an “orthodox” Marxist view of the
dialectical relation between the base and superstructure, thus missing the complexities inherent in Adorno’s
own negative dialectic.
135
As Buck-Morss writes: “Adorno’s pieces “developed dynamically from one pole to another. He used
dialectical argument to construct “models” of thought, which, no matter where they began always moved in
the opposite direction” (The Origin of Negative Dialectics, 185).
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experiences.

Benjamin will forgo such stable polarities, favoring an immanent and

allegorical immersion in the object. Such a method is seen in his own “experiential” texts,
Berlin Childhood Around 1900 (1932/38) and One-Way Street (1928) in which personal
and objective tendencies are intermingled and involved.
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Following such intellectual observations, Adorno makes the more personal
138

charge: “solidarity with the Institute has led to violence on your own thinking.”

That in

attempting to combine the Institute’s “Marxist methodology” with elements of his own
thought, Benjamin had sacrificed the robust methods of his early theological work. For
Adorno, such a method (particularly his distinction between “commentary” and
“criticism”) was better suited for politics: “Your study of Goethe’s Elective Affinities and
the book on the Baroque are better Marxism than your wine tax and your deduction of the
139

phantasmagoria from the practices of the feuilletonists.”

Adorno would rather

Benjamin return to his early methodology that attempt to fuse, or elaborate it along
surrealist, or Brechtian lines. On this point, it would be fair to charge Adorno with
holding a “fixed” image of Benjamin, of attempting to reify him in his early work.
However, if this particular exchange is seen not in isolation, but in constellation with
their prior correspondence, its gains a sense of consistency not present in isolation. As
will now be shown, Adorno leveled persistent objections against Benjamin, specifically
regarding his use of surrealist and Brechtian formulations, both of which he felt to be a
danger both to Benjamin’s own thought, and the aims of the Institute.
Parenthesis: A Genealogy of Correspondence
When examined in repose with the rest of their correspondence, Adorno’s 1938-39
responses to Benjamin appear in a strikingly different tone, one could assert that they
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For example, in “Tough baby” (45), Adorno analyzes his own experience of American masculinity, as a
cipher to the broader patriarchal domination of American mass culture. That men attempt to compensate for
the inadequacy produced in them by culture.
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For example, in “The Imperial Panorama” (One Way Street, SW 1: 450-55), Benjamin presents a “tour”
of German inflation, though economic objectivity is intermingled with the subjects changing relationship
with the world of objects, and it is unclear how this subject relates to Benjamin himself. A more in depth
study would compare Adorno’s Minima Moralia, with Benjamin’s own “experiential” texts (One Way
Street; Berlin Childhood).
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ABC, 283.
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Ibid. 284-85.
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acquire a consistency relating to persistent objections against Benjamin’s transition from
his early method of criticism towards Brecht and surrealism. Throughout much of the
1930’s Adorno sought to mediate between the concerns of Benjamin and the Institute,
whilst maintaining each in their autonomy. Adorno did not so much criticize Benjamin’s
methodology as such, but sought to create the conditions for a successful encounter with
the Institute, knowing (perhaps better than anyone) what such an encounter could entail.
This was due to Adorno’s own employment of Benjamin’s model towards historical
materialism, a practice which he hoped Benjamin would participate in as well. It has
become far to commonplace to emphasize the dis-agreements between the two, at the
expense of downplaying their underlying relationship and the relevant concerns Adorno
had toward Benjamin’s method. Two such examples of the complexity of their
relationship will now be developed: Benjamin’s 1935 Exposé and Adorno’s objections to
its surrealist methodology; along with Benjamin’s 1936 “Work of Art in the Age of
Technological Reproducibility,” and Adorno’s objections to its Brechtian categories.
In 1935, Adorno and Benjamin had convinced the institute to consider funding
Benjamin’s research on the Arcades, for which they now requested that he write and
“Exposé:” a description of the main motifs and proposed methodology of the study.
Writing to Benjamin in 1935, Adorno stresses that the Institute would prefer the Arcades
to unfold in a “historical-sociological” way: that they would be wary of accepting a work
of surrealist montage, one simply presenting motifs that “…avoid[ed] all
140

interpretation.”

However, in the same letter, Adorno stresses that Benjamin

“…compose “the Arcades” in a way faithful to their original history,” that Benjamin
choose a form of composition that immanently arose from the demands of the material.
Adorno further states that he “… would regard it as a mistake if any concessions where
made to the institute in this regard.”
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Adorno seems to present two contradictory

imperatives, but upon closer analysis it is clear that he attempts to present himself as a
mediating figure. As such a mediator—one who understood Benjamin’s commitment to
140

ABC, 112. Put in the terms of Ch. 1, Adorno states that Benjamin should utilize his distinction between
“commentary” and “criticism.”
141
Ibid. 85/84. Adorno further writes, alluding to his own ambiguous relationship to surrealism: “…and the
shock which will proceed from the completed work on the Arcades, like that of the surrealists, strikes me as
more revolutionary than any bare insights into the un-clarified social character of urban studies” (ibid. 85).

140

immanence—Adorno is not apriori opposed to Benjamin’s use of surrealist montage, or
theological interpretations of history: his warning to Benjamin is that such methods may
142

be in tension with the “…apriori [Marxist] approach of the Institute.”

Though from the

completed expose, it is evident that Benjamin largely ignored Adorno’s warnings.
The expose itself, titled “Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth Century,”

143

is not

so much an outline or theoretical preface, but a miniature elaboration of central motifs in
the study. The sections (“Louis Philippe, or the Interior”; “Daguerre, or the Panoramas”
…) are strange, and somewhat shocking assemblages of words and things, associating
historical events (the July Revolution) with the emergence of certain figures and
tendencies (the movement from the private “interior, to the public sphere)—direct
associations taking place in the montage fashion of the surrealists. The work describes
both the regressive and utopian sides of the commodity form, speaking to a new
“collective experience” emerging with technology, alongside the regressions of
consumerism. Writing to Adorno, Benjamin justifies his method as immanently arising
from the material (the 19th century): “just as the self-contained exposition of the
epistemological foundations of my book on the Baroque drama only followed after they
had proved their value in the material itself.”
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Given this disjoint between Benjamin’s mode of presentation, and what the
Institute expected of the work, Adorno’s criticisms focused on Benjamin’s
overemployment of surrealist methods. His focus on the mystical elements of the
commodity and technology denied the possibility of “class consciousness.” For Adorno,
145

in such a “…dreaming collective no differences exist between classes.”

Benjamin has

simply described collective experience, without specifying how such shocks resounded
differently amongst the classes. For Adorno, not only did this harness the ambiguous
(anarchist) political project of surrealism, but more problematically, the archetypal idea
142

Ibid. 83.
On can speculate on the relation of this Exposé to the later work on Baudelaire, in which the title
becomes “The Paris of the Second-Empire in Baudelaire,” eluding to many of the same pathologies, but as
described immanently through the eyes of the poet.
144
ABC, 89.
145
Ibid. 89. Adorno further referred to this as “…an intrinsically un-dialectical conception of collective
consciousness” (ibid. 93). That such a collective is determined by greater trajectories, hence has little
capacity to resist.
143
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of a “collective unconscious” found in the thinking of Klages and Jung. For Adorno, such
descriptions where not “critical,” in that they simply presented humanity as the victim of
larger mythical forces, offering little opportunity for resistance, only archetypal
description. Instead Benjamin should articulate the historical specificity of these myths
(in the 19th century), presenting them historically so as to reveal their illusory character:
“I reject the idea of the collective consciousness…the interior should be rendered
transparent as a social function and its apparently autarchic character revealed as an
illusion.”
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Though Benjamin described the century as “Janus faced”—containing

within it both progressive (utopian) and regressive elements—Adorno worried that this
mode of presentation ran the risk of lapsing into an intoxication with the myths of
commodity fetishism, unless these myths where articulated historically.
For Adorno, the possibility of resistance comes to the extent that reification
(“second nature”) is demonstrated not as eternal, or mythical, but as historical. Benjamin
must portray the century not as a regression to Bachofen’s “swamp world,” but as marred
by the specific myth of capitalism. It can be noted that this is the same criticism Adorno
leveled in response to Benjamin’s 1934 Kafka essay (Ch. 2), that Benjamin sacrificed the
dialectic between “myth” and “pre-history,” simply presenting Kafka’s world as
archetypal myth, not as historically emergent in modernity. For Adorno a broader
analysis of political economy must be undertaken so as to reveal the historical “origin” of
such conditions of domination: “The specific commodity character of the 19th century, in
other words the industrial production of commodities will have to be developed more
clearly and substantially.”
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Or rather, that Benjamin must understand reification in a

more Marxist sense, so as to avoid the lapse into myth. Adorno is also averse to
determinism he detects in Benjamin’s presentation, that in the expose, individuals are
presented as “arising” from the myths of the century. This leads Adorno to present to
Benjamin his own dialectical theory of consciousness, following the “primacy of the
146

Ibid. 113. Adorno is asserting that Benjamin cannot simply present the two in repose, but must describe
the specific interaction between the two. He cannot simple “comment,” but must “criticize” the relation
between the two.
147
Ibid. 103. Adorno goes on to criticize Benjamin’s assertions regarding the myth of the “new,” for
Adorno the new has become old through the perpetual repetition of the commodity form, hence Adorno is
decoding the myth in a historical economic sense, that is in relation to the specifics of modern capitalism.
Benjamin on the other hand does not date such myths so specifically.
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object,” (Ch. 1) the individual must be thought not as wholly determined by ideology,
rather as participating in myth through the reification of thinking. The objective elements
in individual thinking (or in a work) must be “read” so as to reveal the historical traces
inherent in subjectivity. Hence Adorno will object to Benjamin’s association of figures
with historical events (in the titles); they cannot be thought as wholly determined so as to
hold out a possibility of resistance. However, this chiasmus relates to the broader
disagreement relating to resistance and myth, along with their competing notions of the
dialectical image.
Adorno endorses the dialectical image in this 1935 exchange, though he attempts
to articulate it in a more Marxist direction, over and against what he felt to be Benjamin’s
surrealist articulation; though this encounter is haunted by Adorno’s ambiguity towards
surrealism more generally. Referring to his earlier conception of the “historical image”
(Ch. 1), Adorno articulates such images as: “objective constellations in which society
148

finds itself represented.”

That such constellations must be defined in a robust and

materialist sense—that they must be objective—differentiating them from the “mere
chance” of subjective associations. Adorno is not de-facto opposed to imagistic surrealist
associations, though seeks the point(s) of convergence in which such individual
associations articulate elements of broader social significance: when surrealist
manifestations hit at the manifestations of the universal in the particular.
Adorno’s 1956 “Looking Back at Surrealism” discusses surrealism in light of the
horrors of the Second World War, while shedding light on many of the imperatives he
lays with respect to Benjamin. For Adorno, surrealism does not succeed if it merely
demonstrates the world as “uncanny,” presenting everyday objects as “father-figures,”
but only if it awakens subjectivity to reification and allows one to think through
meaningful avenues of resistance. As he writes, “The dialectical images of surrealism are
images of a dialectical of subjective freedom in a situation of objective un-freedom.”
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Ibid. 110.
Adorno, “Looking Back on Surrealism,” Notes to Literature, 88. For more on Adorno’s ambiguous
relationship with surrealism, see the newly published The Challenge of Surrealism: The Correspondence of
Theodor W. Adorno and Elizabeth Link (2015), which deals with discussions Adorno had with his student,
Lenk, during the 1967-68 student protests regarding the capacities of surrealism and resistance. In many
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Such individual juxtapositions must recognize the social aspect of such “associations,” if
they do so they cite not a subjective encounter, but a universal “commodity fetish,” thus
awakening “subjects” to the “objective,” reified elements in individual thought. Such
images hit at the capacity of the subject still to act in the reified world: “dialectical
images are constellations between alienated things and injected meanings, resting on a
150

moment of indifference between death and meaning”

As allegories, they demonstrate

that the subject remains “non-identical” with respect to the social totality. That despite
the total reification, fragments of resistance occur which can at once shock individuals
into class realizations, and further, that the dream of a rational (enlightenment)
articulation of such structures still exists. There are moments in Adorno’s writings on the
work of art in which such images seem to be the only hope left for the work of art in the
Modern era. In Aesthetic Theory he upholds the “firework” as a flash that the world could
be otherwise: “They [fireworks] appear empirically, yet are liberated from the burden of
the empirical, which is the obligation of duration” they are a sign from heaven yet
artificial, an ominous warning, as script that flashes up, vanishes, and indeed cannot be
read for its meaning.” (AS, 81).
Benjamin responds warmly to Adorno’s considerations stating the validity of his
objections, while praising Adorno’s continual presence as a friend and intellectual
interlocutor: “…there have been times when you have known how to extend such faith to
151

me and my work.”

Benjamin specifically concedes that a more complex engagement

with Marxism is necessary in his work, and one can see this in his persistent engagement
with historical materialism in the coming years; though he does not become “orthodox”
in any sense, he understands that he must justify his approach with respect to Marxism
(as it has been argued in this chapter). With respect to the dialectical image, Benjamin’s
response is more complex, he points to the validity and insightful character of Adorno’s

ways this can be read as a continuation of Adorno’s dialogue with Benjamin regarding the dialectical
image; a conversation which is never definitively resolved.
150
Ibid. 115.
151
Ibid. 103.
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conception of the image as an “objective constellation”, yet also rejects Adorno’s charge
of his conflation of the dialectical image with the dream of the commodity form:
The dialectical image does not simply copy the dream—I never intended to
suggest that. But it certainly does seem to me that the former contains
within itself the exemplary instances, the irruptions of waking
consciousness, and that indeed it is precisely from such places that the
figure of the dialectical image first composes itself like that of a star
composed of many glittering points. Here too, therefore, a bow needs to be
stretched, and a dialectic forged: that between the image and the act of
152
‘waking.’”
Benjamin grants that the dialectical image must contain “objective” elements, yet also
that the mythical energies of the commodity first uncovered by surrealism can be used in
an “awakening” from reification. As the development of his work will show, Benjamin
does not so much abandon surrealism under the weight of Adorno’s materialism objects,
but recognizes that the such a conception must be articulated more robustly, a “drawing
of the bow” between un-conscious energies, and conscious conceptions of critique. As
Benjamin’s later writings on the work of art will demonstrate, it is perhaps possible to
harness these energies in the services of “communism,” as opposed to the archetypal
rituals of the commodity form, which result in the fascisms of the 20th century.
In the previous chapter, Benjamin’s reading of Kafka was shown to contain
within it substantial Brechtian elements which allowed many of Benjamin’s theological
notions to be transformed into political affirmation. By 1936, Benjamin had pushed such
Brechtian energies further, with his “The Work of Art in the Age of its Mechanical
Reproducibility,”
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he attempted to harness the forces of technology (reproducibility)

against the cultic rituals of fascism. Though such a confrontation took place on the level
of aesthetics, Benjamin would read changes artistic production as “ciphers” to broader
underlying political currents. The 19th century’s move towards l’art pour l’art culminated
in the rituals of fascism (“the aestheticization of politics”), while the destruction of aura
152

Ibid. 119. As he writes earlier (to Gretel Adorno), praising Adorno’s conception of the dialectical image:
“Firstly, just how important Wissengrund’s description of the dialectical image in terms of a constellation
seems to me to be, but secondly, how indispensable certain elements I pointed out in this constellation
appear to be: namely the dream figures” (ibid. 119).
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Specifically, the 2nd edition of the essay which contained much more Brechtian language before he was
forced to revise it into the 3rd edition that was published by the Institute.
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through reproduction providing the potential for the formation of new forms of
collectivity, via the collective experience of works of art (“the politicization of art.”).
Hence Benjamin will advocate for the potential of new mediums, specifically film, as
allowing art to have a new collective resonance. These reflections historicized present
political imperatives by locating their “origin” in the 19th century, while also
demonstrated the “post-history” of the century as resonating throughout the 20th century.
That the true implications of the 19th century’s pathologies could not be gripped until the
20th century: “…then this fate therefore has something to tell us because it is contained in
154

the ticking of a clockwork whose knell has first pierced our ears.”

For Buck-Morss,

this essay is emblematic of Benjamin’s “constellation”: that “truth was [relative] to the
155

historical present;”

that the past must be thought in such a way to “awaken” the

present moment to its historical “origin,” whilst also demonstrating the “legibility” of the
past in relation to later historical developments.
Adorno’s reaction testifies to the radicalism of many of Benjamin’s assertions,
especially in relation to his prior thought which did not advocate such a full-scale
evacuation of aura or tradition. In fact, the Institute held off publishing the 2nd edition of
the essay due to what they termed to be the fascist elements of its assertions regarding the
evacuation of culture. For Adorno, such assertions “…underestimate the technical
character of art”
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; as hasty and generalized (Brechtian) assertions they underestimate

the complexity (“non-identity”) inherent in every work, that certain forms of art are not
de facto emancipatory or oppressive, and Benjamin cannot make such sweeping
judgments of the “autonomous” work of art. As Adorno writes, “However it seems to me
that the autonomous work of Art does not itself belong to the dimension of myth…but is
inherently dialectical, that is, compounded within itself the magical element with the sign

Benjamin, Briefe 2: 690. “These reflections anchor the history of art in the 19th century in an
understanding of art as it is experience by the present” (Benjamin to Scholem, 1936). Both cited in Wolin,
An Aesthetic of Redemption, 186.
155
Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, 150.
156
Specifically, Benjamin does not differentiate within the genre of film (high or low), and simply asserts
all film to be in rapport with the masses. Adorno of course will be highly critical of film in his later
analyses of the “Culture Industry.”
154

146
157

of freedom.”

What Adorno advocates is “more dialectics:” that if Benjamin is going to

defend kitsch film as potentially containing political import, he must equally defend
autonomous art and traditional figures such as Kafka and Schoenberg, demonstrating the
dialectical capacity of works of art more generally. With such assertions, Adorno is in
fact criticizing Benjamin from the perspective of Benjamin’s own early work. Reminding
him that he too saw such a radical potential in tradition, and that he should avoid such
hasty proclamations such as advocating for the total destruction of aura. Latent in this is
Adorno’s persistent distain for Brecht, and he clearly felt the need to prevent Benjamin
from wholly evacuating his early model of criticism: “my own task is to hold your hand
158

steady until the Brechtian sun has finally sunk beneath the exotic waters.”

In

somewhat of a response to this essay Adorno will write “On the Fetish Character of
Music and the Regression of Listening” (1936), which takes aim at Benjamin’s central
thesis regarding the political potential of an aesthetics of reproduction. Specifically, in the
domain of music, reproduction (or recorded music), had lead to “regression” of listening
and a passivity in the audience, negating the critical potential Adorno thought music to
hold. In fact, Benjamin’s 1936 essay became somewhat of a straw man for the
articulation of many of Adorno’s own views of art in Aesthetic Theory (1970), where he
will defend the “autonomy” of Art, as it most valuable social function:
[Art] becomes social by its opposition to society, and it occupies this
position only as autonomous art. By crystalizing in itself as something
unique to itself, rather than complying with existing social norms and
qualifying as ‘socially useful,’ it criticizes society as merely existing.
(AS, 355)
Adorno’s view actually has much in common with Benjamin’s reading of Baudelaire in
the 19th century. Baudelaire is not read in an explicitly political, or avant-garde sense,
rather as a cipher to the social conditions of the century. Further, his 1937 essay on
Edward Fuchs moves away from such explicitly Brechtian political proclamations,
proposing instead a “materialist” version of many of his early categories of criticism.
Though it has become fashionable to present Benjamin’s 1936 “Work of Art” essay as his
definitive statement on aesthetics, this is not the case when placed in repose with his
157
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ABC, 128.
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other late works. Adorno rightly points this out as a somewhat Brechtian anomaly, and
one can speculate that Benjamin took such claims seriously in the development of his
later readings of aesthetics, specifically his 1938-39 essays on Baudelaire.
***
Returning to the 1938-39 dispute, Benjamin’s response to Adorno (9.12.1938), defends
the dialectical image (“philological attitude”) as it was presented earlier, while
emphasizing that his essay should be seen as “prefatory” to the “social resolution” which
will come in the final chapter of the work. He grants that Adorno’s objections have merit,
159

but that the theoretical resolution Adorno calls for cannot occur within the essay,

as

such explicit interpretation would negate the critical power inherent in the presentation
(Darstellung) of images. Many have speculated as to what this “social resolution” would
160

entail. Wolin, and Agamben

most notably, argue that the Baudelaire essay is the

prefatory analysis, or the “material content” (“commentary”), that would later be read (or
“critiqued”) to reveal the “truth content” of the 19th century. Indeed, there is basis for
such an interpretation, both in the essay, and in Benjamin’s response to Adorno, where he
writes: “To use the language of my work on the Elective Affinities, it demands the
exposure of that material-content in which the truth-content can be historically
161

deciphered.”

However, such interpretations fail to account for the complexities of Benjamin’s
dialectical image (the “philological attitude”), alongside his decision to submit the essay
for publication as an autonomous essay. That the essay has such an autonomous status
cannot be denied from the preceding exegesis, it contains all the major elements of
159

As Benjamin writes: “But I am afraid that an outright correction in the spirit indicated above would be
extremely problematic. The lack of theoretical transparency to which you rightly allude is by no means a
necessary consequence of the fact the philological procedure I have adopted in this section. I am more
inclined to see it as a consequence of the fact that this philological procedure has not been specified as
such. This apparent deficiency may be traced in part to the rather bold attempt to write the second half of
the book before the first” (ABC, 294).
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Wolin asserts that such a “materialist philology” “…redeems facts in accordance with social
emancipation,” asserting the image to have a Brechtian, or “esoteric” resolution. Aesthetic of Redemption,
203. While Agamben reads this resolution “theologically” from the perspective of Benjamin’s early
thinking on Language, see “The Prince and the Frog.”
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Ibid 292. And further: “Only when the poem has come into its own in this way can the work be
touched, or even shaken, by the act of interpretation” (ibid. 292).
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Benjamin’s late historical methodology. The majority of criticism with respect to this
essay, do not treat it substantially, latently ceding that Adorno’s criticisms where correct,
and focusing more on the “2nd version” “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” (1939). Michael
Jennings is one of the few to valiantly defend this essay in its autonomy, stating it to be
the performative enactment of Benjamin’s theory of dialectical images.
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This entails

viewing the thesis of the essay not so much as a work on Baudelaire, but as a treatise on
the practice of history more generally: on the creation of constellations and dialectical
images. Speaking to this point Benjamin responds to Adorno, stating that he had unintentionally grasped the truth of the dialectical image:
When you speak of a “wide eyed presentation of mere facts you are
characterizing the proper philological attitude [or dialectical image]. This
attitude was required not merely for the results it brings, but had to be
solidly embedded in the construction for its own sake as well. It is true that
the indifference between magic and positivism, as you so aptly put it, should
be liquidated. In other words, the philological interpretation of the author
should be preserved and overcome in the Hegelian manner by the dialectical
materialist. Philology consists in an examination of the texts which proceeds
by details and thus magically fixates the reader on it…You write in your
Kierkegaard study that “astonishment” reveals “the profoundest insight into
the relationship between dialectics, myth and image.”…I propose an
amendment to it (as I am also intending to do with the related definition of
the dialectical image on a latter occasion). I think one should say that
astonishment is an outstanding object of such an insight. The appearance of
closed facticity which attaches to philological investigation and places the
investigator under its spell, dissolves precisely to the degree in which the
object is constructed from a historical perspective. The base lines of this
construction converge in our historical experience. In this way it constructs
itself as a Monad. And in the monad everything that formerly lay mythically
163
petrified within the given text comes alive.
Benjamin asserts that in the practice of constructing dialectical images (constellations)—
in citing the past as monad—one overcomes the distinction between “commentary” and
“criticism” in the constructive ability of language. In the proper presentation of the past,
“astonishment” is evoked, but not in a specifically Brechtian (political) sense, rather as a
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See Jennings, Dialectical Images, 33-34.
ABC, 292. As Arendt writes in relation to this: “When Adorno criticized Benjamin’s ‘wide eyed
presentation of actualities’ …, he hit the nail right on its head; this is precisely what Benjamin was
doing and wanted to do” (Illuminations, 11).
163

149

mode by which the text comes alive; that is, reveals itself as continually citable in
constellation with the present moment. The dialectical image must be constructed in a
sense that revels the past as constructible, as emblematic of the ability to write and cite
history from the present moment.

164

Here Benjamin justifies his own immanent

perspective as a critic: his task is to present the “material” on its own terms, not to bring
about a dramatic deus ex machina of a Marxist “social resolution.” In reading Benjamin’s
essay on Baudelaire, one should not focus on what such a “social resolution” would
entail— if it would be Brechtian, or Adornian, or surrealist—rather the focus should be
thrust upon the dialectical image as a method of construction, of a radically new model
for writing history. What is fundamental is not speculation as to what the Baudelaire
book, or The Arcades, would look like in completed form, but the “–ability” to create
such constellations and correspondences, to conceive history (and thinkers as Benjamin
and Adorno) as constructible for our present moment. That they, and the Frankfurt
School more generally are re-writeable based on the manifold of affinities therein.
This letter is perhaps Benjamin’s most explicit statement on his late formulation
of the dialectical image (alongside Thesis XVII), though it further acknowledges the
development of the concept in “correspondence” with Adorno (by citing Adorno’s
Kierkegaard study), a quotation which also appeared in The Arcades [N2,7]. In effect he
is enacting the constellational method with respect to his correspondence with Adorno,
employing a quotation from 5 years earlier so as to demonstrate even past
correspondences as re-citable, and alive with respect to the present moment. As he
writes, “I will not deny that these may occasionally do some violence to my original
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interests,”

though it is such a “destructive character” that allows the past to be “re-

constellated.” It is perhaps as a performative example of the dynamic power of the
dialectical image that lead Benjamin to submit “The Paris of the Second Empire in
Baudelaire” to the Institute for publication, a treatise on the power of the constellational
form.
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As Terry Eagleton will put it, history is “re-constellated:” demonstrating the ability for it to be
constructed anew (Walter Benjamin or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism, 119).
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ABC, 291.
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The true tragedy of Benjamin’s late work is that many of his imperatives fell on
deaf ears, or were realized too late. As he wrote to Adorno: “there was more at stake than
solidarity with the Institute, or simple fidelity to historical materialism, namely, a
solidarity with the experiences which we have all shared over the last fifteen years.”
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Benjamin had attempted to describe something of this experience (of the crises of the
1930s), through an interrogation of its “pre-history” in the 19th century, describing the
dangers and utopias of the project of modernity. It was such ambiguity and tragedy that
remained with Benjamin until his death in 1940.The Institute did not publish the 1st
Baudelaire essay, though Adorno encouraged him to re-write it into “On Some Motifs in
Baudelaire” (1939), an essay which has received much more scholarly attention likely
due Adorno’s selection of it for Illuminations (1955). The essay itself is uncharacteristic
of Benjamin’s late style, utilizing straightforward argumentation, and failing to include
the central motifs of the Passagen-Werk, or his late historiographical imperatives.
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Benjamin closes the essay with the motif of Baudelaire (the poet) losing his halo as he is
jostled backward in the crowd—a motif emblematic of Klee’s backwards facing angel—
the poet is helplessly immersed, un-able to find a rapport with his readers, or give
representation [Darstellung] to modernity. A figure reminiscent of Benjamin himself,
who found affinity with Baudelaire one final time.
Baudelaire singled out being jostled by the crowd as the decisive unique
experience…having been betrayed by these last allies of his, Baudelaire
battled the crowd—with the impotent rage of someone fighting the rain
or the wing. This is the nature of something lived through (Erlebnis) to
which Baudelaire has given the weight of an experience (Erfahrung).
He indicated the price for which the sensation of the modern age may
168
be had: the disintegration of the aura in the experience of shock.
V. Post-History: Negative Dialectics
“Is there—and this is the same thing, differently worded—a dialectics without a system? Benjamin’s thesis
and task.” -Adorno, Lectures on Negative Dialectics, 23
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Ibid. 291.
As Jennings writes, describing the dissonance of the work with Benjamin’s oeuvre: “[the essay] makes
use of a lucid and continuous argument, a discursive form Benjamin otherwise avoids; it uses
oversimplified elements of Freudian theory as its theoretical armature; and it consciously avoids the more
explosive aspects of the theory behind Das Passagen-Werk” (Dialectical Images, 20).
168
Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” Illuminations, 194.
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In conclusion, the “post-history” of Benjamin’s dialectical images (constellations) will be
stated by way of Adorno’s own negative dialectic. Though appearing by name in 1960s
(Lectures on Negative Dialectics 1965/55; Negative Dialectics 1966) Adorno asserts
these texts to be “…a methodological account of what I do in general.” An articulation of
the “non-systematic system” employed throughout his life, beginning with his
employment of Benjamin in 1931: “I want to try to put my cards on the table—in so far
as I know what my own cards are, and in so far as any thinker knows what cards he
169

holds.”

As has been argued throughout, Adorno is one who employs Benjamin in a

“systematic” direction, translating his thinking to spheres not originally intended, yet in
so doing revealing new “-abilities” within the original. Perhaps most prominently Adorno
sought to employ Benjamin’s model to the history of metaphysics, utilizing his
constellational form as mode of thinking through philosophy after its objective
dissolution: his own negative dialectic.
As he states in his lectures, “negative dialectics” attempt to demonstrate “…the
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possibility of philosophy in an authoritative sense without either system or ontology.”

In the same lecture (16.11.1965), he relates his own project to that of Benjamin’s 1918
“Program for a Coming Philosophy” (see Ch. 1), with its attempt to articulate a broader
notion of experience without reducing it in a conceptual framework. By 1965, Adorno
felt that his early assertions regarding the objective dissolution of philosophy to have
been empirically verified by the horrors of the 20th Century. Despite this, he still inquired
into the possibilities afforded by philosophy, though in a decidedly different sense that
Heidegger’s late turn to “thinking.” Adorno’s later works should be seen as attempts to
reconcile the possibility of philosophy with the horrors of the century, and in doing so he
metamorphosed something of Benjamin’s immense melancholy into the dissonance
(negativity) of his philosophical method. Philosophy must be turned towards “nonidentity,” attempting to articulate the concrete particulars left out of philosophical
systems, and in so doing, exposing such systems as devices of domination.
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170

Adorno, Lectures on Negative Dialectics, 5.
Ibid. 31.
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To do this, Adorno breaks philosophical concepts out of their systematic
structures (which he asserts are devices of “domination”
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), giving them an axial turn

towards “non-identity,” that is particular objects left out of the idealist architectonic. In so
doing, Adorno utilizes such philosophical concepts to create “constellations”: immanent
assemblages of systematic concepts refashioned for “critical” purposes. Adorno resists
phenomenology, or any return to “givenness,” instead insisting on a constant dissonance
(“non-identity”) between thinking and being. Neither should Adorno be considered
wholly as a materialist: he continued to reflect upon the Kantian question of the condition
of possibility for individual experience, which for him contains substantial social and
ideological elements (“the primacy of the object”). Fundamentally, Adorno utilizes
Benjamin constellations as a mode of reading Hegel, reconciling his model of immanence
within the Hegelian schema. That is, Adorno read Benjamin’s dialectical image (or
dialectic at standstill), as a mode by which to subsist on the level of the “negative” (antithesis), resisting what he felt to be Hegel’s tendency towards positive reconciliation
(synthesis), and to continue the self-movement of the notion without reconciliation. This
allowed Adorno to develop a wholly negative model of philosophy, one founded on
critique, that could attempt to make thought “actual” again.
A study of greater breadth would continue into the many valences of Adorno’s
method, specifically his “correspondence” with Benjamin in his reading of Hegel. Much
of Negative Dialectics can be read as an attempt to come to terms both with Benjamin’s
dialectical method, alongside his own responses in correspondence—a conversation that
Adorno never seem to reconcile, or conclude. In his final methodological treatise, Adorno
demonstrates the possibility of placing many aspects of Benjamin’s thought in dialogue
with the broader history of philosophy and metaphysics; a possibility often foreclosed by
disciplinary boundaries. One can imagine considering readings of Benjamin in
correspondence with Hegel, Schelling, or even Deleuze. Likewise, throughout Aesthetic
Theory (1970), Adorno continues many of his correspondences with Benjamin regarding
the work of art, holding to his heroic defense of the possibilities of autonomous art. One
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That is Idealist categories are based on the repression of nature and myth in favor of the “progress” of
history. This is specifically argued in Dialectic of Enlightenment, and Negative Dialectics “The
Antinomical Character of Systems.” For more on Adorno’s analysis of the oppressive character of systems
with respect to nature see: Deborah Cook, Adorno on Nature.
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could conceive of a study examining the specifics of their correspondence on questions
relating to aesthetics, and the possibilities therein. In awakening new “-abilities” in
Benjamin, Adorno demonstrates that his method could be moved further, and in a
multiplicity of directions.
To say that Adorno was influenced by Benjamin, is of course an understatement.
Not only did he employ aspects of Benjamin’s method, but he sought to extend it further,
translating it from the perspective of his own present; and such extensions are seen
throughout Adorno’s major texts of the century. Likewise, Adorno should be seen as an
important interlocutor for Benjamin, one who presented him with imperatives, and
applications of his methodology. Following Benjamin’s death in 1940, the onset of the
war took a personal turn for Adorno: his eulogy, “A Portrait of Walter Benjamin,”
provides a moving (though somewhat reified) image of Benjamin as a one who attempted
to reconcile hope and hopelessness, searching for the utopia in dissolution. A grand
revolutionary overcoming was never demanded, only the modest task of preservation: of
collecting, and thinking the past as citable.
Adorno and Benjamin engaged in a profound philosophical conversation, the likes
of which has not been seen since, and perhaps the full valences of it have not yet been
understood. In his final (dictated) letter, Benjamin wished for such a conversation to
continue:
I would ask you to pass on my thoughts to my friend Adorno and to explain
to him the situation in which I have now found myself. I no longer have
enough time to write all those letters I would have written.
-Walter Benjamin, 25.9.1940
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Conclusion
“The work is the death mask of its conception” –Benjamin, One-Way Street, SW 1: 459.

This project began as an attempt to integrate the “correspondence(s)” of Benjamin and
Adorno, examining both their explicit letters, and the implicit constellations underpinning
their thought. The first chapter began by developing Benjamin’s immanent method of
criticism, alongside Adorno’s re-direction of it towards his own critical theory. In this
sense, the opening encounter can be seen as “originary” behind what is today considered
the Frankfurt School. The second chapter interrogated their respective readings of Kafka,
noting their divergent conceptions of Messianism, and imperatives for political criticism.
The final chapter examined Benjamin’s dialectical image as it is presented in his later
work, specifically his “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire” (1938), along with
Adorno’s objections and responses to such a method. Latent in this project where several
points regarding the development of Benjamin as a thinker which can be recapitulated
here:
1) Benjamin’s thinking is marked by a consistent imperative of immanence, by
which a work or epoch must be elucidated in the “light it provides for itself.” As
the “constellation” arose out of the baroque, so too did the “dialectical image”
arise out of the experience of modernity, and the 19th century. Though he did
modify his early distinctions (“commentary” and “criticism”), his commitment to
immanence remained throughout his work.
2) Related to this, Benjamin’s did not decidedly “break” with his early model of
criticism (in 1934), in favor of a Marxist model of critique, rather sought to apply
it on a larger historical scope. This entailed immanently working through the
reception of the 19th century, which necessitated a substantial engagement with
Marxist historiography, and a redirection of its insights to Benjamin’s own critical
purposes.
3) Finally, Adorno was of influence to Benjamin’s development as a thinker. He
issued meaningful, and consistent imperatives to Benjamin throughout his life,
allowing for Benjamin to formulate his thought in new and experimental
directions. Though a determinate relationship cannot be drawn, Adorno should be
considered an essential correspondent in the development of Benjamin’s thinking.
Likewise, Benjamin’s model of criticism should be seen as essential in the development
of Adorno’s own model of criticism (the negative dialectic), and hence can be thought of
as “originary” with respect to many categories associated with critical theory.
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Of the “correspondences” that have been examined between the two, there are
perhaps many more which have not been taken up—both with respect to the two, and the
Frankfurt School more generally. One could image similar projects on Benjamin and
Brecht/Scholem; Adorno and Kracauer; Pollock and Horkheimer, possible
correspondents abound if one decides to approach such figures immanently. One could
also imagine the extension of Adorno and Benjamin’s correspondence further, and
perhaps this study will serve as a provisional commentary for further criticism. If this
study has presented anything it is perhaps this possibility: of embracing the manifold of
constellations in every intellectual position, of thinking figures in correspondence.
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